Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXII, Iran

180. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, November 2, 1966, 1150Z.

1964. Shah-Harriman Talk.

1. Noting he coming at behest of President Johnson, Ambassador Harriman in two hour session evening Nov. 1 outlined to Shah purport of Manila Conference. He stressed it was impressive demonstration of unity of purpose of seven countries with troops fighting in Vietnam to repel aggression. At same time conference concentrated on pacification program as well as determination for negotiated peaceful settlement. Harriman stressed we want South Vietnamese left free to make their own decisions and referred to six months withdrawal pledge. He noted that appeals for US to stop bombing come from same sources which prompted 37-day pause year ago with only result being increase of North Vietnamese infiltration and military build-up. He added US ready cease bombing if there any indication willingness on part of NVN achieve just settlement. Unfortunately, such indications lacking. Meanwhile, USG and its six fighting allies determined neither to escalate the conflict nor to shirk their responsibilities.

2. Shah said USG has no alternative but to continue what it is doing. He reviewed development his own position. In March 1965 during trip to South America he stressed there is clear case of aggression against South Vietnam and USG doing right thing in taking military action to repel it. In June 1965 during his visit to Moscow Shah stressed if Chinese not stopped by Americans in Vietnam all of Southeast Asia would be overrun and in any case Soviets contradict themselves by endorsing Nasser’s military actions in Yemen. This past summer in East Europe Shah had stressed that US doing job UN should be doing, that it is unfair and illogical to ask one party to withdraw unilaterally, and that attention should rather be focused on getting all parties to peace table. Shah cited improved situation in Indonesia as tremendous success and reason why solution in Vietnam could be negotiated settlement rather than military victory.

3. Harriman pointed out that there is no chance of Communists gaining victory and in fact their capability and morale being steadily reduced. Nevertheless Peking and Hanoi give no signs wanting peace, apparently delighted keep US bogged down and hoping one day Americans will become discouraged and pull out. Since there no chance of securing Peking’s support for peace, chief hope lies in getting Soviets to bring decisive influence to bear on Hanoi. This hope been slightly reinforced by attitude displayed by Gromyko during his recent Washington talks.

4. Shah said his trips convince him neither Russian nor East European countries want war. They all determined improve welfare their people because their people demanding it. Moreover, Soviets strongly oppose Chinese expansion. He had that day seen report that Hanoi is asking Soviets and East Europeans to provide “volunteers” as envisaged in communiqué after recent Moscow conference of Socialist countries. Shah convinced this Hanoi ploy is inspired by ChiComs to put Soviets on spot. He said President Ayub describes ChiComs as being motivated by intense nationalism.

5. Asked by Ambassador Harriman his impressions of attitudes of various East European countries, Shah said Romanians only ones close to Chinese but this is card Romanians playing in their game with Russians. Despite CPR-Romanian ties, Shah convinced Romanians can have no influence on ChiComs re Vietnam. Only hope is, as Ambassador Harriman had indicated, via Russian influence on Hanoi. Shah said he had seen another report to effect special Hungarian envoy is en route to Hanoi on peace mission. Shah believes Hungarians, Poles and Czechs so keenly interested in promoting Vietnam peace they might have salutary influence on Russians toward this end. Shah also had strong impression from his East European visits that Poles, and others fear Germans more than Russians and this factor deters them from acting as independently from Moscow as they would like.

6. Ambassador Harriman commended Shah for 25-member medical team in Vietnam and said they doing outstanding job. Shah said he been receiving reports from team and is gratified that they able to assuage suffering, even of some Communist casualties.

7. Ambassador Harriman said Americans delighted that Iran making such fine economic and social progress under Shah’s leadership and also believe his developing fruitful relationships with East Bloc countries is useful. Word of caution, however, is in order, Ambassador Harriman said, noting that while communism as a system is no longer marketable commodity, Soviets still actively support “wars of liberation.” They not beyond dusting off Tudeh Party one day and causing Shah trouble. Thus while detente with East Bloc is good, it well to keep guard up.

8. Shah fully endorsed Harriman view. Russian objectives he said are historic. He recalled post-war Soviet efforts to get positions in Dardanelles, Libya and Eritrea. Now they seeking bases at Alexandria, Djibouti and Yemen. As far as Iran concerned, Shah said he under no illusions. Daily clandestine broadcasts make clear Soviet designs to oust Shah and his regime. Also indicative are vicious propaganda attacks Moscow is making against Islamic “understanding” concept which Faisal and Shah had discussed. Soviet tactics, Shah said, have, however, changed. Any crossing of Iran’s border by Soviet troops would mean world war. Soviets realize this and accordingly are working via Egypt and Syria, both of which wittingly or unwittingly are staging areas for Soviet designs for achieving Mideast warm water ports. Asked if he really convinced Nas-ser under Soviet control, Shah said Nasser doing better job for Soviets in Cairo than if they had “someone there by name of Popov or Litvinov.”

