Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

137. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece¹

Washington, August 20, 1964, 11:36 p.m.

335. We have read your 362² with considerable dismay here. Despite what I know was a valiant effort on your part, it does not appear to us that Papandreou has understood the urgency of the situation or what great responsibility we are taking in offering him a solution to his otherwise insoluble problems. I believe it essential therefore that you see the King at the earliest possible hour today and make the following points:

1. What you are proposing is exactly what he asked [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]—our assurance that we would hold the Turks still if the GOG would move incisively to bring about instant enosis under terms that would give the Greeks 95 percent of what they want.

2. This is not an offer made cavalierly to be treated in a leisurely manner. We are at one minute to midnight. The GOG had better understand this. If the President is to continue to assume the responsibility for trying to keep peace in the Mediterranean and keep the Communists out, the GOG must do its part at this decisive moment.

We in Washington—including the President—will be profoundly shocked and disappointed if—after all our anguish and exertions—the GOG boggles at the leasing of 100 square miles of territory beyond the last Greek offer and thus permits Cyprus to pass under Communist control. (The total area of the Karpas base we are talking about amounts to 204 square miles.)³

4. If Papandreou cannot bite the bullet and act incisively, then the King must realize that a national decision is required and required immediately.⁴

5. Up to this point, the GOG has failed to come up with a single constructive suggestion that takes into account the realities of the situation. What we are offering is a way out of a catastrophic dilemma at little cost to Hellenism, either in territory or national pride. If this offer is not taken immediately, we see no alternative that offers anything but disaster.

6. Not only will our plan extricate Greece from great danger at minimal cost, but it will enable Greece at long last to achieve the historic objective of making Cyprus once and for all a part of Greece and making Athens the single capital of Hellenism.

7. There is no time for Sossides to return to Geneva for further talks with Acheson. We must have a prompt decision or the whole plan will fall apart. The proposal will leak—as knowledge of our efforts has consistently leaked from Athens. Makarios will be put on guard. Grivas will be poisoned against the plan and his capabilities to achieve it will be undermined. Papandreou will once again find himself impotent.

8. We must have an answer today without waiting for Sossides’ return to Geneva. The Turks have been alerted and Kyprianou may be on his way to Moscow at any hour. We cannot undertake to get the Turks into line if the Greeks procrastinate. This is the time to decide and to act and we are unlikely to have a second chance.⁵

Apart from your talk with the King, we would like comments on the following points:

1. We are puzzled by Papandreou’s concern that he will not be able to explain the plan to Makarios. This seems incomprehensible to us since we had not assumed that such an explanation was ever contemplated. Obviously no plan that would possibly be acceptable to the GOT could ever be acceptable to Makarios.

2. We had assumed that the GOG would take measures to bypass Makarios and bring about instant enosis through whatever means they felt necessary. This seems to us the only possible way to effect a solution of this problem. If the GOG does not understand this, we fail to see how any solution can be effected.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Flash; Exdis-TAG. Drafted and approved by Ball. Repeated to Ankara, London, and Geneva for Acheson.
2. Document 136.
3. In telegram 366 from Athens, August 21, Labouisse reported that Papandreou was ready to agree to a deal on Cyprus on the basis of Acheson’s proposals, but it must include assurances from Turkey that it would cease the deportation of Greek minorities. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)
4. In telegram 368 from Athens, August 21, Labouisse reported that he had met with the King who promised to attempt to secure support for a Cyprus deal from the ERE leadership. Constantine also noted the importance of Turkish agreement to cease pressures on Greeks in Istanbul and that Greek Cypriots living within a base area would not be forced to relocate. (Ibid.)
5. In telegram 107 from Geneva to Athens, August 21, Acheson commented that while he did not believe the moment proper to extract further concessions from the Turks on either minorities or Cypriots living within a base area, he believed that such concessions would be forthcoming after an accord. (Ibid.)