43. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State 1

1517. At informal family lunch today with only the Inonus, Metin Tokers and ourselves present, for which invitation only extended yesterday and which obviously intended to afford occasion discuss Cyprus, Inonu was model of courtesy and hospitality but burden of his remarks constituted heavy fare indeed.

Inonu began by saying everything had been tried to no avail and future dark. He was at wits end to know where turn. As far as he knew conversation of Erkin with Secretary2 had not brought out anything new and Greeks opposing discussion Cyprus in NATO Council. It was dismal business. He had done his best explain situation as seen here but still wondered if Washington really understood. At times we had seemed lose interest. I said that, referring first to his last comment, I could say Washington did understand matter but action must of necessity be suited to circumstance. If we had been less active for a time it had been in order give UN opportunity function effectively but when its performance seemed lagging we had not hesitated renew efforts.

Regarding what to do next, I said had always been my conviction that mistake to think of Cyprus as just thing in itself and that closer consultation in past between Ankara and Athens might have spared us much of present grief. I realized that consultation now more difficult but, difficult or not, it seemed necessary step in seeking solution. Could Inonu tell me if Erkin might be seeing Greek FonMin in Hague?

Inonu said he too had always favored direct talks with Athens and there had been some hope under previous Greek govts but Papandreou had now elected identify himself completely with Makarios. Talking with one would be same as talking with other. Regarding Erkin, no reason why he shouldn’t talk with Greek counterpart but Greek officials very high and mighty these days and didn’t know whether would be possible.

I said all this seemed be getting nowhere and asked if Inonu as man of great experience could not identify certain areas where effort might be made break through present barriers.

It was at this point that Inonu delivered what he apparently intended be punch-line of conversation by saying that time for persuasion [Page 91] now passed; no longer any role for “the old statesman,” as matter now stand there are only two alternatives, either submit to Makarios or beat some sense into his head by force.

At this point we were called to lunch but afterward I asked what Inonu meant by using force to bring Makarios to see reason. He said he meant military force; it wouldn’t be necessary to invade all of island, merely occupy part of it. This was something Makarios could understand.

I said needless point out this would probably result in Greek intervention, clash between Greek and Turkish forces and possible escalation of conflict to full-scale war between Greece and Turkey.

Inonu replied decision would be up to GOG. GOT prepared in either contingency.

I observed that, if only possible think of matter in terms of surrender or war, obvious that Turkey’s friends could support neither but I had gained different impression in conversation with Fulbright in which I had understood Inonu to have endorsed idea of strengthening peacekeeping function in order establish security which would in turn permit quiet negotiation.

Inonu said this correct and he still felt that way but doubted it would work. Must look facts in face. Service which USG might render would be to make Turkish determination clear to Athens.

I said this still opened no path toward solution and in this connection questioned accuracy of Inonu’s assumption in equating Makarios and Papandreou so completely. Information available to me did not indicate that situation so monolithic but rather that there were various aspects which might be exploited to advantage with Athens if communication could just be established. Furthermore there seemed to be certain change in pattern of Makarios’ behavior recently which might be more hopefully interpreted. Addressing himself to Makarios first, Inonu said he too had noted certain recent changes but now clear from bitter experience that Makarios is crafty schemer and that such changes merely for tactical deception.

Regarding Athens he was also dubious but, if it wished make contribution, it could announce clearly its recognition of validity of existing treaties. If this done and given several years time eventual solution could be worked out. Such an announcement would completely clear atmosphere.

Adverting again to our attitude, Inonu said he had been greatly troubled by apparent falling off of our interest following Ball Mission and also by persistent reports that USG favoring enosis as solution. This now cleared up but he still felt Washington not fully aware of depth of Turkish despair in finding road out of Cyprus imbroglio and its determination to use force if necessary. If I could convey this depth of feeling [Page 92] to Washington and it, in turn, could convince Athens our conversation would have served useful purpose.

Comments: As is usually case, much of foregoing repetitive and even punch-line re time for persuasion being passed and preparedness intervene by force was reformulation of standard theme. However, when this latter evaluated in terms of emphasis on strategic importance of Cyprus during Fulbright talks and of insistence that GOT could not allow Cyprus slip away as had other coastal islands, regardless of whether Cyprus became unitary state or devolved to Greece, there would seem to be strong indication that policy decision has been reached or is in making in accord with which GOT will insist on some form of Turkish presence on Cyprus or right of custodianship as essential ingredient in any solution involving abrogation of present treaties. As of now this is still somewhat dim shape emerging from mist but its outline has seemed to have become increasingly clear of late. If this correct and if—if such policy rigidly held, it is obvious that certain mixes which have been tentatively considered to meet Turkish requirements would no longer fill bill. Admittedly, this still somewhat “iffy” but trend seems increasingly strong.

In so saying I am also mindful that Inonu may have correctly assumed that his remarks would be promptly reported to Hague as background for discussions there. Even so, I should still hesitate to discount them on that score, given Inonu’s reputation for multiple purpose action.3

Hare
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Nicosia, Athens, London, and USUN. Passed to the White House.
  2. See the last paragraph of Document 42.
  3. In telegram 1563 from Ankara, May 26, Hare commented that while Inonu’s statements were intended to maintain Turkey’s international bargaining position, they were not intended for domestic consumption. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP)