6. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs (Johnson) to
Secretary of State Rusk and
Secretary of Defense McNamara1
Washington, January 21, 1964.
MEMORANDUM FOR
- State—Secretary Rusk
- Defense—Secretary McNamara
-
CIA—Mr. McCone
-
ACDA—Mr. Fisher
- White House—Mr. McGeorge Bundy
- White House—Dr. Wiesner
- White House—Dr. Welsh
- White House—Mr. Johnson
-
NASA—Mr. Webb
-
USIA—Mr. Murrow
SUBJECT
- Possible Disclosure of Satellite Reconnaissance
Conclusions:
Following discussions among your representatives, we have concluded that no
additional action to disseminate more knowledge of our
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satellite reconnaissance capability is required
at this time in support of our disarmament and other policies.
This memorandum summarizes our findings on the nature of present official and
unofficial knowledge of U.S. satellite reconnaissance, and on ways in which
wider knowledge might affect allied and Soviet acceptance of our disarmament
proposals.
State of Allied Knowledge of U.S. Satellite Reconnaissance
Program:
As a result of actions taken following the review of the political and public
handling of the U.S. satellite reconnaissance program under NSAM 1562 in the summer of 1962, all NATO heads of government, Foreign Ministers
and NAC Permreps were told officially of our
reconnaissance satellite program—the fact that we had it, that it was
developing well and was directly benefiting the alliance, and finally, that
the U.S. must maintain it at all costs. A somewhat similar briefing was
given to several selected neutral officials. None of those briefed [2 lines of source text not declassified] were shown
pictures, and no details of the quality or extent of coverage were given.
Changes have occurred in four NATO
Governments and in the NAC since these
briefings, and we have made arrangements to brief the appropriate [3 lines of source text not declassified].
A list of foreign officials who have been briefed on the program is at Tab
A.3
Much satellite-derived information is presently being incorporated into
NATO planning documents, particularly
the Target Data Inventory which provides exact locations on such military
targets as Soviet SAM, MRBM and ICBM
launch pads. This information is classified Secret and there is no
attribution of source. The nature of the data is such, however, that we must
assume that many of the more than 500 non-U.S. NATO officials who have access to the TDI deduce its overhead photographic origin.
We are aware of no basic disagreement within NATO on the accuracy of our intelligence, and thus find no
present necessity for additional disclosures to our Allies, either in terms
of briefing more people or of giving more details about the program.
Non-Bloc Attitudes:
We have examined NATO and other non-Bloc
press coverage of reconnaissance satellites but, with the exception of the
U.S. press, find
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nothing of
significance. We plan to query selected U.S. Embassies in an effort to
determine more clearly the level of public and official awareness of the
U.S. satellite program and attitudes toward it. If our experience with
recent proceedings of the UN Outer Space
Committee is a valid indicator, most non-Bloc states tend to accept space
reconnaissance as a fact of life and to view attendant political
considerations with indifference. This situation is satisfactory from our
standpoint.
Soviet Statements on and Awareness of U.S. Satellite
Reconnaissance Program:
Over the past 18 months we have noted a decline in Soviet press articles and
statements on U.S. satellite reconnaissance. The Soviet press regularly
reports “secret” launches of U.S. “spy” satellites, but these are only two
or three sentence summaries of U.S. press agency stories, usually without
Soviet comment. We have seen little else in the Soviet press since last
summer on any aspect of reconnaissance satellites, and certainly nothing to
compare either with earlier Soviet assaults on such activity or with recent
U.S. articles on this subject. There has been no Soviet commentary yet on
these U.S. articles adverting to extensive U.S. space reconnaissance
operations.
In the UN Outer Space Committee negotiations,
the Soviets have relaxed (but not abandoned) their position of long standing
on banning reconnaissance satellites, at least to the extent of making
agreement possible last fall on general principles of space law, without
reference to reconnaissance. It is clear that the Soviets have taken this
action without prejudice to future negotiations, but it does represent a
significant shift in Soviet tactics.
The new Soviet attitude may result in part from experience they have acquired
with reconnaissance satellites. In the last year the USSR has launched a large number of
recoverable satellites, some of which carried low resolution cameras. We
have intercepted Soviet video transmissions of pictures from these cameras.
It is quite possible, given the 10,000 lb. weight of the Soviet Cosmos
vehicles, that higher resolution cameras were aboard as well. Khrushchev
hinted as much when he told Spaak last summer that the Soviets were
photographing the U.S. and even offered to show Spaak some pictures.
