Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXII, Iran

123. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, March 14, 1966, 1420Z.

1244. Iranian Military Program.

1. Security Preoccupation. During course of lengthy discussion 14th Shah bore down heavily re his military needs and his desire maintain collaboration with U.S.

2. President’s Response Awaited. Shah said he awaiting reply from President Johnson after which he wishes proceed promptly with additional military procurement. He stressed hope U.S.G. would be responsive, for Iran has every reason to continue in pattern set by long-standing U.S.-Iran military cooperation. He said urgency problem increasing and there no need delay because of annual economic review in June or July. He gratified by expert military advice which is emerging from General Peterson’s military survey mission. He confident findings will support his own conviction that Iran does have justifiable additional military needs because of increasing vulnerability of Iran’s vital source of wealth, i.e., Persian Gulf region.

3. Shah Determined. Shah said he wanted to make clear that his public as well as private statements re Iran’s critical needs and his determination to have them supplied elsewhere if West is unresponsive is not bluff, threat or blackmail. He said UAR receiving SU–9 (Fishpot B) aircraft which superior even to MIG–21’s of which Egypt already has goodly supply. Nasser also has 12 destroyers, 9 submarines and number of deadly KOMAR boats, all from Soviets. Iraq recently acquired 20 MIG–21’s and now Shah hears they acquiring KOMAR boats. If latter report true Shah said it clearly accentuates Iranian requirements in Gulf area. Urging reasonable terms from USG, Shah said he has heard that price of F4C’s is from $3,000,000 to $5,000,000. By contrast, MIG’s are available for $600,000. He hopeful US response will be such as to enable him to maintain U.S.-orientation as in past.

4. No Viet-Nam Here. Noting I not aware what President Johnson’s response might be, I told Shah he should nevertheless keep in mind US has problems also. We currently carrying thankless burden of stopping aggression in Viet-Nam and American people heavily preoccupied this matter. Congress also leary of U.S.G. military programs following sad experience of Indo-Pak conflict. Shah said it is precisely because he does not want Viet-Nam story repeated here that he is pursuing policy of making Iran self-reliant as far as regional security concerned. He noted U.S. in any case not member of CENTO and its bilateral agreement with Iran is directed exclusively at Communist threat. Shah reiterated complete support for what US doing in Viet-Nam and recounted how he had made this clear to Sov Dep FornMin Kuznetsov during latter’s visit here week ago. He reiterated his long-standing view that it is in U.S. interest for Iran be able take care of itself.

5. Nature of Collaboration. I told Shah I felt U.S. friendship for Iran was well proven. We delighted country is able stand on its own feet, an objective to which we had made substantial contribution. Our cooperative relations in military field were particularly noteworthy. I felt confident that USG will continue to do what it can to be helpful but he should not build false expectations. If what we might do was not enough, Iran is, as he has emphasized an “independent” country, and it would have to make its own decisions re wisdom of reorienting its philosophy.

6. Agreed Program. Specifically, I said Washington demonstrated responsiveness in sending Peterson mission. While mission’s findings still not completed, my impression is that there is growing U.S. awareness of increasing vulnerability of Persian Gulf installations, and this is without regard to who possible aggressor might be. Referring to 1962 and 1964 Memoranda of Understanding, I made clear that whatever emerges from Peterson survey would require revision of 1964 memorandum and coordination with annual economic review. I expressed view consideration of revised military program in connection with annual economic review did not necessarily mean delay in efficient and effective defense program in Iran. Shah was a bit taken aback because he apparently hoped to place orders, either with US or elsewhere, in month or two. However, he recognized validity of 1962 and 1964 memoranda and reluctantly agreed to procedure I had outlined.

7. Comment. Shah was in dark mood, particularly at beginning of audience. Again he recounted list of grievances against us, specifically expressing hope that our defense collaboration would not experience same end reached after several years of discussing what he said President Eisenhower called “damn steel mill.” He stressed time and again Iran’s new policy of “independence” and what an obvious success it is with people of Iran. After my rather frank and strong responses, he mellowed a bit. Upon departing, he expressed appreciation and welcomed further such frank exchanges between “two friends.”

In speaking as strongly as he did, Shah no doubt was putting on pressure for favorable response from us re things military. Danger is that endeavors of this type can ultimately become national crusade.

One of problems here is that few people have courage to speak to Shah except in terms he wants to hear. Thus sitting in his regal isolation he conjures up without restraint various illusions and distortions of reality. Continuing dialogue with US officials is therefore desirable. We continue to hope that Secretary Rusk’s plans for visit with Shah during CENTO trip will materialize.

Meyer

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US–IRAN. Confidential. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE.