Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

223. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, February 5, 1966, 1125Z.

1163. NATUS.

1. GOG-Makarios communiqué (Embtel 1154)² which climaxed week of discussions shows how far present GOG anxious to avoid cleavage with Archbishop over any part of current Makarios doctrine for Cyprus.

2. Theodoropoulos (FonOff) volunteered to us that communiqué was “too long” (by which he likely meant it to be understood that so much detail in communiqué led to spelling out of positions issue by issue which would make future negotiations difficult). He said current tight identity of views between Makarios and GOG was victory for diplomacy of Tsirimokos because it had patched up outstanding differences between Athens and Nicosia. In this connection, Theodoropoulos recalled that Archbishop had been cool to current GOG and in particular to Stephanopoulos because latter on record in Parliamentary speech in course of which Stephanopoulos suggested “dark forces” had obstructed adoption of Acheson plan. This had led Makarios to refrain from congratulating Stephanopoulos on his elevation to Prime Minister last September.

3. GOG public position on future discussions with Turks has certainly been getting appreciably less flexible in the last month. Tsirimokos at reception this week honoring Makarios said, “We agree on basic principle that Cyprus problem is not problem of negotiations and haggling between Greece and Turkey. Cyprus problem is basically and mainly, if not exclusively, despite its impact on Greek-Turkish relations, a problem of self-determination, independence and sovereignty of people of Cyprus. It is up to them to decide their future and their fate.”

4. This contrasts with Tsirimokos remarks in Parliament and to the Ambassador (Embtel 1005)³ last December when he indicated a much more flexible view on propriety and utility of Greek-Turkish talks.

5. Theodoropoulos reiterated that if Turks want to talk about enosis, Turks and Greeks are competent for such discussions since problem then is addition of territory to Greek soil. But discussions which have to do with the regime on the island as an independent state principally concern Republic of Cyprus and cannot therefore be conducted without Makarios’ participation as principal. GOG would be happy to see GOT consult with Makarios re administration of island but GOG will not discuss such questions separately with Turks.

6. In contrast to rigor of above, FonMin Tsirimokos told me in pre-dinner conversation two nights ago that he counts good Greek-Turkish relations as extremely important and hopes some agreement could be reached in area of a specific guarantee of independence of Cyprus for ten years. He thought rights of Turk Cypriots could be worked out, preferably on basis that enjoyment their rights be assured by international (presumably UN) mechanism rather than by Greek-Turkish joint or separate arrangements. He believed agreement along these lines would do away with any purpose to continued presence of Greek and Turkish contingents on the island. He agreed with me that Turks would consider such an arrangement only on such justification as that Turkey had succeeded in barring enosis for fixed period, at end of which Turks could presumably be in a stronger position to attract world support for justice of Turk views. Tsirimokos concluded that he did not believe in official negotiation on these points, but suggested obliquely possibility that “your people in Ankara” (meaning US Emb) could smoke out whether Turks interested in arrangements sketched out above.

7. Discussion of defense questions between GOG and Makarios said to have resulted in decision that Greek General Staff would study defense of Cyprus with view to possible reduction of forces. We have no direct confirmation, and Tsirimokos (for public consumption) announced yesterday that “under present conditions, GOG did not intend to reduce its military forces in Cyprus.”

8. Theodoropoulos reports three candidates are under active consideration as new GOG Ambassador to Ankara but “snags” have developed with respect to each candidate. Hopes this personnel placement problem will be ironed out soon.

Comment: For domestic political reasons GOG wanted to succeed in making Makarios visit occasion for doing away with impression of divergency of views between Makarios and GOG. This impulse, we believe, will continue to inhibit GOG in taking initiatives to re-start dialogue with Turks except if specific and stated purpose is solution involving enosis. Greeks keep pointing out that nothing in Turk attitude so far suggests to GOG that more generalized dialogue likely to have fruitful outcome.

Talbot

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Nicosia, London, Paris for Crawford and James, USDOCO South for Freshman, and USUN.
2. Dated February 3. (Ibid.)
3. Dated December 30, 1965. (Ibid.)