Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXII, Iran

223. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to President Johnson¹

Washington, August 17, 1967.

1. [5 lines of source text not declassified] We thought the Shah’s mood as reflected in the most recent conversation would be of interest to you in light of his visit with you here next week.

2. I have not sent copies of this cable to anyone other than you [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified].

Richard Helms ²

Attachment

[August 15, 1967]

There follows the text of a cable [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] covering [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] meeting with the Shah of Iran on 15 August 1967:

1. Aside from the perennial subject of demonstrations by Iranian students in U.S., etc., the 15 August meeting with the Shah was standard friendly affair and something of a rehearsal for upcoming visit to the United States. He obviously looking forward to meeting with the President for whom he expressed sympathy and understanding re heavy burden he carries as U.S. top government executive. This after stating he fully understood legislative opportunism and possible irresponsible public performance. Noted however that Export/Import Bank action turned out favorably. In regard to arms he claims to be relaxed, stating he will make his case and if U.S. Government is interested, as they should be, so much the better; if not, he will make other arrangements. No hard feelings—recriminations, etc. He hopeful that at least Air Force support will be forthcoming and that sufficient Air advisors will be available, preferably out of uniform.

2. The Shah was very much concerned over President Ayub’s position and Chinese Communist infiltration of Pak forces. States Ayub is old friend but [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] unfortunately has allowed himself to become isolated from realities. He was pleased to note however that Ayub was most responsive to reasoning set forth last regional cooperation for development meeting at Ramsar (resort on Caspian Sea) and in fact indicated appreciation for guidance and “leadership” offered him.

3. King Hussein due Tehran 16 August and the Shah anxious to see him. “A nice chap in an unfortunate position somewhat due to his impetuous nature.” The Shah is hopeful he can help King Hussein vis-a-vis the Israelis but essentially finds latter characteristically arrogant, an attitude he feels will be harmful to them in the long run.

4. Aref and Iraq the Shah described as unpredictable and unfortunately not even clever. He had hoped they would see the advantage of cooperation with Iran but this seems beyond their imagination or intelligence.

5. Subject of covert support to Yemen [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] touched on lightly. Message being if you fellows want to be in on the act out here get with it, if not, just say so.

6. In summary, we found the Shah relaxed, confident, pleased with his economic successes at home (which he should be) and looking forward to his visit. His story will be that he is offering the cooperation of the only responsible modern progressive country in the area. While he not working against CENTO, which he views as ineffective, but not bad, the regional cooperation for development is more the answer to regional requirements. While most friendly and bland about all of this, we nevertheless estimate that if visit with the President not productive, he will undoubtedly come away with a less friendly attitude than he now professes. What the Shah really wants from the United States Government is recognition as a responsible area leader and, of course, that undefined material something that goes with this recognition.

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files: Job 80–B01285A, Chrons, Aug.–Dec. 1967. Secret.
2. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.