Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

64. Report by the Committee on Nuclear Proliferation¹

Washington, January 21, 1965.

A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

At your request, we have studied the problem of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. In our examination, we consulted widely with your principal officers from relevant agencies of the Government. In the process, we considered a range of possible policies for the future and their consequences for the Nation. We have noted a significant diversity of views within the Government about the feasibility and the costs of preventing nuclear proliferation, and consequently about appropriate policies for the United States.

Among ourselves there was also a diversity of opinions at the outset of our study. As a result of our study, however, the Committee is now unanimous in its view that preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons is clearly in the national interest despite the difficult decisions that will be required. We have concluded, therefore, that the United States must, as a matter of great urgency, substantially increase the scope and intensity of our efforts if we are to have any hope of success. Necessarily, these efforts must be of three kinds: (a) negotiation of formal multilateral agreements; (b) the application of influence on individual nations considering nuclear weapons acquisition, by ourselves and in conjunction with others; and (c) example by our own policies and actions.

Specifically, we have concluded that:

1. The spread of nuclear weapons poses an increasingly grave threat to the security of the United States. New nuclear capabilities, however primitive and regardless of whether they are held by nations currently friendly to the United States, will add complexity and instability to the deterrent balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, aggravate suspicions and hostility among states neighboring new nuclear powers, place a wasteful economic burden on the aspirations of developing nations, impede the vital task of controlling and reducing weapons around the world, and eventually constitute direct military threats to the United States.

As additional nations obtained nuclear weapons, our diplomatic and military influence would wane, and strong pressures would arise to retreat to isolation to avoid the risk of involvement in nuclear war. Nevertheless, even then, we could not escape the problem. There would be additional nuclear powers—perhaps some in this hemisphere—individually possessing the capability of destroying millions of American lives. Major defensive efforts might help substantially to diminish such limited threats, but millions of American lives would always be at risk.

2. The world is fast approaching a point of no return in the prospects of controlling the spread of nuclear weapons. Nuclear power programs are placing within the hands of many nations much of the knowledge, equipment and materials for making nuclear weapons. The recent Chinese Communist nuclear explosion has reinforced the belief, increasingly prevalent throughout the world, that nuclear weapons are a distinguishing mark of a world leader, are essential to national security, and are feasible even with modest industrial resources. The Chinese Communist nuclear weapons program has brought particular pressure on India and Japan, which may both be approaching decisions to undertake nuclear weapons programs.

Although one might be tempted to accept Indian or Japanese nuclear weapons to counterbalance those of China, we do not believe the spread of nuclear weapons would or could be stopped there. An Indian or Japanese decision to build nuclear weapons would probably produce a chain reaction of similar decisions by other countries, such as Pakistan, Israel and the UAR. In these circumstances, it is unrealistic to hope that Germany and other European countries would not decide to develop their own nuclear weapons.

We are convinced, therefore, that energetic and comprehensive steps must be taken in the near future to discourage further acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities or an accelerating increase in the number of nations engaged in nuclear weapons programs will occur—possibly beginning within a matter of months.

3. Success in preventing the future spread of nuclear weapons requires a concerted and intensified effort. Although non-proliferation has been a declared part of United States foreign policy since 1945, we must now greatly intensify our efforts—both to obtain appropriate multilateral agreements and to affect directly the motivations of individual nations—if we are to have any hope of success in halting the spread of nuclear weapons.

We have been impressed in the course of our study by the fact that actions affecting the spread of nuclear weapons also relate to a very broad range of United States interests: relations with our allies and with other nations, weapons deployments at home and abroad, programs in peaceful atomic energy, and commerce with foreign nations. In order that our efforts to stop nuclear proliferation may succeed, each of these areas of interest, as well as the agencies of Government which deal with them, must be truly responsive to our non-proliferation policies, and must give such non-proliferation policies far greater weight and support than they have received in the past.

