Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967

167. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) and Secretary of State Rusk¹

June 5, 1967, 8 p.m.

TELEPHONE CALL FROM AMB GOLDBERG

G said he had seen Fedorenko. (Sec said he would have others with him listen.) G said they came close to our formulation. G said they were meeting in 20 minutes. He read the draft resolution, indicating the bracketed portions were what Goldberg would add:

“The Security Council, gravely concerned at the outbreak of hostilities and with the menacing situation in the area, having [considered the report]² and heard the statement of the Secretary General on the developments in the area (1) calls upon the governments concerned to take the necessary measures for an immediate cease-fire and prompt withdrawal, without prejudice to the respective rights, claims or position of anyone, of their armed personnel behind the armistice lines [and to take other appropriate measures to insure disengagement of forces and to reduce tension in the area]; (2) requests the Secretary General to keep the Council promptly and currently informed about the situation.”

G said he had told Fedorenko that if we were going to have withdrawal, we should have it. Sec suggested saying “avoid use of violence in the area.” Sec asked what about unconditional cease-fire? G thinks we could get “unconditional”. He didn’t know how our Israeli friends would like that. Sec said we wanted to be sure we had a case. G said we got “prompt withdrawal” not “immediate withdrawal”. The Israelis have a frigid attitude toward any declaration supporting withdrawal. Sec asked about the Straits problem and what the Egyptians could do. G said this doesn’t decide the Straits question; their prior formulations did. G said “prompt withdrawal” was a plus. Sec said there were 2,300 UNEF still on the ground. G said he didn’t know how much longer we could stand against a unanimous resolution. He said Israelis were out to get Nasser. G said he had been very frank. Sec said if Rafael³ got rough, let him know the US has its own position and its own responsibilities and we didn’t know what was going to happen this morning. G said politically the price for settlement was that the Gulf be opened. Sec said resolution wouldn’t settle the matter. It provides a base for a beginning. Sec said to see what he could do along these lines.

(Katzenbach, Sisco, GRostow, McCloskey present.)

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls. No classification marking. The notes of the conversation were prepared in the Secretary’s office. Rusk was in Washington; Goldberg was in New York.
2. These and following brackets are in the source text.
3. Israeli Representative at the United Nations Gideon Rafael. For his recollections of these events, see Destination Peace: Three Decades of Israeli Foreign Policy: A Personal Memoir (New York: Stein and Day, 1981).