Adzhubey is reported to have made a similar statement in Finland in
September 1963.
On the basis of the inconclusive evidence we have acquired in the last year
or so, we believe that (a) the Soviets are certainly aware of the program,
although probably still uncertain of its precise scope and quality; (b) they
are prepared for the moment to live with it, in part
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because there is no feasible alternative open to them
to stop it, and (c) they are probably engaged in a reconnaissance effort of
their own. As they acquire first hand experience, their awareness of the
strength and weaknesses of space reconnaissance may have some influence on
their future proposals in space and disarmament matters.
Relationship of Satellite Reconnaissance to Current U.S.
Disarmament Proposals:
At Tab B is a study, prepared by ACDA,
attempting to gauge the impact of satellite photography on the principal
current arms control proposals under consideration in ACDA, and on the contribution satellites can
make in monitoring agreements already in effect, i.e., the test ban and the
resolution against bombs in orbit.
A separable first stage proposal on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and
production cutoff would, of course, be heavily dependent on our unilateral
reconnaissance capabilities. The degree of this dependency may well have to
be revealed in part to make a separable first stage proposal acceptable to
our Allies and domestically. Until a U.S. position on this matter is fully
worked out, however, we cannot usefully anticipate possible solutions to
this problem.
Tab B
The Contribution of Satellite Photography to the
Verification of Current Arms Control and Disarmament Proposals
Problem
The United States has developed an observation satellite system which is
now able to furnish reasonable quality and reasonably timely photography
of any area in the world which may be of interest. This unilateral
capability effectively provides the “open skies” coverage of the USSR which was requested by President
Eisenhower in 1955 as part of
a disarmament agreement. It is clear that possession of this photography
changes the requirements for ground or other types of inspection as part
of the verification of a number of different proposed arms control
agreements although it does not obviate the need for complementary means
of data collection. This brief discussion has been prepared as an
attempt to gauge the impact of satellite photography on the principal
current arms control proposals under consideration in the U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency.
[Page 17]
Capabilities of Current Satellite Photography
Currently the most important single U.S. intelligence asset is satellite
photography. Since the first successful recovery of a Keyhole vehicle in
August 1960, there have been about 30 recovered missions, providing
cloud-free, usable photography of approximately 90 percent of the USSR. The quality of the photography has
now reached the level, in some instances, of early U–2 photography, and
long focal-length camera systems, first successfully used in the summer
of 1963, can now provide even better materials on selected targets. With
photography from the normal search mode, using the KH–4 camera system,
photo-interpreters can detect objects as small as 8 to 10 feet on a
side. [8 lines of source text not
declassified]
Satellite photography will be of particular value in the investigation of
suspect locations. It is particularly well suited for the identification
of new construction activity, for example, and existing photo
interpretation procedures include, as a matter of course, the
examination of comparative photographic coverage of a given area to
detect changes. Tunneling and digging operations, requiring the dumping
of spoil, would be readily apparent, for example.
The appearance of new transportation nets, even if only a few dirt roads
into a relatively inaccessible area, is readily identifiable.
For nearly four years photography from earth satellites has been an
important source of information on the ground force in the Soviet Union.
The extensive high level photography from aircraft (Talent) of military
installations and training areas acquired during the period from
mid-1956 to mid-1960 is still useful to photo-interpreters for
comparison with photography from satellites (Keyhole). Usable Keyhole
photography acquired since mid-1960 covers virtually all of the USSR, East Germany, Poland, and Hungary.
This photography is good enough to locate and describe military
installations including such details as the dimensions, and probable
functions of buildings. It can reveal whether installations are
currently in use, although the extent of usage at any time cannot be
determined. Military training areas, firing ranges, tank moving-target
ranges, and vehicle driving courses are easily discerned, and the
photography can reveal whether such facilities have been in recent
active use. However, it cannot pick up major land combat equipment.
Enhanced image resolution offers the hope for sufficient further
improvement to eliminate this difficulty. However, there is no certainty
that overhead photography can provide a complete and independent
confirmation of the existence of a unit or of its strength in manpower
and equipment.
[Page 18]
Arms Control and Disarmament Proposals
- 1.
-
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Including
Underground Tests.
The evidence of actual underground nuclear testing, both in the
United States and the Soviet Union, has already been detected in
photography. The major deterrent to effective use of satellite
photography is likely to be lack of adequate coverage resulting
from weather conditions or long time lapses between photography.