We must acknowledge the importance of participation by the Soviet Union in efforts to stop proliferation. Furthermore, it is unlikely that others can be induced to abstain indefinitely from acquiring nuclear weapons if the Soviet Union and the United States continue in a nuclear arms race. Therefore, lessened emphasis by the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear weapons, and agreements on broader arms control measures must be recognized as important components in the overall program to prevent nuclear proliferation.

4. A major effort on our part has promise of success in halting or retarding the spread of nuclear weapons. The dangers of proliferation affect all countries, creating a widespread common interest in early and effective steps to halt the nuclear spread. To date, initiatives within the United Nations and in disarmament negotiations have been only partially successful, but the Irish Resolution of 1961 and the limited nuclear test ban treaty of 1963 continue to offer a basis on which to take more comprehensive and effective steps. There remains broad support for multilateral measures to control nuclear proliferation.

We believe that the Soviet Union, because of its growing vulnerability to proliferation among its neighbors, probably shares with us a strong interest in preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons. Further, we believe that the change of leadership in the Soviet Union and the possible resulting review of Soviet nuclear policies may now provide an immediate opportunity for joint or parallel action in the near future to stop the nuclear spread.

Of course, even major efforts on our part may not be successful in halting or greatly retarding the spread of nuclear weapons. But we are unanimous in our agreement that such efforts should be made. The rewards of long-term success would be enormous; and even partial success would be worth the costs we can expect to incur.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We therefore recommend that the United States undertake the following measures to implement its policy to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons:

1. Multilateral agreements.

Measures to prevent particular countries from acquiring nuclear weapons are unlikely to succeed unless they are taken in support of a broad international prohibition applicable to many countries. We should seek to obtain on a multilateral basis formal treaty commitments of three kinds:

a. Non-proliferation agreement. We should intensify our efforts for a non-proliferation agreement and seek the early conclusion of the widest and most effective possible international treaty on non-dissemination and non-acquisition of nuclear weapons. We should be prepared to bring strong pressure on significant countries (including Germany, France, India, Japan, Israel, the UAR and Sweden) to achieve their participation in such an agreement. Our initiatives in this area should not wait, or be dependent upon, the resolution of any issues relating to an Atlantic nuclear force, however helpful such resolution might be.

As recommended in paragraph 3 below, we should intensify our efforts to persuade the Soviets of our strong non-dissemination objectives in connection with any Atlantic Nuclear Force in order to make it possible for the Soviets to take the lead with us in seeking worldwide support for a non-proliferation treaty. In any event, any conflict between our non-proliferation and ANF objectives may not become critical until the future of the MLF/ANF is known; but if it arises strongly before then, the priorities of the two proposals with respect to our overall national security should be carefully reviewed.

b. Comprehensive test ban. We should renew our efforts to negotiate a verified comprehensive test ban with the Soviet Union. Assuming there will be an adequate withdrawal provision in the treaty, we should be prepared to go ahead without the participation of either France or China. We should be prepared to accept the minimum number of on-site inspections in the Soviet Union that would be consistent with a viable treaty. In this connection, we should consider our anticipated improved capabilities for seismic detection and identification, and our other relevant unilateral intelligence capabilities. Inspection procedures and quotas covering other countries should also be reviewed to facilitate the widest and most effective application of the treaty. We should be prepared to propose an exception to such a treaty for peaceful nuclear explosions if a satisfactory procedure can be promptly devised that would preclude the development of nuclear weapons under the guise of a peaceful explosives program and if such an exception would be acceptable to other nations. An early approach should be made to the Soviet Union, and we should seek the widest adherence to the agreement and be prepared to bring strong influence to bear on significant countries to participate in it.

c. Nuclear free zones. We should actively support the establishment of Latin American and African (including, if possible, Israel-UAR) nuclear free zones. To facilitate such agreements, we should be prepared to modify our requirements for verification and our position on transit rights and declarations with respect to United States nuclear weapons to the maximum extent consistent with demonstrable United States security needs.

2. Policies toward non-nuclear powers.

In conjunction with the multilateral measures described above, we should intensify our efforts on a country-by-country basis to influence the decisions of individual non-nuclear powers not to undertake the development or acquisition of nuclear weapons and to secure workable commitments to this effect. We should ourselves refrain from actions that would contribute to or suggest a future contribution to the development of nuclear weapons by these countries.

The State, Treasury and Commerce Departments should develop programs of economic restrictions and other measures which could be quickly imposed by Executive action and which would be strong enough to produce a reversal of any decision to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.

a. India—to deter India from building nuclear weapons:

(1) While attempting, if possible, to avoid formal guarantees, we should be prepared, to the extent necessary and if requested by the Indians, to offer credible assurance of United States action in the event of a nuclear attack on India in exchange for an Indian commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons. We should be prepared to undertake, if requested by the Indians, parallel action with the Soviets and/or the United Kingdom. Appropriate agencies of the Government should give early consideration to the form such United States assurances might take.

(2) We should assist India in reasonable and economically justifiable scientific programs designed to build the prestige she might otherwise attempt to obtain from the development of a nuclear device. Such programs should be of a character that will not contribute significantly to future nuclear weapons capabilities. Particular attention should be given to those areas (such as natural resources, health and birth control) most relevant to India’s economic and social problems. We might also initiate a major coordinated United States-Indian program of scientific, cultural and educational exchanges. In consultation with appropriate agencies, your Science Advisory Committee should be called upon to submit recommendations regarding United States assistance to Indian scientific activities and United States-Indian exchanges.

(3) We should back India for a larger role in the United Nations. Such support, and, to the extent feasible, any new role, should be conditional on India’s remaining a non-nuclear power.

(4) We should reconsider the level of our economic and military assistance to India in the event she decides to develop or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. To the extent that advance knowledge of this intention by Indian officials would be likely to have a constructive influence, it should be disclosed to them.

b. Japan—to deter Japan from building nuclear weapons:

(1) We should reaffirm, and if necessary, reinforce our present defense commitment. As in the case of India, early consideration should be given to the form these commitments might take.

(2) We should, as in the case of India, attempt to help the Japanese with appropriate prestige alternatives.

(3) We should support Japan’s desire for a more important role as a world leader.

c. Israel-UAR.

(1) Israel. As long as Israel remains a non-nuclear power, we should continue to give Israel assurances against being overrun by the UAR. We should make clear to Israel that these assurances would be withdrawn if she develops a nuclear weapon capability and that we would be prepared to consider other measures as well.

(2) UAR. We should make it clear to UAR that our policy restraining an independent Israeli nuclear force is unlikely to be effective if the UAR acquires nuclear weapons. If the UAR should make a decision to do so, we should be prepared to take measures designed to reverse that decision.

(3) We should make major efforts to persuade France, Germany or others against providing missile or nuclear assistance to Israel or the UAR, and should work for Soviet cooperation in keeping the Israeli-UAR confrontation non-nuclear.

d. Spread of weapons technology. We should revise and broaden NSAM 294 so that it will restrict United States contributions to the development of nuclear warheads or strategic nuclear delivery capabilities of any country (including the United Kingdom if she can be induced to fold her strategic nuclear force into the ANF). Moreover, we should seek to enlist the cooperation of other advanced nations in parallel actions designed to complement the actions of the United States.

3. Policies toward Europe and the Atlantic Nuclear Force.

Our present policies in this area are defined in NSAM 322. In dealing with the Soviet Union, it should be made clear that any Atlantic Nuclear Force must reinforce and contribute to our basic policy of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. To this end, it should be emphasized that any treaty establishing such a Force would include undertakings whereby the nuclear members would agree not to disseminate nuclear weapons to the independent control of non-nuclear members and the non-nuclear members would undertake not to develop or acquire or obtain control over nuclear weapons; that in all cases the agreement of the United States would be required in order to have the Force fire nuclear weapons; and that the voting procedures could be revised only with the unanimous agreement of all participating nations. Moreover, it should be emphasized that any ANF agreement would prevent the proliferation of individual nuclear capabilities among the participants and may reduce the number of nations having independent strategic nuclear capabilities by at least one (the United Kingdom).

Several of the members of the Committee believe that an MLF/ANF or something like it may be essential if the Germans are to be inhibited from eventually acquiring an independent nuclear capability. Others feel that more modest measures such as increased sharing in nuclear consultation and planning and further exploitation of bilateral arrangements for nuclear weapons systems would suffice to deter the Germans from an independent nuclear course, particularly since the Germans are aware that such a course would be strongly opposed by France and the Soviet Union. In addition, it could be made clear to the Germans that the maintenance of United States forces in Germany would be inconsistent with the independent possession of nuclear weapons by Germany. Others of the Committee, seeing a basic incompatibility between the goal of German reunification and German acquisition of nuclear weapons, feel that greater emphasis should be placed on reunification as a means of shifting German interests away from nuclear weapons toward an objective more consistent with long-term European stability.

In any case, all members agree that the appropriate agencies of the Government should continue urgent exploration of possible alternatives to an MLF/ANF which would permanently inhibit Germany from acquiring nuclear weapons, but would nevertheless assure that, in the absence of German reunification, West Germany would remain as a real ally on the Western side.

4. Policies toward existing nuclear powers.

a. France. While maintaining a place for France in the structure of any ANF, as provided in NSAM 322, we should make it clear to France that her insistence upon the development of an independent nuclear-strategic capability and upon atmospheric testing are unacceptable. Accordingly:

(1) We should in no way assist the French atmospheric or underground nuclear test program and should be prepared to support international measures initiated by others having the effect of impeding or penalizing French nuclear tests.

(2) Insofar as France is concerned, we should interpret NSAM 294 strictly.

b. United Kingdom.

(1) We should continue to favor the incorporation of the United Kingdom independent strategic nuclear deterrent in an ANF-type arrangement.

(2) In consultation with the United Kingdom, we should undertake an appropriate revision of the 1958 amendment of the Atomic Energy Act authorizing nuclear assistance to nations with advanced weapons capabilities that would be consistent with the future course of a special relationship with the United Kingdom while removing the implicit encouragement of existing law to other countries to achieve advanced nuclear capabilities.

c. Soviet Union. In view of the great importance of Soviet support and cooperation in connection with efforts to stop nuclear proliferation, we should undertake new initiatives to obtain such support. We should make early approaches to the Soviets, seeking cooperation on as broad a basis as possible in achieving the objectives described in this report, and to the extent possible, the relevant specific actions set forth in paragraphs 1, 2 and 5 of these recommendations.

In addition to the direct non-proliferation measures described in paragraph 1 above, we should undertake early initiatives toward the following United States-Soviet arms control agreements as a means both of reducing tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union and creating an atmosphere conducive to wide acceptance of restraints on nuclear proliferation:

(1) A verified fissile materials production cutoff for weapons purposes, to be established by treaty (with appropriate provision permitting the production of tritium).

(2) A verified strategic delivery vehicle freeze coupled with significant agreed reductions (e.g. 30%) in strategic force levels, to be established by treaty.

(3) An 18- to 24-month halt in the construction of new ABM or ICBM launchers, to be accomplished by reciprocal Executive action based on unilateral verification capabilities.

d. China. We believe that it will prove difficult over the long term either to halt nuclear proliferation or to obtain worldwide peace and stability until China has joined the society of nations and is willing to participate responsibly in arms control measures. In view of the complexity and difficulty of the problem, we recommend that the Government undertake a major high-level reexamination of our policies toward China, taking into account the effect of those policies upon all aspects of our national security and our alliances in the Far East.

5. Peaceful uses of atomic energy.

While we recognize that in the long run fissionable materials will probably be available in all industrial countries as a result of nuclear power programs, we believe that every effort should be made at this time to ensure that peaceful atomic energy programs do not unreasonably contribute to potential proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities. We should in all cases insist on adequate safeguards for all peaceful programs. Moreover, our support should be limited to those programs which will advance the economic development of friendly countries; and we should not press such programs with special subsidies. Careful consideration should be given to the political stability and reliability of countries where such programs are undertaken. We should make an effort to get all potential suppliers to agree to offer materials and facilities only under adequate safeguards.

