50. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State1

Critic 2. Immediately on receipt info transmitted [document number not declassified]2 I asked see Erkin urgently and was received at once.

Without revealing knowledge CAS report I said that as result constant association with Cyprus problem one tended develop certain sensitivity to situation and I somehow had feeling something out of ordinary might be in wind. Could he give me reading since I would not wish be caught unaware. Also referred our understanding his assurance to President.

Erkin said in talks with Tuomioja latter had said Makarios intent on pursuing his objectives regardless consequences. Fault lay with USG and UK for not having been sufficiently active and Turk cause lost unless two governments did something.

Erkin then added present situation on island very critical and Cabinet meeting at 8:30 (local time) tonight to decide what to do. I asked if intervention might be decided. Erkin said that possible.

I then said it was understandable but definite instructions warn most seriously against intervention and I gave reasons, adding that I had also been somewhat encouraged recently by reports from Athens indicating [Page 104] Papandreou was pondering some formula which might meet Turkish needs.

Erkin said he had heard nothing of more encouraging nature from Athens but, if there was anything firm, it could have important effect on decision of Cabinet tonight and he would endeavor postpone meeting for an hour in order to afford opportunity for us to communicate anything which we might have.

I then asked what Erkin meant by indicating agreement that we and British should have been more diligent. Erkin said support in Athens of Turkish demand for federation or “double enosis.” This essential and such ideas as exchange of population or giving Turks “some small island” out of question.

Erkin also said he had thought our attitude toward enosis had been clarified in Washington but he alleged have information that American official sources in Nicosia were in fact stating enosis was our approved policy.

Hope you or Athens can give me something urgently which I can convey to Erkin in effort deter precipitate action.

On leaving FonOff I by chance ran into Inonu and approached him in similar manner but Erkin apparently got wind that we were talking and joined us to say he had explained situation to me and would fill in Inonu. I told him make sure stress gravity our concern of intervention contemplated. He said he would.

I have never seen Inonu more relaxed, even jovial.

He did however confirm that situation critical.

Contents this tel must in no circumstances be revealed to other than Americans.

Hare
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Flash; Limdis. Received at 12:19 p.m. Repeated to Athens, Nicosia, London, and Paris. Passed to USUN and to U.S. Intelligence Board agencies.
  2. Dated June 4. It reported a Turkish official statement that following Makarios’ rejection of his June 3 request for a Cabinet meeting to find ways to end the bloodshed, Vice President Kutchuk would proclaim the independence of certain Turkish Cypriot enclaves and request a Turkish intervention that would occur on June 5 or 6. (Ibid.)