Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

28. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus ¹

Washington, March 28, 1964, 2:54 p.m.

699. Ankara’s 1254 to Dept; Nicosia’s 1035 to Dept; Nicosia’s 1039 to Dept.² Agree with Embassy Nicosia’s conclusion reftel that Makarios’ action in appointing acting ministers to replace Turks designed underscore Turk non-participation and strengthen formal GOC control Turkish-allocated ministries. This connection, Cyprus UN PermRep Rossides has informed SC President that civil servants who “deliberately refuse report to office” could not expect “continue indefinitely be paid out of public funds”.

Timing these Greek-Cypriot tactics is interesting. Makarios apparently fully understands that (1) Turk-Cypriots could strengthen their case and weaken his by participation, (2) that such participation was not likely while security forces were primarily GOC and British, and (3) that formal establishment UNFICYP is strategic moment for Kutchuk to insist on participation. He appears to have made moves re Denktash and acting minister appointments to goad Turks into frittering away energies in protests and legal arguments until opportunity has passed. Makarios’ tactics will probably succeed if Turk-Cypriots continue to sit on hands and feel sorry for themselves.

If Kutchuk would return to his office because of UN presence, he could be serious embarrassment to Makarios. Even if Makarios could insist successfully that all measures of GOC taken during Kutchuk’s absence are legal and not subject to Vice-President’s veto, he would have difficulty not forwarding future bills or measures to Kutchuk as required by constitution. His only effective alternatives would appear to be: (1) to maintain that Kutchuk was rebel who tried to set up separate Turk-Cypriot administration and therefore had lost authority in government (difficult argument to sustain if GOC has, as it claims, been sending invitations to Kutchuk and other Turk-Cypriot officials to attend scheduled meetings) or (2) to maneuver Turk-Cypriots into holding back from participation until too late.

He appears to be operating under second alternative. With each passing day that his tactics perpetuate Turk-Cypriots boycott of government, he increases general acceptance GOC as presently constituted, strengthens his contention that Turk-Cypriots are insurgents and weakens ability UN to remain neutral between two communities.

In this connection, British Embassy informs us GOT has asked HMG to intercede with Makarios and protest to UNSYG on behalf Denktash. HMG has informed GOT British forces Cyprus part of UNFICYP and they cannot make independent intercessions with GOC. (FYI. UKUN, however, has been instructed to call Denktash problem to attention SYG on humanitarian grounds. End FYI.) Turk Embassy informed Dept of GOT concern re Denktash but made no request for USUN action and Dept plans none.

For Nicosia: Explore problem with UK HICOM and in your discretion reiterate points made in Deptel 668³ to Kutchuk and Turk-Cypriot leaders as to advantage renewed participation government. Re Rossides claim regarding payments, would appreciate clarification on situation since other reports indicate Turks paying relief because no salaries paid by GOC to absentee Turk-Cypriots.⁴

For Ankara: In your discretion, discuss Turk-Cypriot non-participation further with GOT. We would be interested any indications GOT is planning or willing actively push Turk-Cypriot leadership into participation.⁵

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential. Drafted by Gordon D. King; cleared by NEA, UNP, and BNA; and approved by Jernegan. Also sent to Ankara and repeated to Athens, London, and USUN.
2. Telegram 1254 from Ankara, March 27, reported Turkish press reaction to Makarios’ refusal to permit Denktash to return to Cyprus. (Ibid.) Telegram 1035 from Nicosia, March 27, reported that Makarios’ appointment of “temporary” ministers appeared to avoid violation of the Cypriot Constitution. (Ibid., POL 15 CYP) Telegram 1039 from Nicosia, March 28, reported negative Turkish Cypriot reaction to Makarios’ actions. (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 668 to Nicosia, March 18, stressed the need to get Turkish Cypriot support for UNFICYP. (Ibid., POL 23–8 CYP)
4. In telegram 1051 from Nicosia, April 1, the Embassy reported the British believed that Turkish Cypriot leaders preferred partition as a solution and would avoid returning to the Cabinet. It also reported that Turkish Cypriot civil servants who failed to report to work were not being paid. (Ibid.)
5. In telegram 1278 from Ankara, the Embassy reported Turkish assurances that they were urging Turkish Cypriot Ministers to rejoin meetings of the Makarios government. (Ibid.)