Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967

368. Memorandum of Meeting¹

Washington, July 15, 1967, noon.

SAND STORM

(First Special Meeting)

(12:00, July 15, 1967)

1. Amb. Findley Burns, who had just returned from Amman, assessed the situation currently existing in Jordan, the mood of King Hussein, his desires for military equipment, his intent to reach an agreement with Israel, and his optimum terms for such a settlement.

2. This provided a basis for a general discussion of the Jordanian situation, Hussein’s relationship with Nassar, and the outlook for a peaceful settlement. It was noted Nassar had recommended that Hussein endeavor, with US assistance, to reach an agreement with Israel. His two expressed conditions were that there should be no peace treaty and no direct negotiations.

3. It was agreed that the US would have to play a major role if the peace effort were to succeed. A danger exists that Nassar would booby-trap us as the intermediary who sold out Hussein. Therefore, we should be very careful if we become engaged.

4. In this respect (1) we should determine whether there is sufficient flexibility in the Israeli position on Jerusalem to justify us to advise Hussein to negotiate; (2) we should support a GA or SC resolution authorizing U Thant to send a Mediator to the Near East with a broad mandate; and (3) we should operate behind the scenes.

5. Hussein and General Khammash have approached Ambassador Burns with requests for military equipment. Khammash has expressed a need for selected spare parts and non-lethal equipment. This could be encompassed within the approximately $1.8 million in MAP grants earmarked for FY 1968 and the $5.9 million outstanding under the sales program. The Jordanians apparently wish to shift from F–104s to F–5s. They also wish to obtain 18 Hawker Hunters from the British. Khammash apparently has a list of the equipment he desires and wishes to come to Washington to discuss it. The King supports this proposal.

6. The question of the resumption of military supplies to Jordan should be staffed-out expeditiously with the DOD.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–14 ARAB–ISR/SANDSTORM. Secret; Nodis. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. The meeting is also recorded in a July 15 memorandum from Wriggins to Walt Rostow and Bundy, which lists the participants as Ambassador Burns, Katzenbach, Eugene Rostow, and Kohler. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. VIII)