Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI, Arms Control and Disarmament

220. Letter From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to President Johnson¹

Washington, December 5, 1967.

Dear Mr. President:

We have had no further word from our Allies regarding the alternative formulations of the first sentence of Article III since the November 30 meeting of the North Atlantic Council when a number of them gave us their reactions.² At that time it appeared that those allies who are not members of Euratom could accept any of the alternatives. This is also true of Japan, whose views we also solicited. The Netherlands representative in NAC highlighted the point that the November 2 draft is no longer a viable alternative.³ However, there has been no clear indication of the FRG’s views.

Mr. Foster succeeded, with Roshchin’s cooperation, in keeping the ENDC in session until the middle of December. The other ENDC delegations were willing to go along with this on the assumption that this would facilitate the efforts of the Co-Chairmen to reach agreement on Article III before the ENDC recesses.⁴

If we are unable to table an Article III before the ENDC recesses, there is likely to be a sense of heightened frustration on the part of the non-aligned delegations who have been kept waiting, first by the Soviet delay in agreeing to tabling a draft treaty with a blank Article III until August 24, and later by the delay in an evolution of a definitive Western position on Article III, a phase we are still in.

Ambassador Cleveland has been instructed to tell his colleagues that we would like to have the definitive views of the Euratom countries, and especially those of the FRG and Italy, at the Council meeting scheduled for December 6⁵ in order to permit us to determine if there is a basis for tabling an Article III before the ENDC has to recess in mid-December.

If the FRG and Italy do not give us their views at the December 6 NAC meeting, or if they insist that we continue to push the November 2 language which the Soviets reject, the completion of the NPT will have to be put off until next year.

Official reaction in the FRG and Italy to your December 2 speech offering to place U.S. peaceful facilities under IAEA safeguards has been very favorable.⁶

We hope the speech will help in producing a more favorable position on Article III in these countries.

Faithfully yours,

Adrian S. Fisher

Enclosure⁷

Alternatives for First Sentence of Article III

1. November 2 US Draft (rejected by Soviets but most acceptable to Euratom allies)

“1… . undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the IAEA in accordance with the Statute of the IAEA and the Agency’s safeguards system … .”

2. November 9 Soviet Delegation Proposal (not clear whether now acceptable to Soviets; not clear whether acceptable to FRG; apparently rejected by Italy; acceptable to most other allies)

“1… . undertakes to accept safeguards, in accordance with the Statute of the IAEA and the Agency’s safeguards system, as set forth in an agreement to be concluded with the IAEA … .”

3. Modification of a UK Proposal (most likely to be acceptable to Soviets; rejected by FRG; not clear whether acceptable to Italy; acceptable to most other allies)

“1… . undertakes to accept IAEA safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be concluded with the IAEA in accordance with the Statute of the IAEA … .”

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Non-Proliferation Treaty, 7/21/67, Vol. II, Box 26. Secret.1
2. Not further identified.
3. For text of November 2 draft, see Document 216.
4. In 1967, the second session of the ENDC convened in Geneva on May 18 and recessed on December 14.
5. See Document 219.
6. For text of President Johnson’s address on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the first nuclear reactor, December 2, 1967, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book II, pp. 1083-1085.
7. Secret.