178. Letter From the Ambassador to Iran (Meyer) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Hare)1
Dear Ray:
Set out in the paragraphs below is the Embassy’s assessment of the internal security situation in Iran prepared in accordance with instructions from IRG/NEA (Department Airgram A–11 of July 21).2 You will note that since last October when we submitted our last formal report on the counter-insurgency situation here (A–281 of October 20, 1965),/2/no major changes have taken place in the situation as we viewed it at that time. However, the moves toward settlement of the Kurdish revolt in Iraq this year and some evidence that the growing number of Soviet technicians is outrunning the capacity of the security services for effective surveillance, point to possible longer-term problems. There has also been a negative development in the reorganization of the Army’s Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC), hitherto regarded as the most effective counter-intelligence force in the government, which will bear continuous close scrutiny.
As noted in the Embassy’s recently-prepared semi-annual assessment of the political situation in Iran (Embassy’s A–104 of August 23, 1966),3 the period since our last assessment has been characterized once more by the relative placidity of the internal scene. It has been years since the political atmosphere has been as sluggish, as self-satisfied, or as resigned to the status quo. This is related only partly to the effectiveness of political controls. It is in large measure attributable to economic prosperity and to the Shah’s success in giving the impression that a reorientation has taken place in Iran’s international position. There is more popular confidence in the regime and less carping criticism. A rising new middle class is on the march economically and, in the short run at least, appears to be developing an interest in political stability. This situation could change, of course, if the Shah should be assassinated, or if a serious slowdown in present economic momentum should take place.
The favorable economic situation and the reduced level of popular dissatisfaction have had the effect of dampening political activities of all kinds. The Communists are in disarray, their fortunes probably at the [Page 322] lowest ebb in years. They certainly can take little heart in the increasingly obvious efforts of the Soviets and the Communist orbit of Eastern Europe to deal directly with the Shah himself on a government-to-government level. The religious opposition remains unreconciled to Iran’s increasing modernity and, while there have been rumors of an unholy alliance between the right-wing religious oppositionists and left-wing elements, so far nothing actually has materialized. With the surrender of the Qashqai bandit Bahman Khan earlier this year the last vestige of rebellion among the southern tribes disappeared from the scene, at least for the time being.
However, there is some evidence of increasing activity on the part of the Iranian Kurds. The apparent negotiated settlement of the Kurdish revolt in Iraq reached late last June was generally well-received by the Kurds in Iran. The end of hostilities, however, also set in motion a latent nationalist fervor among this minority group due primarily to the expectation that the Iraqi Kurds would gain certain advantages and privileges from their acceptance of the cease-fire. This tendency probably is best reflected in what has been described by Embassy sources as a general increase in political activity, particularly among Kurdish groups in the Mahabad area. The Iranian Government appears to be watching this unsettled situation warily and has developed a renewed interest in the National Resistance Movement (NRM). So far, however, we have no evidence of any major shift in GOI policy vis-a-vis the Kurds.
Although some Iraqi leaders continue to believe to the contrary, the GOI appears to have discontinued purely military assistance to the Iraqi Kurds, and has closed the Iraqi-Iranian border in the Kurdish area. So far, although there are the usual cases of smuggling and banditry, Iranian Kurdistan appears peaceful. We do not believe that political activity on the part of Kurds in Iran which might affect drastically Iranian Kurdistan will develop in the near future. Iran’s central security organizations appear quite capable of handling any situation likely to develop.
While Iranian security forces appear capable of handling any political activity likely to develop in Kurdistan, they are having their difficulties elsewhere. At the present time, the greatest security problem is of a long-term character. The Iranian security forces clearly are unable to keep the steadily rising number of Soviet technicians in Iran under effective surveillance. The number of Soviet personnel in Iran in connection with the steel mill, pipeline, and other projects is approaching 600 and likely to surge beyond that figure. The Iranians, however, have taken a number of administrative steps to aid in controlling more effectively the movements of Soviet officials more or less permanently stationed in this country. The Embassy also hears that a number of dossiers concerning suspicious activities on the part of the Soviets are piled up on the desk of the Shah. We believe that Iranian security forces are keeping especially [Page 323] careful tabs on possible contacts between Soviet technicians and Iranian Communists.
Speaking once more of the Communists, Savak is showing interest in long-term threat posed by the Chinese Communists. The latter have not been able to form any organization within Iran, but have been successful in their propaganda activities among Iranian students in Europe. An increasing number of these students have begun to show Communist Chinese sympathies and some of them apparently have even visited China. The Chinese have flooded Europe with publications which are having an effect on Iranian students some of whom can be expected to return to Iran and to attempt to conduct subversive activities. Savak believes that students returning from abroad will have to be checked very carefully lest the Chinese Communists get a foothold in Iran. Although Savak believes that the pro-Soviet group now dominates the Tudeh party, it feels that the Chinese Communists, considering that they have been laboring under the double disadvantage of being newer in the field than the Soviets and of having no official representation in Iran, have done very well to date. For this reason, Savak will continue to observe closely the activities of Chinese Communist elements.
The decentralization of the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) of the Iranian Armed Forces has reduced its effectiveness markedly. CIC units in the field have been transferred from the administrative and operational control of CIC Headquarters in Tehran to the units to which previously they had been attached only. Thus, all reporting on security matters now must pass through channels via the unit commander who, if he sees fit to do so, may suppress the reports rather than forward them to the Supreme Commander’s Staff (SCS). Given the well-known Iranian penchant for not reporting matters which superiors do not wish to hear, security reports are more often suppressed than forwarded to headquarters. In addition, decentralization takes away the capability of CIC units in the field to respond quickly to an urgent request from CIC Headquarters for operational support on an espionage or subversion case. Under the new arrangement such requests must be dispatched through command channels to the lower CIC unit. In the past CIC Headquarters sent a message directly to the unit concerned. A study is now underway, however, to determine how to retain such support from the field without taking away the prerogative of the major commander concerned. The decentralization has had a deleterious impact on the morale of the CIC as has also the fact that it is still smarting from the incompetence of its previous commander. Although a new commander, a professional intelligence officer, has been recently appointed, it is problematical whether he will be able to restore the CIC to the level of its previous effectiveness when it was regarded as the top security organization in Iran.
[Page 324]We continue to find valid the judgment made at the time of our last report (March 19, 1966 letter to Governor Harriman)4 that there are no disturbing elements in the present situation requiring counter-insurgency measures. On the program side we continue to be interested in support for the National Police and in communications for the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie (IIG). In this latter connection we have obtained from the IIG an idea of the program it desires and have forwarded to DOD via Genmish channels our comments and suggestions. The IIG has obtained from the GOI a pledge of support which we believe approaches 50% of the total cost. The total cost of this communications project is $10.2 million. With the GOI apparently prepared to put up $5 million and with $2.2 million already in the program for IIG communications, this means that $3 million needs to be financed over a five to six year period. We would be grateful for any help you feel you might provide in getting this project on the rails. We think it is of the utmost importance in any counter-insurgency situation likely to develop in Iran that we have an effective command and control system for operations in the countryside.
With all best regards,
Sincerely,