Few areas in the USSR remain
which have not yet been photographed, and none of these is
readily accessible by existing transportation facilities.
Certain portions of the USSR,
however, provide more information than others. In far northern
latitudes, light conditions generally preclude much usable
photography during winter months. Meteorological conditions also
hamper interpretation in places—the Kamchatka Peninsula and the
Kuriles, for example, are nearly always cloud covered, as is the
Baltic area. On the other hand, desert areas between the Caspian
Sea and Lake Balkhash are nearly always cloud-free.
The time between photographic missions covering a given area
varies considerably, depending on the location of the area under
study. Although to date an average of at least one mission per
month has been orbited, the areas covered by each mission vary,
and few areas receive repeated coverage on consecutive missions.
With the added factor of unfavorable cloud conditions, it is
frequently possible that a specific target may not be covered
more frequently than every six to eight months. On the other
hand, some areas located near significant targets, such as
ICBM sites or known R&D facilities, and in desert
areas where cloud conditions are generally good, are covered
nearly every time a satellite is programmed.
[2 paragraphs (22 lines of source text) not
declassified]
- 2.
-
Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles, Interim
Reduction and Production Cut-off.
The current proposal specifies armament reductions and
curtailment of test and production for the following major
strategic weapons categories: ICBMs and IRBM/MRBMs; heavy and medium bomber aircraft with
air-to-surface missiles; submarines equipped to deliver weapons
by ballistic or cruise missiles; and ABMs.
[2 paragraphs (7 lines of source text) not
declassified]
- a.
-
Land Based Missiles:
Satellite photography has permitted the identification of
all or nearly all the fixed launch facilities for
strategic missile systems in the USSR and would provide an
effective check on Soviet declarations of such bases as
well as initiation of new launch site construction. [2–1/2 lines of source text not
declassified]
- b.
-
Submarine Launched Missiles:
[1 paragraph (6 lines of source text)
not declassified]
- c.
-
Heavy and Medium Bomber Aircraft:
[1 paragraph (6 lines of source text)
not declassified]
- d.
-
Production of Strategic Weapons:
[1 paragraph (18 lines of source text)
not declassified]
- 3.
-
Fissionable Material Production Cut-off
Satellite photography is admirably suited to support any arms
control agreement on the cut-off of production of fissionable
material. Installations capable of contributing significantly to
the fissionable material stockpile of any of the nuclear powers
would, of necessity, be sufficiently large and characteristic to
be detectable by all present reconnaissance systems. In fact it
is believed that essentially all of the important elements of
the Soviet AE production complex have been so photographed and
identified. Thus Soviet declarations of production sites could
be confidently checked by satellite photography and decisions
made on the Soviet compliance. A solid basis would be provided
for reaching a decision on inspection to locate an undeclared
facility. Construction of a new AE production facility could
also be detected and probably identified well in advance of
actual operation.
[2 paragraphs (13 lines of source text) not
declassified]
- 4.
-
Nuclear Free Zones
The proposal provides for the prohibition of nuclear weapons from
defined geographic regions, such as Latin America. Photographic
satellites could provide broad-base coverage on which to
establish a base or mosaic of large-scale military activities in
a particular region. It would be a useful means of obtaining
wide area coverage to be used for targeting more specific
collection means such as low altitude or ground observation.
[1 paragraph (8 lines of source text) not
declassified]
- 5.
-
Other Proposals
Photographic satellites would have limited applications in
providing background information pertinent to the enforcement of
a number of other arms control measures.
- a.
-
Observation Posts and Surprise
Attack:
Satellite photography would have only limited value in
support of the observation post proposal. In general the
time delay in obtaining reliable coverage of any area
make this source unattractive as a unique source for
detecting any surprise attack or clandestine maneuver.
Furthermore, the quality of the [12
lines of source text not declassified].
- b.
-
[less than 1 line of source text not
declassified]
[1 paragraph (6–1/2 lines of source
text) not declassified]
- c.
-
Bombs in Orbit:
The US and the USSR have
agreed to a UN resolution
forbidding the orbiting of nuclear weapons. Verification
is by unilateral means and, presumably, the orbiting of
the number of large, low-orbit satellites sufficient to
have real military significance would be noticed even
though intentions were not known. [6
lines of source text not declassified]
- d.
-
Conventional Armaments and Force
Levels:
[1 paragraph (5 lines of source text)
not declassified]
