Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXII, Iran

153. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, July 11, 1966, 1400Z.

145. Military Sales to Iran. Ref: State 4417.²

1. Pursuant to reftel, I discussed with Shah eleventh each of points set forth in para 2. Left with him written paraphrased version.

2. Re point A, Shah now knows USG endorses fully views which I have previously expressed to him.

3. Re point B, Shah obviously gratified by prospect of two F–4 squadrons being considered for Iran, as well as earlier delivery date. I noted phrase “within available credit” signifies Washington’s uninterrupted desire that military expenditures be kept in perspective.

4. Point C opened up whole subject of proposed dealing with Soviets. Disinterest in Hawks, Shah said, is due to fact Iran has approached Soviets for anti-aircraft guns and SAMs. I showed him clipping from July 8 NYHT describing ineffectuality of Soviet SAMs in Viet-Nam. Having had considerable background in capability of Hawks (during days when Israelis first sought them from us), I pointed out superiority this weapon: a) entirely different from Nike-Bloodhound-SAM flashlight ray types; b) radar much more sophisticated; c) catches aircraft at low altitudes, which is what Shah has to fear, as over against SAMs which are not good at low levels; and d) enemy aircraft have more difficulty dodging Hawks than SAMs.

5. Shah showed lively interest in these arguments but countered; a) it’s too late; Iran has already approached Soviets and to reject Soviets without hearing them out would be impossible demonstration of his being “U.S. puppet”; and b) it is all question of money; Hawks are too expensive to shoe-horn into available U.S. credit. Re latter point, I said it remains to be seen what we can finally shoe-horn into joint program we had envisaged. Re Soviets, I expressed assumption Iranians would do better staff work than obviously been done to date and decisions re military equipment would be influenced by quality of product as well as low pricing and political considerations. I suggested that inferiority of SAMs might well prove to be loophole from which to get out of transaction with Soviets. While Shah gave no indication, my impression is that this thought was tucked away in his mind for potential but not probable use.

6. Re point D, Shah still attracted to four British Vospers, hover-craft and battle-class destroyer (which while not new will be adequate for time being, he said, particularly as trainer. He likes idea of 1,100 ton Vosper “pocket destroyers” with their 40 knot speed and electronic guns. (He confided in strict confidence Vospers would be equipped with surface to surface missiles to be acquired from a small non-Commie country.) Shah said PGM’s are lighter craft, but I stressed earlier delivery date possible than for British vessels which still largely gleam in designer’s eye. Shah said destroyer is not essential to British sales package; any or all items available in accordance Shah’s wishes. Cost of Vosper is 4,000,000 pounds per copy. Once again I urged Shah to assure complete staff work had been accomplished before rushing headlong into a transaction. Throughout discussion I [garble] clear that some well-conceived diversification of his supply sources provided they not Communist is not objectionable.

7. Shah smarted somewhat over assertion in point E that furnishing of military assistance is a choice just as sovereign for US as is procurement for Iran. He himself began adding up figures and found something like $460,000,000 in USG grant and credit is at stake. He suggested this is something we should think about (meaning gravity of chain reaction), but quickly drew obvious point it is even more important for Iranians to think about. I of course, once again emphasized how incredible it is that Shah would jeopardize so much for so little gain. Changing supply pattern in itself would be costly business. Nonetheless, Shah undauntedly professed confidence Iran would one way or another be able fulfill its military needs if complete break in US-Iran military relationship occurs.

8. Re point F, Shah with considerable conviction expressed view Congress could be persuaded to see wisdom of his purchasing some arms from Soviets. He argued: a) by contributing to Iran’s security strength, Soviets will in fact be contributing to Iran’s ability to resist Communist endeavors against Iran. I said obviously Soviets have other purposes of which we only too well aware. His second argument: b) Soviets are building up image as being [garble] and peaceful nation whose only interest is to build up Iran’s economic strength as by steel mill. Last evening he had heard clandestine broadcast emphasizing this theme. Wouldn’t it be more intelligent, he asked, to tarnish Soviet image by diverting to them allegations presently being made against Americans to effect our only interest is monetary profits via peddling of arms? I said latter thought had occurred to us. “Intellectual critics” of Shah’s regime (whom Shah loathes) have for long time condemned USG’s over-identification with Shah in military field. I said I did not believe day would come when Shah would concur with those critics. He quickly added that such criticism exists in Washington as well as Iran.

