Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

146. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, August 25, 1964, 9:30 p.m.

405. Department may wish repeat to Nicosia. Embtel 399.²

1. Meeting with Papandreou took place at Kastri with his son, Andreas, and Dan Brewster present. Papandreou said Makarios coming at PriMin’s invitation and that he would also see King before leaving this evening.

2. I then stated that I was finding it very hard to explain Greek policy on Cyprus to Washington. I referred to Papandreou’s public statement last night regarding “complete accord” with Cyprus leadership, while at same time Kyprianou was saying there could be no base on the island³ and Makarios telling Nicosia press Cyprus attitude on Soviet military aid remained unchanged. How did all this fit in with what PriMin had been telling me about his distaste for and differences with Makarios, etc.

3. Papandreou replied he was in death struggle with Makarios and had to make these tactical “moves.” He referred to rest of his statement to effect there was no pressure and no agreed solution, adding there was surely no agreement in Geneva.

If he (Papandreou) had approval from us of his offer, then he could disagree with Makarios, hence, his statement that there is no agreed solution was accurate. He said he was in complete accord with Makarios in that Makarios is also claiming that he is for enosis following self-determination. Moreover, as long as there is a “spontaneous” Soviet offer to prevent Turkey from attacking Cyprus, he could not condemn Makarios for accepting this. I questioned whether the Soviet offer had been spontaneous in response to Makarios’ appeals. I also recalled his statement to me of several days ago that, if Makarios should make an alliance with Soviets, there would be parting of ways.

4. Papandreou then reviewed briefly events of past weeks, saying Turkey threatened to attack and in fact had attacked the island, at which point allies did not stop it. Neither did Greece help nor could it help. With no one offering guarantees that Turkey would not attack, Papandreou’s position was made extremely difficult vis-a-vis Makarios. He affirmed, however, that Greece would not change its foreign policy position, and if Makarios undertook any commitments to Soviets, he would withdraw Greek forces.

5. There was then some talk on what had been achieved at Geneva. According to PriMin, Sossides had asserted that Acheson (as late as last night) was greatly disappointed at fact Turks “who had originally accepted concept of leased-base had reverted to position of maintaining sovereign base was only solution.” I corrected this misimpression, stating it was Acheson who had proposed leased base concept but that according our record, Turks had not as yet budged from their position that they required sovereign base area.

6. Andreas Papandreou then spoke of despicable manner in which press on Cyprus and in Athens were attacking Papandreou government for even considering negotiated base. Papandreou’s position on island was completely destroyed because Makarios was spreading word that Papandreou had betrayed Cypriot cause. PriMin then stated his tactics were to attempt to disarm Makarios.

7. Papandreou said he was going to talk to Makarios strongly and insist on following policy lines:

a) That there be no tie-ins with the Soviets or commitments made to them. He added he would make clear to Makarios that Greeks could not fight on side of USSR.

b) That there be peace on the island and no provocations.

c) That common aim would be enosis and not independence.

8. Papandreou asked that he be permitted to sum up his policy concerning Cyprus:

a) He preferred an agreed solution which would bring peace and lead to enosis and NATO-fication. That is why GOG participated in Geneva and Makarios did not.

b) Papandreou expected acceptable plan to be found at Geneva but this was not achieved.

c) Since bombings of Mansoura an agreement which would satisfy Turkish needs and be acceptable to Makarios and Cypriot people has become far more difficult to attain.

d) Although everyone on island is convinced there would be no base, he, Papandreou, took full responsibility for a base area size of British bases in his letter to Mr. Acheson (further proof that he differs with Makarios). He added unfortunately there has been no response to his proposal. He has been told that Turks are insisting on sovereignty of whatever base they might obtain and hence agreement impossible. He could not accept sovereign base. If Turks could accept his proposal he would be willing to struggle with Makarios.

e) Following “Geneva failure”, he now faces situation without basis of Geneva talks. He would be more than delighted if coup d’etat for unconditional enosis would be achieved in which case Makarios would be his captive. Acheson has been informed of this and although Papandreou had no hopes that this could be accepted, it would be desirable. He was willing to eliminate Makarios.

9. He repeated again that he planned to stress with Makarios that there be no aggressive action on part of GOC and no provocations. GOG wishes wash its hands of responsibility in this area. Problem would then go to UNGA. If Turks attack because Geneva has failed, GOG will fight on side of Cyprus “but under flag of enosis and not of independence.” As to Soviets, he emphasized he would demand that Makarios make no commitments.

He repeated that if he were to make any commitments, Greek army will leave Cyprus.

10. I stressed great importance of Papandreou making clear to Makarios today that, despite his statement of accord, Greeks would not put up with further Makarios brinksmanship. I specified various areas which must be covered, including cooperation with UN on island, cessation of Greek-Cypriot attacks, discontinuance of economic blockades, permission for rotation Turk contingent. Papandreou said these were “details”, but it very nearly got Greece into a war. I noted that frequently it was not general understanding but “details” which caused wars, and added that Makarios was trifling with peace in his tactics. If by a provocation the communities on Cyprus were to fight each other it would be Makarios’ fault, yet because of PriMin’s public statements of identity of views, he was permitting Makarios to determine Greek foreign policy and possibly, to involve Greece in war.

Papandreou agreed that Makarios trifling with peace, but asked what more could he do? He asserted that he could not make public statement against Makarios now. I replied that he could at least make it crystal clear to Makarios that he would have to go it alone if he did not conform to Greek wishes. Papandreou said he would make strong statement to Makarios against provocations.

12. Papandreou said he realized what a problem he had with Makarios and that he proposed to enhance Greek military forces on island to ensure pacification of island and to do whatever he could to enhance GOG influence on Cypriot press and public opinion. I said that something along these lines made sense to me, but that if he had in mind sending planes to Cyprus, this was something else again. This would not only be provocation to Turks, but would run counter to UN resolution. Papandreou’s spontaneous reaction was “you want Greece to control island and yet you don’t want airplanes delivered. If GOG does not send them, Makarios will say he will get them other places.”

13. Meeting concluded with Prime Minister repeating that he was in death struggle with Makarios and that he hoped I would give him time to work things out with Makarios today and report to Washington after events of this afternoon.

14. In parting, I raised question of municipal elections, expressing view that if Athens found itself with an EDA Mayor in a fortnight, this would be very bad for Greek image. Papandreou stated that I could be assured there would be no Communist Mayor of Athens.

Comment: Main purpose of my call was to stiffen him up against Makarios and to let him know I was genuinely unhappy with his public stance. He appeared to us to be in trouble. Whether his tactics will work with the wily Archbishop remains to be seen.

Labouisse

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis-TAG. Repeated to Ankara, London, and Geneva for Acheson. Passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, and USUN.
2. Telegram 399 from Athens, August 25, reported that Papandreou had justified his press statement as a tactic needed to put himself in a position to deal forcefully with Makarios. (Ibid.)
3. Reported in telegram 398 from Athens, August 25. (Ibid.)