97. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State 1

190. 1. I called on PriMin today at Kastri with Costopoulos, Sossides and Brewster present. We talked for about ninety minutes. PriMin received us in his bedroom (he has been in bed for several days with kidney trouble which apparently developed while on London trip). He immediately apologized profusely for unfortunate impression leak of “Acheson proposals” was bound to create. He attributed this leak entirely to Cypriots who had been here this week, with whom naturally he had had to discuss certain aspects of Geneva talks and to whom he had shown some papers but not all (he did not distinguish). He said he had just completed a call to Makarios in which he had expressed his deep indignation at this leak and at Makarios’ most unfortunate press conference. He said he had come to conclusion this week that Makarios was “impossible to deal with” since he was completely intransigent on all points. He had “used” Greek press and all of this at expense of Greek Government which wants to maintain good relations with US. He had done the unforgivable by putting Greek Government in a position of looking soft and willing to bargain, whereas he (Makarios) was the hero standing up against the forces of the West. PriMin was convinced that Makarios was playing a completely “Nasser game” and wanted to set up an independent Cyprus “as an Arab state.”

2. He then stated that, after this meeting with Makarios, he had concluded there was only one solution, “a dangerously simple one”—enosis must come promptly because there could be no interim period in which Cypriots had unfettered independence. It was important to follow this course in order to get rid of Makarios. Although Makarios is working against enosis, Papandreou believed if action is taken at early date it can be achieved. His proposal was that enosis be achieved by joint action of the Greek Cypriot and Greek Parliaments, while agreements could be reached within the “family group” (i.e., US, UK, Turkey, Greece) to provide for a bill of rights for the Turk minority and a NATO base with Turkish Commander granted by Greece to Turkey. He mentioned frequently that he, as PriMin, could not force concessions out of Makarios who thought he would win an independent Cyprus. Only way to be rid of this was to have Cyprus a part of Greece. Enosis with a NATO base should offer Turks security both for their minorities and strategically. A Cuba-type Cyprus under Makarios’ aegis would certainly be dangerous for [Page 207] Turkey and for us all. GOG would also be prepared to indemnify any Turk Cypriots who might wish to leave Cyprus, and hopefully there could be some economic aid provided Turkey which would help meet its problems. He said foregoing was in essence what he would put to Nikolareizis who was arriving this evening for consultations, and which would in turn be passed on to Acheson.

3. Speaking personally, I stressed that I could not imagine Turks would accept such a proposal, even assuming that we all want to get rid of Makarios. The proposal did not take realistically into consideration the three basic factors which Turkish side considers essential to a solution. It was, in fact, asking Turks for complete and unconditional capitulation. After outlining some of events related to Makarios’ visit, including his Nicosia departure statement that there could be no “agreed solution”, the “complete identity of views” communiqué, and ending with Makarios’ homecoming statement that Cyprus would have full support of Greek armed forces if attacked,2 I said that, although I accepted his assurances re the Acheson story leak and his indignation at Makarios’ press conference, [no?] Turks and few others would believe this was not Greek-Makarios maneuver. He denied this heatedly, and twice said that he now considered Makarios “an enemy.”

4. I then pressed him on question of proposed appeal to UN on which he had apparently agreed a common line with Makarios. He replied that he agreed with Makarios on only three things: a) need to maintain peace on island (and here he said Makarios had promised him to take no military action of any importance without prior consultation); b) Greece would defend Cyprus if attacked; and c) Greece will support Cyprus in appeal to the General Assembly if no solution found. Papandreou repeated his urgent desire to reach solution before General Assembly meets, otherwise Makarios might gain his complete independence. If circumstances make appeal to Assembly necessary, Papandreou envisages that Cypriots would take initiative in trying to get resolution endorsing independence for Cyprus and right of its people to determine their own future. To this I responded that I knew of no authority whereby the UN could effectively take step which would nullify treaties entered into in good faith. I also pointed to questionable company he would be keeping and fact that, in interim, anything might happen and agreed that his proposal was “dangerously” simple. He acknowledged this, but said [Page 208] he saw no other course in view of intransigence of Makarios and strong public appeal of self-determination in Greece as well as Cyprus.

5. Conversation ended in friendly atmosphere, with Papandreou agreeing that next step was for him to give his instructions to Nikolareizis, who would continue talks in Geneva.3

Comment: Events of last few days lead us to believe that Papandreou is, in fact, fed to the teeth with Makarios and that he cannot draw any concessions from latter. Of course, this could all be Byzantine plot, but we are satisfied that only point Papandreou and Makarios have in common now is dedication to self-determination.

Many Greeks, including several officials, outspoken in their distaste for Makarios and his unreliability. However, the very strong and profound conviction among all Greeks that Cypriots should have right of self-determination is making them prisoner to Makarios’ machinations and allows him, in name of what they all believe to be only just end, to call turn for Greeks. The “capital of Hellenism” is in Nicosia on this issue.

When I was pointing out to Papandreou the ways in which Greece was being “used”, including giving military support to Makarios, Papandreou replied that he recognized this, but asked what would happen if Greece withdrew its support? He answered his own question by saying things would be even worse and there would be no control over possible military adventures; moreover, it would surely result in “others, particularly the UAR” giving more support “which has been promised.”

Our reading of situation is that Papandreou sincerely wants to achieve enosis before matters go to the UNGA for he has come to believe it is only way to set aside Makarios and that latter is real stumbling block in all Western efforts to resolve Cyprus problem.

We realize Papandreou’s present line is not compatible with Turkey’s wishes, but if he cannot in fact deliver Makarios, it may well be only alternative which has a chance of being in Turkey’s as well as our own interests. It may be possible in Geneva talks to pin Greeks down to specific understandings to meet some of Turk desires after enosis. However, in my opinion, we cannot expect agreement on sovereign base for Turks nor on full scale of special position for Turk-Cypriot minority envisaged in Acheson memo to Nikolareizis. Greeks consider this would lead to same type problems as exist under London-Zurich Accords.

Labouisse
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Priority; Exdis-TAG. Repeated to Geneva for Acheson, Nicosia, London, Ankara, and USUN.
  2. Text of the Makarios-Papandreou communiqué, announcing “absolute harmony of views” was transmitted in telegram 176 from Athens, July 30. (Ibid.) In telegram 187 from Athens, July 31, the Embassy commented on both Makarios’ “self-assured” press conference and the bitterness of his comments about the “Acheson Plan.” (Ibid.) In telegram 136 from Nicosia, July 31, the Embassy in Cyprus reported on Makarios’ public statements upon his return. (Ibid.)
  3. In telegram 192 from Athens, August 1, Labouisse reported that Costopoulos had assured him that Greece desired to continue bargaining at Geneva and that Nikolareisis would return shortly to the talks. Costopoulos also outlined Greek objections to the proposals made by Acheson. (Ibid.)