Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967

266. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, February 7, 1966, 7 p.m.

1890. Eban-Sisco meeting. Following main points of discussion of refugee issue between Formin Eban and Asst Secty Sisco:

1. Sisco noted US concern over refugee debate, pointing out signs of diminishing support for US and Israeli positions, citing restiveness of contributors, and stating we foresee even more difficult problems this year than last. He expressed opinion ways must be found to firm up support for weakening positions.

2. Eban expressed appreciation for US effort last year and agreed experience should be warning to us. He suggested earlier planning and said GOI task force will meet in February, develop its ideas by March, and would wish to confer with Dept in spring. Early planning especially necessary, he said, to allow time for full diplomatic efforts with other governments.

3. Ideally in future, Eban said, GA should approach question on reasonable basis, disposing of budgetary and other technical matters without rehearsing over again in familiar terms whole political situation. Only way to achieve this is to make debate less attractive to Arabs. He cited Arab-Israel border situation and declared that since Arabs have learned they cannot have own way they have stopped making trouble. He implied that similar measures in UN could halt refugee debate.

4. Eban also suggested PCC should “intensify” its efforts, not by attempting any new initiatives, but simply by going through motions and reporting that views of two sides far apart.

5. Sisco agreed it useful try to de-politicize refugee item and if possible omit it entirely from proceedings, but doubted this feasible. He then went on to note issue at GA depends greatly on what goes on in area, and asked if there not something Israel could do which would not only help refugee problem, but also have favorable impact on debate. He cited various ideas: Israeli contributions to UNRWA; broader family reunion plan; and especially compensation plan.

6. Eban said Israeli efforts such as agreeing to separate refugee question from overall settlement and un-blocking bank accounts had drawn no response from Arabs, but admitted such gestures gave Israel tactical advantage and agreed GOI would have look at suggestion.

7. Sisco noted US concern over Rossides proposal. He expressed our understanding GOI opposition, but noted there not many negative noises against plan when introduced last GA.

8. Eban then insisted strongly that emphasis should not be on what Israel might do to improve position but “what we can all do together” to line up GA behind GOI position. What can US do to hold line or reinforce our position, he asked, and suggested time may have come for USG to state more explicitly its views on resettlement as solution to problem as he claimed US did in early 1950’s. You should get others to say it with you, he said, and added it will be shock, but we must confront Arabs with international opinion.

9. Sisco noted that UN in early 1950’s was very different and much less difficult organization. He agreed however on need for early planning and expressed gratification Israel recognized last GA debate as warning.

10. Eban also expressed gratitude for US position on Nine Points and rectification and Sisco pointed out our friends and Israel’s were very wobbly on this.

11. Eban concluded discussion refugee question by insisting that instead of making our position softer, we should make it harder—on rectification of rolls, on solving 3rd generation problem outside political context (i.e., without going into juridical status of refugees), etc. Sisco noted GOI should work on “all our friends—not just Africans.”

Comment: We unable discern any indication Eban any more flexible on refugee issue than predecessor. Nor did we get impression GOI will take very sympathetic look at possible gestures it might make either to improve basic problem or its own image. But discussion served very useful function of making clear to new Formin that while we continue to be sympathetic to GOI problem and wish continue work with Israel USG influence at GA not unlimited on this issue and GOI must take lead own defense. We intend to continue to take this line as set by Amb Goldberg in NY.

Ball

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, REF 3 UNRWA. Confidential. Drafted by Campbell, cleared by Brown and Symmes, and approved by Sisco. Repeated to Tel Aviv and pouched to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, Ottawa, Paris, Ankara, and Jerusalem.