9. I went on to say that popular opinion does not usually charge Soviets with same criticism it employs against U.S. Fact is most Iranians would be impressed and quite a few dismayed by what is becoming virtual stampede in direction of Soviet Bloc, e.g. steel mill, barter agreements, HIM’s visits to five Commie countries, etc. My own impression is Soviets and many Iranians would consider this as sign of weakness on Shah’s part, particularly if pell mell rush to Soviets is now topped off with arms deal. I pointed out what a triumph all this would represent for Soviet policy in Iran and in Middle East. Shah said it was USG’s fault e.g. high prices, R and D costs, etc. Once again I reviewed what we have done to be responsive.

10. Although acknowledging there many different circumstances particularly in economic field, I drew parallel of “red prince” Badr in Yemen. He too had been impatient with West, had gone to Moscow, been wined and dined, and delightedly embarked on arms procurement road with Soviets. Months later, when he was murdered by recipients those arms, Soviets shed no tears but cynically and quickly recognized his successors. Shah opined that Soviets had also worked through Nasser, but then went off on tangent re American recognition of Sallal regime. Shah made clear he intends to purchase five years’ supply of spare parts for equipment acquired from Soviets.

11. Shah contended by proper instruction American people could be persuaded of wisdom his buying non-sensitive arms from Soviets. I said this simply not realistic. On contrary, fact that he has been such an admired and responsible friend likely cause added bitterness of jilted lover. Emphasized, as in point F, impossible predict future of concessionary military programs, both grant and sales.

12. Referring to Al Friendly articles, I said Shah has always had good image in U.S. and particularly recently. This highly gratifying. I said it incomprehensible why he wishes tarnish this image in such dramatic fashion. I quoted Shakespeare re money being trash but good name is all-important.

13. When making point re security complications (noted in point F), Shah insisted Soviets would be kept in check. There would be no Iranians trained in Soviet Union and Soviet technicians training in anti-aircraft usage would be kept apart and returned as soon as possible. Again, I said, Shah is being unrealistic. In any case, there no question in USG minds that opportunities for Soviet penetration and subversion would multiply and would effect our willingness supply equipment. Shah said USG seeking “excuses.” I pointed out India and Iraq are examples where US furnishing no sophisticated arms.

14. Shah said he wants proceed with procurement those items he ready purchase from U.S. He wondered re next move, e.g. letter from Minister of Court to us. I said it not possible make such move until total picture is clear. For example, how could we make an agreement without knowing whether Iran will order Hawks. Shah said he would in any case require three battalions and that would eat up too big a chunk of available credit. He simply wants order from U.S. those items which he clearly wants. If USG unwilling sell F–4’s Shah said, he will turn to French Mirages, and there is, he added, some urgency re this matter. I reminded him that when prior to his departure we expressed readiness to provide additional $200,000,000 credit it was made clear that if substantial purchases made elsewhere this would reduce total available from USG. It was obviously time to make this point again for Shah was visibly shaken by it.

15. Shah went into inequities of “strings” and “taking orders.” He referred to our “puppets” elsewhere which he did not care to emulate. I asked him to name one. He couldn’t. I said even General Ky in whose country USG is investing $20,000,000,000 is, sometimes to our pain, his own boss. Human beings everywhere, including Americans, have same instincts as wish of wanting be “independent.” There is no attempt, I said, for USG to give Shah “orders.” There is, however a great challenge to both our countries to translate former aid-dependent relationship into something normal, natural, constructive and durable. I said I was sure this was his intention, even as it ours, but it is something that must be done gradually and may not survive drastic move as his turning to north. Irritated by phrase “turning to north,” Shah reiterated his old line that over these past months USG has failed to respond satisfactorily to his appeals including indications that he would, if necessary and as much as he disliked it, increase trade, including initiation of some arms procurement, from East Bloc if USG and oil companies persisted in their disinterestedness.

16. Throughout conversation I stressed to Shah importance of his maintaining his maneuverability. This is true in his handling of opinion in Iran, I indicated, (having in mind his forthcoming session with Parliament members). Shah said he is refraining from airing details of issue between our two countries, even in his deliberate efforts to fashion U.S. opinion as via Al Friendly and via Tom Brady who is currently here with New York Times. Shah agreed our diplomatic dialogue continue.

17. Comment. There is no longer question Shah has approached Soviets for Ack Ack guns and SAMs. He indicated several times curiosity re what Soviet response will be, even manifesting a little impatience over failure of Soviets to reply in past ten days or fortnight. He thought it might be their preoccupation with Warsaw Pact. Questions now are whether Shah can be persuaded to extricate himself from joint business (using technical loopholes) with Soviets, and if not how to shape our own response considering among other factors undesirability pushing him further into Soviet embrace.

Meyer

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–IRAN. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA.
2. Document 152.