29. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Bundy) to President
Johnson
1
Washington, March 13, 1964.
SUBJECT
Mike Feldman and I have talked further
about tanks for Israel and we agree that the best way to put it up to you at
this stage is by sending you two memoranda—Mike’s is at Tab A and mine is at
B.
Since Mike agrees with my Tab B, you can expedite this by giving a signal of
approval—and keep Mike’s longer memo for leisure reading. The consequence of
such approval would be that we would not decide on tanks before June.
[Page 69]
Tab B Approved2
Speak to me
Tab A
Washington, March 14, 1964.
Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Counsel
(Feldman) to President
Johnson
SUBJECT
I agree with the Bundy memorandum. However, I would
urge that we make the decision as soon as possible as to whether or not
we are going to supply tanks to Israel, leaving for a later
determination the terms under which they will be acquired.
If it is decided that we should supply the tanks, I should like to be
able to convey this decision, in confidence, to the leaders of the
Jewish community. They have shown in the past that they can keep a
secret.
Attached is an elaboration of my views on this problem.
Attachment
TANKS FOR ISRAEL
In an earlier memorandum I set forth the political problems we might face
if the decision was deferred too long. There are foreign policy aspects
to the delay which are even more important.
It seems to me that the logic in favor of providing tanks for the Israeli
armed forces is inexorable. In view of the commitments expressed many
times by many Presidents to come to the assistance of Israel if she is
attacked, our basic policy must be directed toward the prevention of any
aggression. Our policy must be such that American intervention will not
be necessary.
[Page 70]
Basic to the prevention of war is the maintenance of a balance of forces
between Israel and her neighbors. There is no doubt of the growing
preponderance of Arab tank strength. Nor is there any question about the
Israeli need for modern tanks if Israel is to be able to meet the
military threat posed by Russian tanks in Arab hands. Israel feels she
must have at least half as many tanks as Egypt. I believe that everyone
who has considered this problem believes that the balance of forces
needed to prevent conflict requires that a means be found to provide the
Israeli Government with between 300 and 500 modern tanks.
There are four problems:
- 1.
-
It is said that any announcement indicating American military
support for the Israeli army would disrupt our relationships
with the Arab nations. I must confess that I am somewhat
skeptical of this argument. I have heard it in connection
with every American action designed to give comfort to
Israel. We should remember that most of the nations depend
upon us for large-scale aid. I notice that, even so, they
more often support the Soviet Union than the United States
in the United Nations. I read their constant denunciations
of American imperialism; and I am more inclined to believe
that firmness will attract respect than that concessions
will win their favor.
Anyhow, if carried too far, this argument will result in
actions justifying and encouraging forces in Israel, which
have had very little success thus far, that are much more
militant.
- 2.
-
It is said that a decision should be deferred as long as
possible. We have already waited five months. These are
long-lead time contracts. Unless the Israeli Government
receives some indication that American tanks may be
provided, it will be compelled to make its plans on the
basis of other assumptions. Already, I understand, they have
agreed to purchase 90 British tanks.
Those who favor letting the Israeli Government purchase their
tanks elsewhere overlook the shock to American-Israeli
relationships which would result from our action, the
balance of payments effects and, most important, the
inability of the Israeli Government to purchase any
substantial number of tanks if they are sold on the usual
terms for military purchases. Besides, ours are the best
tanks. To prevent war, these tanks are needed before the
disparity between Egyptian and Israeli equipment becomes too
great.
- 3.
-
There is some feeling that we should not agree to the tank
sale unless the Israeli Government gives up its intention to
purchase ground-to-ground missiles. I find myself
sympathetic with this position. However, it is difficult to
tell a sovereign power what weapons it needs for its
defense. The existence of Egyptian missiles and the fact
that the Israeli Government has already contracted for 25
experimental [Page 71]
missiles from France makes it impossible to condition the
sale of tanks upon a renunciation of missiles.
But there are two alternatives. First, Israel could give up
its right to missiles of any kind, including Hawks, if Egypt
would enter into a similar agreement. Israel would agree to
this, but there is little chance that Egypt will.
Second, we might be able to persuade Israel to refrain from
any further purchases of missiles without prior consultation
with us. In order to do this, however, it would be necessary
for me to explore the question frankly and candidly with
Prime Minister Eshkol,
and I would have to know what we might be prepared to do in
consideration for such an understanding.
- 4.
- Finally, and most important of all, there is the problem of
terms of sale. Assuming it is decided that we supply Israel with
the tanks, a 500 tank order would cost in the neighborhood of
$75 million. This is a staggering sum for a country with a total
budget of only $1 billion. The Israeli Government has asked for
grant aid. We have explored various other kinds of assistance in
the past; we have often increased the amount of development
loans in order to free funds for the purchase of military
equipment. But with the steadily decreasing foreign aid
appropriations this is becoming increasingly difficult. Thus far
I have seen no proposal looking toward the solution of this
problem.
Tab B
Washington, March 13, 1964.
Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President
Johnson
4
SUBJECT
I still think the best way to go ahead with this issue is to push any
decision ahead of us. I think we should use Mike Feldman’s April visit to Israel as a
reconnaissance in force, providing him with a detailed set of probing
questions and comments, but carefully withholding any U.S. Government
decision on the ground that such decision should await the meeting
between President Johnson and
Prime Minister Eshkol.
[Page 72]
In this same spirit I would now send out a White House directive to
State, Defense, and CIA to review all
aspects of this problem—tanks, missiles, Arab reactions, actual levels
of Israeli procurement elsewhere, etc. etc., with the object of
presenting a coordinated interdepartmental recommendation, with
dissents, not later than May 1. I would plan to review this
recommendation here, with Feldman,
Komer, and myself
participating, and then bring it to you for decision safely ahead of the
Eshkol meeting.
