Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

41. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, at The Hague¹

Washington, May 10, 1964, 3:25 p.m.

Tosec 27. For Secretary from Acting Secretary. Disturbing developments in the Cyprus situation lead me to think that you should probably have some talks in The Hague with key NATO Foreign Ministers, looking toward possible common action at the appropriate point. In this telegram I shall try to sum up the situation as I see it.

1. Tuomioja, the Finnish Mediator, while a reticent man, has given some vague foreshadowing of his thinking. Proceeding from the Constitution of 1960, he is considering proposals that would give the Greek Cypriots more in the way of majority rule. In order to assure the Turk Cypriots of their rights and security, he is toying with the idea of (a) a quasi-federal system under which five or six areas with predominant Turkish populations would have a certain autonomy in communal affairs and (b) a long-term UN observer and international participation in or supervision of the court system.

2. While this represents progress over what appeared as his first thoughts, I am confident that the Turks would not presently be prepared to accept a solution along these lines.

3. While it is not entirely clear what his plans are (and there are conflicting stories) Tuomioja has indicated to us that he intends to put both to Makarios and Kutchuk written questions regarding measures to guarantee Turkish Cypriot rights. He will give the parties about two weeks to respond. He believes Turkish Cypriots may not reply. He intends then to submit his report to UNSYG. Thereafter he will return to his post in Stockholm where he can “mediate in comfort” until mid-June and remain unless developments warrant further intervention by the Mediator.

4. Tuomioja’s proposed course of action could result in a gravely dangerous situation. Makarios might well make the heroic gesture of agreeing to accept the Mediator’s proposals. Kutchuk would almost certainly reject them. Makarios would then go into the Security Council and demand that they be given effect. The GOG would almost certainly have to support Makarios and the USG and other NATO governments would face the discomfort of having to vote against the proposals of the UN Mediator.

5. The Soviet Government would presumably seek to play a double game of supporting Makarios while at the same time exploiting the growing disenchantment of the Turks. What the Soviet Union is most afraid of is “enosis” which could lead to the presence of NATO in Cyprus.

6. Under the circumstances we have instructed Belcher to emphasize to Tuomioja that he should not put in a non-agreed report. If he feels it necessary to make a report in the near future, he should simply state his inability to reach an agreed solution and indicate his determination to continue the effort. USUN is also making the same representations to the SYG.

7. Even if Tuomioja goes along with this formula, we shall face serious problems in the SC. There are only six weeks to go until the present resolution runs out. Makarios will use the occasion of the further extension of UNFICYP in June to try to put further hamstringing conditions on the use of the UN force. We shall have great difficulty getting the members contributing forces to agree to supply further financial support and we shall be hard put to scratch around and find the necessary money. Troops will be difficult to hold and replacements even more difficult to find. A number of countries will wish to withdraw their units and there is a danger that the SYG will have to reach farther out to less desirable suppliers. We shall have difficulty holding Tuomioja to a longer term than the initial three months.

8. All of this confusion is made to order for Makarios, who has already shown a notable ability to do mischief in the SC. He may make an effort to get a special meeting of the UNGA called in order to achieve an even better forum.

9. Meanwhile time is not running on our side. The GOT is getting in a mood of greater moroseness and despondency and the Turk-Cypriots are capable of a kind of Gotterdammerung psychology that could lead to a blow-up all over the Island.

10. There seems to me only one sensible procedure and that is for the Greek and Turkish Governments to move into the situation and take charge of it. From Papandreou’s talk with Fulbright and from other sources there are indications of an increasing Greek Government disenchantment with Makarios. I find Papandreou’s repeated references to “enosis” a healthy sign. From the point of view of all of NATO, we should regard “enosis” as a useful component in any final solution since it would mean that a NATO government would have charge of the Island rather than the wolf in priest’s clothing. Obviously, “enosis” would be possible only if some provision were made for those Turk-Cypriots to leave who wanted to leave. In order to make this palatable to the GOT there would have to be some kind of territorial concessions by Greece.

11. I doubt that there is much efficacy in trying to get Erkin and Costopoulos together in The Hague. But I do think that you might wish to have talks with some of the other Foreign Ministers in order to prepare their minds for possible joint pressure on both Papandreou and Inonu directed at persuading them to take matters in their own hands and work out an agreed solution somewhere down the line. Papandreou seems confident that he can bring off “enosis” by providing some kind of a plebiscite on the Island. While a Greek Cyprus would be hard for the Turks it would certainly be better for their interests than Cuba off their shores.

12. I have talked with both Harlech and Charles Ritchie about these matters and have told them that I would suggest to you that you have some conversations in this spirit with some of the other Ministers. I think you will find both Butler and Paul Martin prepared for this.

13. Meanwhile you might suggest to some of the other Foreign Ministers that Tuomioja’s role is to be that of quiet mediator and that they should make this clear to him. Nothing could be worse for our purposes than a report by the Mediator that would give the initiative to Makarios and drive the Turks into a greater sense of isolation and despondency.

Ball

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Ball and cleared by Talbot and Bracken. Repeated to London, Nicosia, Ankara, Athens, and Paris for USRO. Secretary Rusk was attending the NATO Ministerial Meeting May 12–14.