184. Editorial Note
When President Johnson ordered the partial cessation of bombing, private individuals acting as unofficial negotiators were in North Vietnam. Americans Harry Ashmore and William Baggs of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, who had been involved in overtures to the North Vietnamese in 1967, were granted entry visas by the North Vietnamese Government in March 1968 in order to facilitate the peace process. Following a briefing by Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs William P. Bundy, Ashmore and Baggs arrived in Hanoi on March 29. As a result of their conversation on April 1 with Hoang Tung, a spokesman for the Hanoi regime, Ashmore and Baggs reported to Ambassador to Laos William Sullivan through the offices of the Indonesian Ambassador to North Vietnam, Nugroho, that their efforts had produced tentative procedures for the initial meetings between the United States and North Vietnam. In an April 2 covering memorandum transmitting an intelligence report on the channel to the President, Walt Rostow noted that it appeared that “our two blind hogs (Baggs and Ashmore) have found an acorn.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 70) In telegram 6972 from Vientiane, April 2, however, Sullivan notified the Department of his skepticism at having “to play cloak and dagger with these two characters.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–14 VIET/CROCODILE)
[Page 537]Following another conversation with Tung on April 4, Ashmore and Baggs assisted him in composing an aide-memoire on April 5 which they believed had approval from the highest levels of authority in the North Vietnamese Government. Immediately returning to Vientiane, they turned over the aide-memoire to Sullivan, who subsequently transmitted it to the Department in telegram 5650, April 5. It reads:
“The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has repeatedly protested against the U.S. action in illegally laying hold of civilians and military personnel on board fishing boats and freighters even in the territorial waters of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam demands that the United States stop all its arrogant acts, respect the sovereignty, territory, and security of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and release immediately, unconditionally and without any need for an agreement between the two parties, all citizens of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam now being illegally detained. As for the captured American pilots, they are regarded by the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as guilty to the Vietnamese people. Acting upon orders from the U.S. Government, they have bombed the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, an independent and sovereign country, killing civilians and destroying property of the Vietnamese people. However, in accordance with the humane and lenient policy of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, they have enjoyed good treatment. On the occasion of the last Tet festival, for the first time, three of the captured U.S. pilots were released in view of their correct attitude during their detention. With regard to the ‘limited bombing’ of North Vietnam announced by President Johnson, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam made clear its view in its April 3, 1968 statement. The U.S. Government has not seriously and fully met the legitimate demands of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, of progressive American opinion and of world opinion. However, for its part, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam declared its readiness to appoint its representative to contact the U.S. representative with a view to determining with the American side the unconditional cessation of the U.S. bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, so that the talks may start.” (Ibid.)
The Department requested that Ashmore and Baggs return to Washington. (Telegram 142968 to Vientiane, April 6; ibid.) After a conversation he had with Ashmore and Baggs in Tokyo as they were en route to the United States, Ambassador to Japan U. Alexis Johnson reported that they considered the message from Tung to be an official [Page 538] reply to the United States. In addition, Ashmore and Baggs noted that they had confirmed to Tung their transmission of the aide-memoire. (Telegrams 7219 and 7220 from Tokyo, April 7; ibid., S-AH Files: Lot 71 D 461, Sept. 11, Meeting XXI)
Once back in Washington, Ashmore and Baggs briefed Ambassador Harriman on their visit, but the message did not have the impact they expected it would. Rostow decried the fact that they had “acted as negotiators” and “took a position that washed out reciprocal action by the DRV if we stopped bombing.” (Memorandum from Rostow to the President, April 6; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Crocodile, Chronological, Vol. I, 3/31–4/10/68) In an April 12 letter to Secretary of State Rusk, the President railed against any further such private contacts since they always seemed to result “in a posture of quasi-negotiation which misleads Hanoi and undercuts our position at home.” (Ibid., Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 72)
The full report of Ashmore and Baggs was submitted as a memorandum to Harriman dated April 10. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S-AH Files: Lot 71 D 461, Sept. 11 Meeting) For Ashmore and Baggs’ account of their overture, see Mission to Hanoi (New York: G.P. Putnam’s, 1968), passim. Bundy’s comments on the particulars of this book are in a memorandum to Rusk, September 9. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–14 VIET)