We should take the following actions with regard to IAEA and Euratom:

a. IAEA.

(1) We should increase our efforts to build up the IAEA, including broader responsibilities, increased operational activities, larger budgets and improved technical capabilities.

(2) We should exert stronger influence on all nations including supplying nations and the Soviet Bloc to accept IAEA safeguards on reactors and separation plants and should offer, in return, to extend safeguards to additional United States facilities.

(3) We should explore additional means of establishing control practices with respect to uranium and fuel elements which would reduce the risk of nuclear power facilities being used for military purposes.

b. Euratom.

(1) We should press Euratom in order to obtain satisfactory United States verification of Euratom safeguards.

(2) We should work toward Euratom acceptance of IAEA safeguards and IAEA acceptance of Euratom.

While we recognize that the peaceful uses of nuclear explosives (Project Plowshare) may have long-term economic importance, we do not believe that the program should be allowed to jeopardize a comprehensive test ban treaty or to encourage interest in nuclear weapons. Undue emphasis on such programs tends to make nuclear explosives appear desirable, necessary and acceptable for countries presently considering undertaking nuclear weapons programs. In addition, attempts to incorporate provisions permitting such programs under a comprehensive test ban treaty may be difficult, if not impossible, without providing a loophole under which nuclear weapons could be developed. We should not, therefore, actively seek to interest other countries in such programs until we better understand their relationship to the comprehensive test ban and the general nuclear proliferation problem.

6. United States weapons policies.

If we are to minimize the incentives for others to acquire nuclear weapons, it is important that we avoid giving an exaggerated impression of their importance and utility and that we stress the current and future important role of conventional armaments. It is also important that our physical arrangements minimize the possibility of unauthorized seizure or compromise of design information regarding United States nuclear weapons deployed abroad. Accordingly, we should take the following actions:

a. NATO strategy. We believe that the prospects for success of our effort to stop the spread of nuclear weapons will be enhanced by adoption of a revised NATO strategy, along the lines now being proposed by the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, placing greater stress on a non-nuclear option and relying less upon tactical nuclear weapons. (Such a policy would of course maintain a tactical nuclear capability for deterrence, credibility and flexibility.)

b. Physical security. The program for the installation of Permissive Action Links (PALs) in weapons deployed in Europe should be continued and expanded to apply to all weapons deployed overseas. Intensified research to develop improved safeguards against seizure or unauthorized use should be continued. We should consider appropriate assistance to the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union in connection with the development of PALs and safety devices for their respective weapons.

c. Research and development. The Department of Defense should reexamine future requirements in the light of the policies recommended in this memorandum. Consideration should be given, among other matters, to damage limitation systems effective against lesser nuclear threats; to detection and identification systems related to such threats; and to the development of any weapons systems necessary to back our commitments to nations electing not to develop their own nuclear weapons.

The program outlined above should not preclude other measures to prevent nuclear proliferation and the appropriate agencies of the Government should be called upon to undertake to develop additional proposals to that end. All agencies should carefully consider the implications for nuclear proliferation of all their actions and information policies, and their progress on non-proliferation matters should, we think, be followed closely by you and your senior advisers.

• Arthur H. Dean
• Allen W. Dulles
• Alfred M. Gruenther
• George B. Kistiakowsky
• John J. McCloy
• James A. Perkins
• Arthur K. Watson
• William Webster
• Herbert F. York
• Roswell L. Gilpatric
  Chairman

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Report (Final, 12/21/65), Box 8. Secret. The report and a 13-page “draft of an NSAM which would in the opinion of the Gilpatric Committee give execution to its recommendations,” was transmitted under cover of a memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Foster, Seaborg, General Wheeler, McCone, and Hornig, January 23, 1964 [1965], with the President’s admonition that “these papers not be shown to anyone outside the Committee of Principals without his direct approval in each case … . I cannot overstate the strength of the President’s conviction and concern for the security of these documents.” A copy of the draft NSAM, not printed, is ibid. The NSAM was never formally issued.