Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXII, Iran

214. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, June 30, 1967, 1330Z.

5266. NATUS for Battle. Ref: State 218169.² Subj: Amb Hare’s Meeting with Shah: Arab-Israeli Situation. Following discussion of Glassboro Summit, Amb Hare provided Shah detailed presentation Dept’s views contained reftel. Shah from time to time interjected comments which led to further mutual elucidation of respective viewpoints, as noted below:

1. Nasser’s Threat.

Shah acknowledged substantial benefits gained by Nasser’s other neighbors such as Iran or even Turkey, from Israeli victory. On his recent visit to Ankara he found full awareness that aggressive UAR threat might have been directed against others if not so effectively blunted by Israelis. Nasser remains an evil force and must someday be destroyed. Yet he had been allowed go on too long unchallenged, throwing gas bombs in Yemen and carrying out other nefarious doings. Arab arrogance and aggressiveness repugnant to Iran. Arabs made much of their long subjection to foreign rule, excuse they constantly draw on to explain their own lack of accomplishments in health, education, etc., whereas real responsibility for lack of progress lay with area countries themselves. If they had actually wanted education, they could have had it, and likewise in other fields about which they now complain. In this atmosphere Communists have been provided with fertile ground for stimulating anti-West reaction on every aspect of Arab sensitivities. Shah concluded Russians now “have” Syria, Algeria, Yemen and UAR.

2. Israel.

Shah more vehement if anything in his criticisms of Israelis. Iran’s ties with Israel are close but Shah deeply disturbed by their “arrogant” attitudes: “Mouth of General Dayan should be closed.” Israelis should be taking line that they merely trying to defend their security and rights. They should be emphasizing simple desire live in peace enjoying security. Instead Israeli spokesmen taking strong positions all over place, annexing Jerusalem, affirming their desires for this and that, proposals obviously aimed using their recent territorial acquisitions as levers remake their surroundings on lines of ambitions they have long harbored. Concept of demilitarized areas, strengthening of frontiers etc. were ideas which might be put forward by Danes or other Israeli friends but should not be propounded by Israelis themselves.

3. Hare replied that we did not, of course, condone Israeli position on Jerusalem as recent Presidential statement³ had made clear. Fact was hard-liners now getting most publicity. Shah agreed there two schools of thought in Israel but moderates seem unable attract public attention.

4. Ambassador said examination of problem indicated Israelis perhaps not as hard line as they might seem. Thus fundamental Israeli need is security (requirement which Shah readily acknowledged). Hare said to begin with Israelis obviously don’t want Sinai and would probably settle for demilitarization. If belligerency problem could be done away with, beginning with UN vote, this would then take care of Straits of Tiran and Suez problem. As to Gaza, this never historically part of Egypt, but not clear what Israelis want or don’t want there beyond security. With regard exodus of refugees from West Bank, U.S. has been striving hard persuade Israel adopt enlightened policy permit West Bankers remain and allow return those who have already fled. Hare urged Shah take similar vigorous line with Israelis. Shah said he had already instructed FonMin in New York urge such policy on Eban. Iran would say something further this topic but he wondered whether Israelis prepared to listen. Shah said US must assume principal role for damping down Israeli exuberance. Time will come when U.S. must say flatly, “Stop the nonsense.” (Shah’s views on UNGA strategic situation reported Tehran 5261.)⁴

5. Other Factors.

Hare mentioned reactions he had encountered in New Delhi talks and myopic Indian tendency view Arab/Israeli question solely in terms India’s problems with Pakistan. Talk turned to Tito’s role with Hare noting press reports of opposition within Yugoslavia to Tito’s strident support of Nasser. Hare said this explainable perhaps in terms evolving internal political patterns with growth “new” guard chafing at dominance of oldsters. Hare also suggested there perhaps some connection between Tito’s hard support for Nasser and recent events in Greece. Shah said he did not know the Greek Junta but felt they had done job which had to be accomplished; otherwise Papandreou like Mossedegh would have thrown country into chaos.

6. Middle East Arms Control.

When Hare touched on our interest terminating ME arms race, Shah asked pointedly how, in this context, US defined Middle East. Hare replied he not in position answer authoritively, but, speaking personally he had not understood we intended that restrictive plans should apply countries with whom we in treaty relationship.

7. Comment:

Foregoing paragraphs as well as extended discussion UNGA technical problem (Tehran 5261) revealed no major shifts Shah’s attitude. He is still committed to public posture generally sympathetic to Arabs but deeply anxious with regard possible resurgence Nasser’s power. Both he and Hoveyda would be delighted find way out of present stage of dilemma through vote for resolution strongly supporting withdrawal and also including paras for coming grips with Arab-Israeli fundamentals. Faced with grim facts rapid Soviet replenishment Arab arms, Shah non-plussed. So far he has reacted by making clear he intends prevent if he can any more overflights of Iran but apparently has refrained from any general remonstrances urging Soviets cease and desist from all arms deliveries to Arabs.

Shah interested, courteous, and thoughtful throughout 1–1/2 hour meeting and obviously very appreciative Amb Hare’s presentation US views. However, recent lengthy ceremonial visits abroad and hard perplexities of ME situation have left him somewhat weary and worried. He now definitely scheduled depart for Caspian July 1.

Thacher

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Iran. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Paris.
2. Telegram 218168 to Tehran, June 29, for Ambassador Hare stated that the principal purpose of his meeting with the Shah was to get his views on the Middle Eastern situation, particularly any ideas he might have for steps which would lead to a permanent, peaceful solution. Hare was also to congratulate the Shah for the constructive steps he had taken during the crisis, such as intervening with Feisal and Hussein not to break with the United States and urging restraint and moderation to the Israelis. (Department of State, Central Files, POL ARAB–ISR)
3. Reference is to the President’s address at the Department of State to the Foreign Policy Conference for Educators on June 19; for text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book I, pp. 630–635.
4. Dated June 29. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 ARAB–ISR/UN)