Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXII, Iran

139. Intelligence Memorandum¹

No. 1355/66

Washington, May 21, 1966.

THE ARAB THREAT TO IRAN

1. Iranian foreign and military policies are heavily influenced by the Shah’s belief that Arab nationalism, personified by Egyptian President Nasir, is striving to dominate oil-rich and vulnerable south-western Iran and the Persian Gulf area. His concern has been heightened by the diminishing role of the UK in the Persian Gulf shiekdoms.

2. From a geopolitical standpoint, the Shah’s fears for the security of southwestern Iran and the Persian Gulf are not groundless. The oil facilities in Khuzistan Province and the offshore islands provide nearly 75 percent of Iran’s foreign exchange earnings, and hence are the primary source of Iranian economic development funds. These highly concentrated facilities provide extremely vulnerable targets for sabotage.

3. Iranian transportation routes to the Western world are also vulnerable. The major ocean port, Khorramshahr, can be reached only through the Iraqi-controlled Shatt-al-Arab waters. A hostile Arab sheikdom at the Strait of Hormuz—the mouth of the Persian Gulf—could endanger all Iranian shipping into the Indian Ocean. Iran is attempting to decentralize the oil industry, and to open new ports along the Gulf beyond Iraq’s control. The most important new facility will be the port at Bandar Abbas, on the Iranian side of the Strait of Hormuz. This will also be Iran’s main naval base. Bandar Abbas is not expected to be completed before 1968, however.

4. Psychological and political factors have led the Shah to believe that Arab nationalism presents a “clear and present danger” to Iranian security. He bitterly resents Nasir’s claim to leadership of “progressive forces” in the Middle East against “reactionaries” (including the Shah), especially in view of his ambitious social “revolution” in Iran. The Shah feels that he has been insulted by the UAR’s break-off of diplomatic relations in 1960 and by Nasir’s subsequent propaganda attacks against his country and himself. He may fear, too, that Nasir’s brand of aggressive and neutralist nationalism, and his charisma, will prove infectious to some Iranians.

5. The Shah holds Nasir responsible for claims occasionally voiced by various Arab leaders to Khuzistan (“Arabistan”) and for their presumption in terming the Persian Gulf the “Arabian Gulf.” The Shah probably is convinced that Egypt, Iraq, and Syria—which the Shah lumps as one malevolent force—are actively plotting to take over Iranian territory, and fears that the nearly 500,000 Arabs living in Khuzistan—a majority of the province’s population—could become a “fifth column.”

6. Iraq’s close relations with Egypt since the coup of November 1963, and the presence of Egyptian troops in Iraq, have convinced the Shah that the Iraqi Government is a tool of Nasir and that the web of Arab nationalism is tightening around Iran. [3 lines of source text not declassified] In addition, actual border incidents between Iranian and Iraqi troops in the course of the Kurdish rebellion have added fuel to the fire in the Shah’s mind. There have also been reports of arms shipments from Iraq to dissidents among the Qashqai and Baluchi tribes. The Shah’s predilection to believe the worst of Nasir leads him to put all available facts, rumors, intelligence reports, and suspicions into a pattern which proves to him that Nasir is out to overthrow his government.

7. The pattern he sees is an exaggerated version of what Nasir in reality has done and is doing in the way of “threatening” Iranian security. Nasir may well be giving encouragement and some form of covert aid to Arab nationalists conspiring against the Shah. Egypt regularly beams propaganda to Iran—Cairo radio broadcasts in Persian for two hours each day, and a clandestine “Voice of the Iranian Nation” emanates from Egyptian territory for four hours daily. Moreover, Nasir has attacked the Shah directly in recent speeches. Nasir is actively engaged in subversive activity in the Persian Gulf sheikdoms, and his efforts eventually to succeed Britain as the dominant influence among them could be construed with some validity as posing a long-range threat to Iranian transit through the Strait of Hormuz.

8. Other information indicates that the over-all danger Nasir poses for Iran is at most only potential, and indirect at present. [3 lines of source text not declassified] The small 350-man Egyptian force in Iraq, which worries the Shah, is but a token force in the narrowest sense of the term and is designed to influence political developments in Iraq. There are no plans to use it against Iran. The regime of Iraq’s late premier Arif, who died in a helicopter crash early this spring, was clearly pro-Nasirist, but did not menace the Shah or his domains. The Arabian majority in Khuzistan is generally inactive politically, [1 line of source text not declassified]. A “Khuzistan Liberation Front,” based in Kuwait with an office in Syria, probably receives some support from both Cairo and Baghdad, but does not appear to wield much influence in Khuzistan.

9. In responding to the Arab “threat,” the Shah has followed a policy of supporting governments, elements, and activities which might keep his enemies distracted and occupied. The Iranian Government has directed a hostile—sometimes shrill—propaganda campaign against Nasir, both in Iran and abroad. Iran has given military equipment and financial assistance to the Kurdish rebellion, which keeps a large percentage of Iraqi troops tied up in northern Iraq. [3–1/2 lines of source text not declassified] The Iranians have attempted openly to win support among leaders of the Shi’a minority Islamic group in Iraq. Iran has purchased arms for Saudi Arabia to pass on to the Yemeni royalist forces, and has maintained close liaison with Nasir’s primary enemy, Israel. Among the more conservatively ruled Arab states, the Shah has attempted particularly to woo Saudi Arabia and Jordan and has given sympathetic attention to Saudi King Faisal’s proposal, which Nasir opposes, regarding Islamic solidarity. There is even evidence that the Shah hoped that his rapprochement with the USSR would cause the Soviets to exercise some restraint over Nasir—although Premier Kosygin’s recent visit to Egypt may have dashed those faint hopes.

10. The Shah lays most emphasis, however, on bolstering Iranian defenses, particularly naval and air, in the Persian Gulf and southwestern Iran. A considerable defense build-up would be necessary to provide a credible deterrent for hostile Arab countries—which presently have substantial military superiority, at least in an order-of-battle sense—were they in fact bent on attacking Iran. The Shah suspects, moreover, that in the event of an attack, the U.S. might be caught in the middle and might even stop selling arms, as it did to Pakistan during the conflict with India last fall. U.S. economic assistance to Nasir tends to bolster the Shah’s conviction that he would have to stand alone against the Arabs. He gives every sign of being determined to add substantially to his country’s armaments, whether or not the U.S. Government agrees with his assessment of the Arab threat, and has made it clear that he will go elsewhere if he cannot purchase additional military equipment quickly and on desirable terms from the U.S. (MAP)

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Iran, Memos & Miscellaneous, Vol. II, 1/66–1/69. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence in the Central Intelligence Agency’s Directorate of Intelligence.