Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXII, Iran

195. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, May 12, 1967, 0700Z.

4488. Reference: Tehran 4486.² Shah and Fulbright.

1. Obviously eager to discuss his unhappiness over Fulbright hearings, Shah received me only four hours after request for audience. We had 2–1/2 hour session late Friday afternoon 12th. It was rough going.

2. Apparently what irked Shah most was injection into public media of unchallenged suggestion by Fulbright that Iran becoming ripe for revolution. Shah was appalled that chairman of such an influential body as US Senate Foreign Relations Committee could believe and make public as his own views those of an itinerant student who walked into his office. He had assumed Fulbright would be fully briefed by USG but if Chairman’s judgement to be gauged by this episode, “Heaven help the United States”.

3. Obviously deeply wounded because he considers himself in forefront of world’s progressive leaders and is profoundly proud of Iran’s successes under his leadership, Shah contrasted Iran’s progress and freedom with that of other Afro-Asian countries, particularly so-called “progressive” states which he presumed liberals like Fulbright favor. He said he ready make referendum in Iran tomorrow and all but smallest fraction (mostly few American or British trained maladjusted Iranians) would register enthusiastic approval of Iran’s reforms and economic and social development. It is absurd to think that Western-style democracy could be automatically transplanted to countries like Iran, he said, adding that nevertheless Iran is making progress in democratic procedures in accordance with its cultural traditions and state of its economic development.

4. We went round and round. I recalled Secretary Rusk during his visit here had told Shah there bound to be reaction on Capitol Hill to Iran’s closer relations with Soviets. I emphasized freedom to dissent in US and noted that present administration does not have much leverage on Senator Fulbright. Assured him, as Secretary Rusk’s message made clear, prevailing U.S. opinion, certainly that of USG, appreciates good work which being done in Iran. It would be shame, I said, if Iranian student who spoke to Senator Fulbright would be allowed to “defeat” Shah. Best counteracting course, obviously, I said, is for Iran’s story to be told more widely and there no better opportunity than Shah’s forthcoming Washington visit.

5. I pointed out Secretary’s reassuring message represented official USG view. Shah asked I convey his deep appreciation for Secretary’s timely and welcome words. He described both President Johnson and Secretary Rusk as great and good friends. Problem, he said, is that Secretary’s message is confidential. Meanwhile, Fulbright’s charges will pre-sumably get world-wide publicity. I told him I not aware that UPI story has gotten much play. Shah expressed hope some means could be found to counteract via public media implications Fulbright allegations. If these allegations get publicity here, he said, there would be no alternative but counter publicity.

6. After first-half our of slow going, I found best way to get Shah into normal frame of mind was to discuss other subjects, e.g., Viet Nam, Turk visit, Hussein’s visit, etc. Separate telegrams re these subjects will be sent tomorrow. But without fail Shah would return to bitter subject of Fulbright’s unwelcome remarks. I urged Sermon on Mount reaction or that of Lincoln that best way to destroy an enemy is to make him a friend. Shah recognized this as good philosophy but it clearly not an ingredient of Persian mentality.

7. While Shah never could get himself to give unqualified affirmative, I came away convinced that he will proceed with plans for Washington visit. Tactically, I felt it better to leave with relatively good feeling we had achieved at conclusion our long talk and leave negotiation of further details re Shah’s program for later discussion between Court Minister Alam and myself. I have strong doubts, however, that Shah will be willing to go through with planned tea with Fulbright.

Meyer

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 IRAN. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Passed to the White House and USIA.
2. In telegram 4486 from Tehran, May 12, Meyer expressed confidence that Rusk’s “wonderful message” in telegram 192135 to Tehran (Document 194) would “do the trick.” He noted that the message had arrived during their farewell dinner for Ambassador-designate Ansary, and that Prime Minister Hoveyda had rushed to phone the Shah. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 IRAN)