47. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State 1

1265. Deptel 860.2 Arms procurement. There is little doubt that GOC is determined to obtain substantial armaments. Most contacts here, including Swedish and Finnish Charges, agree with our assessment that UAR will be principal source, but financed by Soviets. We have received information (ARMA tel) that UAR-trained Greek Cypriots will be flying UAR-supplied aircraft. In addition, British-trained ground control parties were also trained to fly so they are available at least for light aircraft already purchased. Information received today [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] indicates Soviet Ambassador’s two calls on Makarios this week concerned arms to be purchased on long-term credits. Shopping list reportedly being prepared by General Karayannis and our informant says “anything goes”.

We agree UN cannot allow this problem go unnoticed and believe best course would be to suggest SYG at least issue strong statement condemning not only GOC and Turkish Cypriots for action in attempting build up forces at this time, but also condemning those nations which furnish arms.

In practical terms, however, we doubt he would get far with such an “appeal”. (Gyani tells me he has urged SYG go further, having placed arms control question at top priority. He says Plaza agrees and will pre-sent forceful case to U Thant.) In first place, smuggling can probably continue largely undetected. Secondly, GOC is apt to argue that as legal government it has authority and responsibility to secure arms needed for national defense. We expect they may put this argument in connection with demand that SC resolution not only instruct UNFICYP to help GOC put down “rebellion”, but also state UNFICYP will be used to defend Cyprus in case Turkish “aggression” unless, of course, GOT will give further guarantee of no intervention while UNFICYP here. When SC does not comply, GOC will probably cite lack of guarantee against Turkish intervention as justification for continued arms acquisition.

Of course, arms acquired under this rubric can also be used against Turkish Cypriots. Swedish Charge Bundy fears this is real purpose of armaments and believes problem cannot be ignored by SYG.

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In connection with SC consideration of arms problem, GOC is certain to raise question of Turkish clandestine arms and personnel shipments through Mansoura-Kokkina area, west of Morphou Bay area. Minister of Labour Papadopoulos told me yesterday that GOC was about to insist UNPKF do something to stop smuggling or GOC would be forced to take action. Said both arms and men coming in from Turkey in increasing numbers and UN unable or unwilling to stop. I pointed out UN efforts to stop it would mean clash with Turkish Cypriot fighter groups and I doubted Swedish contingent would take such action. (Swedish Charge later confirmed this.) Papadopoulos was insistent GOC could not permit traffic to continue. He went on to say that Minister of Interior Georkadjis had documentary evidence of complicity Turkish Ambassador in smuggling arrangements and that this might be used in UN proceedings.

Despite these complicating factors, I do not see how we can sit idly by and take no notice of GOC plans to exacerbate situation with extensive arms purchases. Therefore, come what may, we should urge SYG to make representations GOC, as well as to Greece and Turkey, to cooperate in stopping arms race on island. Naturally, appeal should be addressed to other nations as well, and if additional, usable information re UAR and Soviet implication in deals can be developed, statement can be directed at them specifically. (Eventually, of course, as equipment begins arrive, source will be obvious.)

We might also consider utility of requesting NATO embargo on arms to island as in keeping with SC resolution of March 4. This would embarrass Greece and Turkey, but would at least dry up certain other sources. In this connection, Israeli Ambassador says there is blanket prohibition by his government.

Have also spoken to British HICOMer Bishop and Finnish Charge Kawin, both of whom have sent strong reports their governments along foregoing lines.

All this is something which can be discussed with Plaza in New York on his return from Quito.3

Belcher
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Paris for USRO, USUN, and Cairo.
  2. Telegram 860 to Nicosia, May 20, stated U.S. opposition to the introduction of armaments on the island and speculated that Makarios was maneuvering to lay the groundwork for an agreement with the Soviet Union on arms supplies. (Ibid.)
  3. Topol 1822 to Paris, May 26, instructed the Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to avoid any discussion of a NATO arms embargo since it would cause further deterioration of relationships with Greece, Turkey, and the Greek Cypriots without affecting Makarios’ ability to procure arms. (Ibid.)