Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXII, Iran

244. Memorandum From the Chief of the Near East and South Asia Division of the Plans Directorate, Central Intelligence Agency (Critchfield) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms¹

Washington, November 16, 1967.

SUBJECT

• Conversation with the Shah on 16 November 1967

1. This memorandum is for your information.

2. A fortnight after his coronation, the Shah was in a relaxed but sober mood reflecting confidence in his domestic program, his role as a leader in the Middle East and his relations with the Great Powers—a confidence mixed with concern and some anxiety about obvious elements in the Middle East situation which continue to threaten his own ambitions for the area.

3. Although priorities in Iranian foreign policy now rest on his decision to develop regional strengths that will give the Middle East nations a common capability to contain and live with the threat of Soviet pressures, his policy rests on the premise that his special and primary relationship with the United States can be preserved a few years more. Strengthened relations with Pakistan and Turkey remain the basis of his regional policy; as CENTO fades, other military and economic arrangements in which the US and the UK play no direct role are expanding. He has found it necessary to give Ayub “virtually an ultimatum” to get his foreign affairs in order; he sees Pakistan gradually turning more to the West, placing more confidence on regional security arrangements, being less dependent on the Great Powers and emphasizing Islamic rather than radical Afro-Asian associations.

4. The Shah’s relations with the Arab-Israel world remain complicated. In the Cold War context his sympathies lie entirely with Israel; the defeat of the radical Arabs in June dramatically served Iran’s interest. [4–1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Denial of the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Peninsula and the lower end of the Red Sea Basin to the Soviet Union and the radical Arabs is the strategic goal that constitutes the basis for this relationship. Arms captured by the Israelis in June are now finding their way via Iran into friendly Arab hands in the Yemen. The expansion of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean, the appearance of “Red Beret Russian Marines” and the military implications of the Elath sinking were all on the [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified] agenda.

5. Overtly, the Shah continues to associate Iran with the Arab, but more particularly the Islamic, cause in the context of the Arab-Israel conflict. He told me that during April 1967 he had advised Hussein to give vigorous armed response to any repetition by Israel of the 13 November 1966 raid on Samu in Jordan’s West Bank; this action was essential, in the Shah’s view, to Hussein’s survival. Since the war, the Israelis have approached the Shah seeking his assistance in mediation efforts with Jordan; the Shah declined because he did not feel that Hussein and moderate forces in Jordan could survive reaction in the Arab world to a unilateral Jordan role. While the Shah has reservations about Hussein’s judgement, he argues that Hussein’s survival is vital to Iranian and American interests.

6. The Shah is relaxed about the expansion of French influence in Middle East oil and arms. The Shah takes a positive view of the prospect of some standardization of aircraft—Mirage in the short run—in Pakistan, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and possibly other Arab countries. However, he is emphatic in his view that the Turkish and Iranian Air Forces must be based on US equipment and doctrine. This was one of two points raised by the Shah in comparatively strong language. The other dealt with the attacks on the President concerning his Vietnam policy.

7. We had examined the likelihood that Moscow, sooner or later, would have to take a hard look at Khrushchev’s policy of providing armed support for “just wars of national liberation”. In four areas of the world—Southeast Asia, the Arab Near East, Africa and the Western Hemisphere, the Soviets had gained no favorable decision, had suffered several disasters and had seen the price of the game rising steadily. I had said that I thought the time for a Soviet reappraisal of Khrushchev’s policy might come after President Johnson was re-elected. A decision by the Soviets to write off the Vietnam War—following the disaster which struck them in the Middle East in June 1967—could, I said, mark the turning point in Soviet policy. In this case, President Johnson would emerge in history as “one of our greatest Presidents”. With some vigor the Shah interrupted and corrected my statement—“he will emerge as the greatest President of the United States; the toughness and courage demonstrated by him in sticking to his position when under attack from all those in the US and abroad who oppose his Vietnam policy is inspiring to all of us who know that he is right”.

8. The Shah feels that trade with and aid from the Soviet Union is entirely compatible with his basic policy of seeking to build a strong Middle East bloc of nations which will have normal relations with the industrially developed powers, including Russia and all of Europe. He seems confident that a combination of economic and social progress in Iran and an effective and sharply oriented intelligence and security effort keeping track of the Soviets in Iran will limit the dangers of expanding trade and relations with the Soviets to a tolerable level. In this task, he desires to retain his special relationship with the United States. I assured him that in intelligence matters, the United States benefits as much as if not more than Iran in this close cooperation.

9. I saw the Shah alone; the foregoing represents only the highlights of a lengthy conversation.

James H. Critchfield ²

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 80–R 01580R, DCI Files, 10/209—Middle East Crisis. Secret. Sent via the Deputy Director for Plans. Attached to a December 5 note from Helms to the President that reads: “I thought you would be interested to read the highlights of a conversation which one of our senior officers recently had with the Shah of Iran. This officer deals with the Shah in the context of our intelligence assets located in Iran.”
2. Signed and initialed for Critchfield in an unidentified hand.