57. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State1
1844. 1. In absence Prime Minister in Crete I had talks with FonMin Costopoulos on Saturday and again Sunday evening and covered points mentioned in Deptels 1446, 1456 and 1464.2 I started by saying the events were causing USG to play more active role in Cyprus matter, observing that Turks wanted this and I understood Tuomioja and Greeks also did, provided this done within framework UN. We wanted to be helpful but needed help from parties themselves—and particularly Greeks and we must work closely together in finding way out of morass. I then made entirely clear how deeply concerned we were about recent developments, and stressed once more deadly seriousness situation to Greeks as well as to Cyprus and West. I recognized that, for political reasons, Papandreou felt himself in difficult position to oppose Makarios publicly at this time, but pointed out that GOG’s open support of Makarios coupled with such things as its failure publicly to protest at time of Saint Hilarion and in connection with hostages following Famagusta had left bad impression and that GOT seemed justified in assuming Makarios calling tune and Greece willingly following. It was therefore most important that something be done which would indicate an atmosphere of reasonableness on part of Greek Govt. I mentioned possibility of GOG influencing Makarios to have talks with Kucuk, delay in introducing conscription, and suspend reported importation heavy armaments.
2. Costopoulos expressed great appreciation for what USG had done. When I said this wasn’t the point, he replied that Greece would like to do something to help, but Turks made it very difficult. Latest Turkish threats were justification for Makarios’ worries and his actions. However, Costopoulos assured me Greeks had urged Makarios to talk with Kucuk—not under conditions set by Kucuk but just to have general discussion. Makarios had refused, saying it would serve no purpose with Kucuk and Turk Cypriots in present frame of mind.
[Page 115]Costopoulos then referred to alleged heavy armaments imports and assured me that as of present time no deals had been made and the main thing Cypriots wanted was torpedo boats (“possibly three”). He believed Cypriots would stop at that and we could pass this on confidentially, but he added he could not guarantee what Makarios might do in future. He shied away from conscription issue. He then referred to an earlier conversation and said Cuba not setting up establishment in Nicosia.
3. Concerning the current Turkish threat, Costopoulos was of two minds. I believe he understands seriousness of situation, but he also harbors theories re GOT motivations which have somewhat offsetting effect. In first place, he believes—as do many Greeks—threat was timed for Senatorial elections—“it would not be first time they have done this.”
But in his opinion, even more important motivation was probably related to Turks’ “spoiled child” complex in which they seek to obtain concessions from USG to support GOT in return for latter’s better behavior. I acknowledge that these might be factors in matter, but that GOG would be making frightful error in judgment if it underestimated Turkish feelings and deadly reality of Greece’s danger. It was only President Johnson’s very strong message and Inonu’s statesmanship that had saved terrible catastrophe so far. I spoke of Inonou’s internal problems and repeated need to find some way of preventing Turkish humiliations. I also strongly urged that GOG caution press against playing “bluff” theme it has used in past. He said he agreed with what I had said: his govt has been trying to influence Makarios along reasonable lines but there was not much it could effectively do in circumstances.
4. Costopoulos reverted to my remark about internal political considerations curtailing Papanderou’s freedom of action re Cyprus. He said this was entirely true but was only part of story. More important was fact that if GOG did not go along publicly with Makarios, then game might well be lost to the Soviets who were smartly supporting nationalistic aspirations, both here and in Cyprus. Situation was becoming more and more dangerous and only choice was between “a Mediterranean Cuba and NATO” (i.e. enosis). There was no hope of handling the Communist threat through partition or federation. This would only aggravate matters and play into hands of Communists. It was much better for Turkey’s security interests, as well as for Greece and Cyprus, to have Cyprus part of Greece with NATO base and with “Greek Govt monarch rather than someone like Lysarrides or worse in control.” Latter was only realistic alternative to enosis.3
[Page 116]5. I said it would be very difficult for Inonu and Turks to swallow such a proposal and pressed again for some other Greek suggestions. He acknowledged problem, but repeated there was only one sensible and effective solution in Western interests. It was useless to expect Greece to cede territory to Turkey to achieve this end. He did volunteer, however, that a population movement might be possible, although he asserted that movement of Greek population and of Patriarchate from Istanbul would cause extreme agonies for Greek people and it was possible that no govt could approve it.
6. I again asked about possibility of talks between Greeks and Turks to which Costopoulos replied that talks between Papandreou and Inonu or between him and Erkin should not be held without proper preparation. On his return from The Hague, he had suggested to Papandreou that Greek and Turk Ambassadors meet in some unspecified spot for discussions but Papandreou had turned this down at the time. I obtained impression that there was possibility of making some headway on this front and I shall continue probing.4
7. It came out during talk that Greeks believe that Tuomioja leaning toward Greek concept of satisfactory solution. Costopoulos had received report that USUN opposed to Tuomioja filing report of his own views with Security Council. He asked if this was USG position. I replied in the affirmative, saying that I understood Tuomioja’s job that of a mediator and that if he could not find agreed solution, he should keep on trying and should not come out with a personal opinion favoring one extreme or the other; this could only serve to cause trouble at this juncture.
8. At end, Costopoulos said that Greece had been informed during day (Sunday) that Kucuk was about to assert sovereignty over certain areas of Cyprus in expectation that Turkey (and possibly Pakistan and Iran) would support his action by some sort of recognition. His intelligence was that this would take place during Inonu’s absence in the States—probably in next couple of days. I said we had heard rumors about possible Kucuk action few days ago and this had given rise to some of our concern. I hoped new rumors were just old ones catching up. Costopoulos said that Greek Cypriots would have to react forcefully against Turkish Cypriots if Kucuk took such action. I strongly urged that in any such event GOG should use every possible influence to have Makarios refer matter to SC without resorting to force. He agreed and was to talk to Kyprianou about it.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Ankara, London, Nicosia, Paris for USRO, USUN, the White House, CIA, JCS and OSD.↩
- Telegram 1446 to Athens, June 5, instructed the Embassy to urge the Greek Government to relieve pressures in the region through action with the Greek Cypriots and gestures toward Turkey. (Ibid.) Telegram 1456 to Athens, June 5, instructed the Embassy to urge Papandreou to press Makarios for some concessions toward the Turkish Cypriot community in order to reduce tensions. (Ibid.) Telegram 1464, June 6, instructed the Embassy to reiterate that the United States had less leverage with Turkey after restraining it and urge that Greece take concrete actions to lower levels of tension. (Ibid.)↩
- In telegram 1845 from Athens, June 8, Labouisse reported that based on his talk with Costopoulos and others he believed that a limited possibility of a Greek-Turkish accord based on enosis and a strictly controlled Turkish base on Cyprus existed. (Ibid.)↩
- In telegram 1851, June 10, Labouisse reported that the Greeks were ready to begin secret Ambassadorial-level discussions with Turkey. (Ibid.)↩