9. Shah went on to outline his thesis, developed more fully within last year or so, that it is not wise for country like Iran to consider dependence on even as good a friend as U.S. as “essential part of our defense policy.” Great power intervention anywhere these days is “more difficult,” (he obviously thinking of Vietnam). It therefore imperative for Iran to develop capability of taking care of itself in deterring or coping with regional threats, even though he must pay high U.S. prices for equipment. Danger, he said, will be at its height within next five years, particularly after 1968 when British withdraw from Aden. Ambassador Harriman agreed that British withdrawal was unhelpful, particularly since expense of keeping British forces in place is relatively small. Shah felt Iran’s capability for handling regional disturbance is as much in USG’s interest as that of Iran.

10. While agreeing that Iran have adequate self-defense, Ambassador Harriman made strong point of keeping military expenditures down. He stressed that economic development and prosperity are as important if not more so in preservation of Iran’s independence and integrity. Shah agreed, provided that minimal defense requirements are met.

11. Shah then launched into his usual argumentation on need for increased revenues from oil consortium in order to maintain 8 percent growth rate for Iran. He noted that while he is told that his demands are exorbitant oil lifting from several other countries are well above 17 percent annual increase which Iran must have. He added that these other countries have small populations and do not know what to do with their excessive incomes while for Iran, which is largest of these countries, 17 percent increase is critical. Ambassador Harriman repeatedly urged Shah to be reasonable and avoid repetition of 1951 “tragedy.” Shah said he did not wish 1951 be repeated but he should not be forced into corner. He alluded to proposals which he had forwarded to U.S. via Alam (Embtel 1932)² and expressed hope they would lead way to solution. He noted his request for crude been reduced to 2,000,000 tons. Ambassador Meyer took occasion to refer to likelihood Romanians selling refined Iranian crude to West Germans (Embtel 1952).³ Noting this would be self-defeating for Iran, Shah insisted it would not occur but he would check into it. Perhaps safeguard provisions, he said, could be incorporated in any agreements. This portion of discussion was closed with expression of gratification that Shah has taken steps to avoid further public discussion of oil problem so that atmosphere most conducive to reasonable negotiation can prevail.

12. Shah spoke of his high hopes for Iran’s future. Only Japan and Iran have possibility of attaining within next 20 years state of development reached by European countries, he said, adding Iran has more abundant natural resources than does Japan. Ambassador Harriman congratulated Shah on progress made and expressed delight that so many American firms are entering into joint enterprises here, e.g., petrochemical industry.

13. At conclusion, conversation returned to Vietnam. Ambassador Harriman earlier had noted that so many countries privately support U.S. but refrain for domestic political reasons from coming out openly. In departing he referred to De Gaulle’s Cambodia speech which demanded US withdraw but demanded nothing of Vietnam. Similarly, Nasser, Indira Gandhi and Tito had just few days ago in New Delhi made similar public demands. Ambassador Harriman pointed out that such public pronouncements, besides not being impartial, have tragic effect of making Hanoi more intransigent. Shah concurred.

14. At beginning and throughout conversation, Ambassador Harriman made clear that purpose of his visit was to exchange views with leader whose special friendship President Johnson and USG have long valued. Shah was obviously gratified. He asked Ambassador Harriman to convey his warm wishes and abiding friendship to President Johnson.

15. Comment: Discussion was everything hoped for. Shah obviously delighted that USG still considers him important friend. Having known Ambassador Harriman since 1942, he was speaking with trusted friend. At times, he sounded almost like Shah we knew in days before present ballyhoo about “independent policy.” Under circumstances, this talk tended to bring Shah back to moorings which are deeper than vagaries of current Afro-Asian politics. This does not mean there will be any turning back from Iran’s present “independent” posture. But it may mean that swing of pendulum may be a little slower than it has been since Shah’s East European visits. All in all, stopover here was decided success. For Ambassador Harriman it was a long day, he having started from New Delhi early in morning, lunched with Ayub, and still having four hour journey to Rome prior to heavy round of talks there tomorrow. We grateful he agreed to this extra task which was accomplished so effectively and look forward to his early return.⁴

Meyer

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Paris for Harriman and to Moscow.
2. Dated October 31. (Ibid., PET 6 IRAN)
3. Dated November 1. (Ibid.)
4. Harriman’s November 28 report to the President on his trip to Iran and nine other countries following the Manila Conference is ibid., POL 7 U.S./HARRIMAN.