Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

226. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, March 22, 1966, 1135Z.

438. NATUS. Athens 1379 to Dept; Athens 1388 to Dept.²

1. Aside from its effect on Greek politics (reftels) current acute phase of Makarios-Grivas feud represents danger to peace and stability on island. We believe there are dangers inherent in Grivas “victory”, i.e., unequivocal control over forces of Greek side on Cyprus especially National Guard.

2. From US viewpoint Grivas’ initial appearance on island in June 1964 had some utility, mainly in organizing and disciplining National Guard and disbanding or absorbing armed bands of Lyssarides and Sampson, etc. These purposes were largely accomplished by end of ’64 but since that time Grivas presence here has had disruptive effect on developments. It is not clear how much collusion or tacit agreement existed between Makarios and Grivas at critical moments such as Famagusta last November or Ambelikou earlier but obviously Grivas did not exert restraining influence and consensus was that both were Grivas doing. On political side his followers constitute most intractable (even though they are anti-Communist) group on island. They are against anything except enosis now and likely continue to be adamantly opposed to any compromise solution.

3. Earlier when “instant enosis” was actively being considered as possible solution perhaps Grivas had value as man who could be relied upon take effective action on island, theory being that he had necessary prestige with Greek Cypriots and could hold island briefly until GOG assumed administrative control. None of various schemes floated on island at that time envisaged him as ruler of Cyprus for more than few hours or days, it being well understood that except for Makarios’ alleged opposition to enosis there existed no real complaints against his government for corruption or mal-administration. Now “instant enosis” followed by immediate appearance of GOG is unthinkable because of inevitable Turkish reaction. At same time Grivas continues to remain at center, in eyes of Cypriots at least, of opposition to Makarios and possibility will always exist that Grivas, if he had wherewithal in shape of armed forces at his disposal would become exasperated with Greek Cypriots over trivial or personal reasons and attempt coup d’etat, unilaterally declaring enosis with ominous consequences or even more idiotically attack Turk Cypriots. Furthermore, having given him this facility GOG would be hard put to disengage from Grivas’ actions and thus would also bear brunt of Turkish response. (One wonders, under circumstances, what Stephanopoulos could have thought would be end result of ill-advised move in appointing Grivas supremo in Cyprus.)

4. We are inclined to say that best result of this confrontation now leading to Makarios-Grivas showdown would be to neutralize Grivas by giving him only nominal authority and aiming at his eventual withdrawal from island under face-saving circumstances. This could be achieved by leaving Grivas in command Greek units and appointing someone stature Gennimatas as National Guard commander who would be more stable cooperative individual understanding dangers to Greece and Cyprus of precipitate action against Turk Cypriots or in respect to enosis. We suggest that if occasion presents itself Embassy Athens if appropriate might express opinions along these lines as soon as possible to GOG officials perhaps including Bitsios in Palace.

Belcher

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Athens, London, USUN, Paris, USDOCO South, and Ankara.
2. Telegram 1379 from Athens, March 20, discussed the problem created by Grivas’ presence on Cyprus. (Ibid.) Telegram 1388 from Athens, March 21, analyzed the impact of the Makarios-Grivas struggle on Greek politics. (Ibid.)