Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

78. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, July 22, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Jordanian Arms Requests: A Policy Problem

Background

The rapprochement between the UAR and Jordan and Jordan’s participation in the Unified Arab Command (UAC) set up as a result of decisions taken at the Arab Summit meeting in January, 1964 are beginning to pose some nettling problems for us. The attached [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] cable² conveys King Husayn’s comments on current pressures on Jordan from the UAR and the Soviet Union to expand its forces and to begin to “standardize” on Soviet military equipment. This graphically portrays the complexities of one of these problems.

1. The King and his military have been interested for some time in expanding and modernizing Jordan’s forces and the “confirmed requirement” for a squadron of twenty supersonic jet fighters, additional tanks, and other modern equipment to be provided at UAC expense is tempting.

2. At the same time, the King has been told by the Egyptians that the primary initiative for the introduction of Soviet equipment into Jordan came from Prime Minister Khrushchev who during his visit to the UAR this spring urged the UAR strongly to pressure the Jordanians to accept Soviet equipment in the interest of breaking the western monopoly on arms in Jordan.

3. The King tells us he insisted in his discussions with the UAC that Jordan could satisfy its need from the United States and was authorized to negotiate for the equipment decided on. If we are unwilling to provide the equipment, Soviet equipment will be delivered either through the UAR or directly from the Soviet Union.

The King’s representative, Brigadier Amer Khammash is now in Washington with a shopping list. (He is responding to Secretary McNamara’s suggestion to King Husayn during the April visit that Jordan give the United States an opportunity to sell hardware when Jordan had funds from the UAC.) Jordan reportedly is to receive initially five million pounds sterling from the UAC to contract for its requirements. The UAR has “guaranteed” the Jordanians continuing funds and sources of supply even if the UAC should disappear.

Jordan has agreed with the UAC to add the irregular 9,000-man National Guard to the regular army, to alter the army brigade organization to include greater firepower, supporting armor, and increase in the number of brigades and brigade strengths, and to add a squadron of 20 supersonic fighters to the RJAF. Counting on our concern at the prospect of Soviet aircraft in Jordan, they are requesting twenty F–104–G aircraft from us.

Problems Posed

Should we fail to hold the line on sale of supersonic aircraft and other sophisticated hardware to Jordan, we would be subject to pressures from the other Arab states and Israel, thus encouraging the Near Eastern arms rivalry. Israel’s reaction to creation of an air cover for Jordan’s army, be it made up of Soviet or Western aircraft, is another factor entering the equation. We must also recognize the inevitably adverse effect on the Jordan budget of an expanded and more costly military establishment if UAC/UAR commitments of support are not carried out.

Actions We Are Taking

In coordination with Defense we have developed a position designed to persuade the Jordanians to concentrate on modernization rather than expansion of their forces. We will make clear to Brigadier Khammash, and subsequently to King Husayn, that yielding to UAR/UAC pressure to accept Soviet equipment poses grave risks to Jordan’s integrity and to U.S.-Jordan relations. We will seek to persuade Jordan of the disadvantages of acquiring aircraft beyond its present inventory of Hawker Hunters until Jordan can maintain and operate these effectively. If we are unable to accomplish this, to preclude Jordan’s being forced to accept MIGs, we will indicate our interest in facilitating Jordan’s acquisition of a modern Western, preferably British, jet interceptor. With respect to ground equipment, we are proposing that we assist Jordan in the formulation of a long-range plan for equipping and modernizing its ground forces within Jordan’s capability to operate, maintain, and support.

We have discussed this problem informally with the British and are awaiting London’s comments on our proposed position. The British apparently are aware that the UAC has advised Jordan not to acquire British military equipment.

The decisions we must take with regard to the Jordanian requests are, of course, relevant to our overall Near Eastern arms policy. The accompanying memorandum³ discusses the rationale for continuing our traditional policy. Your reaffirmation of the policy will be useful in setting forth guidelines for the entire Executive Branch.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12–5 JORDAN. Secret. Drafted by Symmes and Davies; concurred in by Officer in Charge of Politico-Military Affairs in NR Colonel Donald W. Bunte and Colonel William B. Robinson of G/PM; and sent through Harriman.
2. Listed on the memorandum as [text not declassified]; not found.
3. Reference is to a memorandum from Talbot to Rusk, dated July 21, on the subject “Near East Arms Policy,” to which Talbot apparently attached the memorandum printed here. Both were forwarded to Rusk by Harriman as attachments to Document 79.