Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

56. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson¹

Washington, January 29, 1966.

SUBJECT

• Bringing Viet Nam to the Security Council

On the assumption the bombing of the North has been resumed, Arthur Goldberg and I are agreed that an almost simultaneous request for a Security Council meeting would help demonstrate that we want to stop not just the bombing but the whole war by seeking an honorable settlement. Furthermore, the Popeʼs appeal for UN mediation provides the United States with a favorable opportunity to convene the Security Council promptly on the Viet Nam problem. We recommend therefore that you approve a US move to convene the Council. You could announce this decision on Monday morning;² Ambassador Goldberg would about the same time submit a formal letter to the President of the Security Council requesting an urgent meeting, and the Security Council could meet on late Monday afternoon or Tuesday morning.

Our plan is to have the United States preempt the situation in the Council in two ways: (a) a detailed speech by Ambassador Goldberg laying out the full record of our efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement, the lack of constructive responses by the other side, and their continued aggression; and (b) a resolution calling for unconditional discussions among the participants of the Geneva Conferences of 1954 and 1962.³

It is true that our frequent soundings over the past year, including the last one two weeks ago, on the desirability of bringing the Viet Nam question to the Security Council have produced almost uniformly unfavorable responses. U Thant said in his press conference January 20:⁴

“I felt, and I still feel, that at this stage the UN cannot be involved in the conflict”. The Soviets and French whom we consulted as well as the British, Australians, and New Zealanders were decidedly negative.

The unfavorable reactions have been based primarily on the fact that Hanoi and Peking, because they are not UN members, have explicitly and repeatedly rejected any UN jurisdiction or involvement in the Viet Nam problem, and would therefore presumably refuse to participate in the Security Council debate or accept any decisions the Security Council might take. Consequently, it is assumed, no doubt correctly, that the Soviets would oppose any Security Council consideration or action, would feel obliged to attack the United States viciously during the debate, and would veto any substantive resolution that might be proposed. A debate could further reduce whatever capabilities the USSR may have as an eventual mediator and could further reduce their freedom to deal constructively with the United States on other matters such as disarmament. An additional argument against reference to the Security Council has been that it would cut across whatever moves toward negotiation were being made as a result of our peace offensive.

Nevertheless, there are two strong reasons for convening the Security Council, one psychological and one substantive. First, once our bombing of the North has resumed, it will be especially important that it be clear to the world that our peace offensive is still being vigorously pursued; also such a move would meet the persistent domestic criticism that the full resources of the UN have not been brought to bear on the Viet Nam problem.

Second, while we can assume strong Soviet opposition, a Security Council debate focusing on the need to move the Viet Nam problem to the conference table should at least help stimulate further peace moves (the Pope, the non-aligned, free world friends) through diplomatic channels whether or not the Security Council is able to adopt a formal resolution.

This course is not without risks. We can expect that resumption of the bombing of the North will have dissipated to a degree the present favorable international climate and support for our position. The risks are threefold:

a. there would be pressure to include in the resolution a call for a ceasefire;

b. we will also be pressed to agree to a formulation on NLF participation in any negotiations which goes beyond our present publicly stated position; and

c. those who would be willing to support a call for unconditional discussions in some appropriate forum are also likely to insist that such a proposal be made in the context of further suspension of bombing.

The way to meet this is for the United States to preempt the situation with a resolution which formulates a number of key points in a manner acceptable to us. The attached resolution⁵ is submitted for your approval. We estimate there is a majority in the Council for such a resolution. Moreover, because of our peace offensive we should be able to prevent a majority being mobilized in the Council for a resolution or an amendment calling for another suspension of the bombing by the United States without any reciprocity by the other side.

There are two principal likely results:

1. Hanoi and Peking will deny Security Council competence and it may be that as a consequence the members would decide against pressing any formal resolution to the vote. Such an outcome would be satisfactory to us since it would then be clear to world opinion and our own that we seek peace but our adversaries do not.

2. If the members prefer to vote on a resolution, we are likely to have the requisite majority.⁶

Dean Rusk

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 19. Secret; Nodis; Pinta. McGeorge Bundy forwarded the memorandum to President Johnson at 7:30 p.m. (Ibid.)
2. January 31.
3. Regarding the resolution submitted to the Security Council on January 31, see Document 59.
4. See footnote 4, Document 33.
5. Attached but not printed.
6. At 4:30 p.m. on January 30 Rusk spoke by telephone with McGeorge Bundy, who stated that the President had asked if Rusk was certain that going to the United Nations was the right course. According to notes of the conversation, Rusk “replied ‘yes, he thought so.’ Let the Security Council take it on to see if they can do anything.” Asked by Bundy if his “subordinates were on board,” Rusk said, “Goldberg and Sisco think it is all right.” (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telcons)