Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

50. Notes of Meeting¹

Washington, January 27, 1966, 6:20–8:20 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Resumption of Bombing

PRESENT

• President, McNamara, Rusk, M. Bundy, General Wheeler, Moyers, Valenti

Rusk: Nothing to report on diplomatic front. Plane to Hanoi has been delayed from Vientiane.

I canʼt honestly say I see any taker from the other side. One thin thread that hasnʼt played its course—from Souvanna.

President: Did you ask McNamara and Bus Wheeler to see Ayub letter?²

Bundy: Yes.

Bundy or Rusk (not clear): From a diplomatic view only, the general reaction to a few days more pause would be good—balanced off against the military.

Donʼt know how much you think the 15 Senatorsʼ view³ will take hold.

President: What do you recommend?

Rusk: Resume bombing—but bombing policy be kept under firm control. The dangers of the Chinese coming in.

Very little initiative on part of Viet Cong.

Resume this weekend.

President: What significance do you attach to low level of VC initiative?

Rusk: If it went on longer perhaps it would be significant—reports are they will draw back to guerrilla type warfare. Perhaps if this continues, we can let our bombing intensity reflect this.

Wheeler: Westmoreland said he is afraid of what is developing in First Corps area—may be getting ready to mount major effort in northern provinces.

Also reports of sizable concentration in Quag Ny (probably Quang Ngai). ROK battalions are there.

Fact there havenʼt been number of sizable attacks is meaningless.

Bundy: It is unusual for (so) few attacks so long.

(Wheeler:) Not so, really.

McNamara: Rate of activity is off since Tet. Donʼt know why nor will we for at least a week. but they are continuing to reinforce at rapid rate.

President: Donʼt know “why”—but the “why” is probably not to our advantage.

McNamara: I agree. Further delay on resumption of bombing can polarize opinion in this country. I feel we should resume—and send execute order tonight.

President: Does it make any difference if we start on Sunday?⁴

McNamara: No, not really.

Rusk: Senior officers in my Department would vote holding off a while longer. Canʼt find any solid basis, however, to recommend to you we refrain.

Wheeler: Dean, how much would it take to get a definitive answer from Souvannaʼs man?

Rusk: Probably a week—or never.

Bundy: We wonʼt get this man to make any definitive … odds are very long if he came back in a week, he would have anything.

Only reason for prolonging is the low level of VC activity—and opinion of Ayub and others that it would create confusion on the other side.

Rusk: But with these trucks coming South, how do you justify refraining?

President: What are the latest facts on infiltration?

(President read report on ______)

(Agreed we would not send execute order until we are absolutely ready to go.)

President asked: “Whatʼs different in bombing on Saturday as compared to Monday?”

McNamara: Thereʼs a difference in number of perishable targets. They might be off the roads by Monday.

President: Are we doing any good on our bombing in South Vietnam and Laos?

McNamara: Yes, we are. Running 1900 sorties a week in Laos.

Wheeler: In area just opposite Laos, in the Delta area, destroyed 5 trucks, took out anti-aircraft plus others. This is the only day we havenʼt hit a secondary explosion.

Rusk: Can planes going to Laos bring bombs back?

Wheeler: Yes, they can bring bombs back. They donʼt like to bring ordnance back to carriers.

McNamara: Cable⁵ came in saying operations have been limited by bomb shortage. Laotian planes …

Wheeler: But the cable didnʼt make sense—

McNamara: Cable came out of meeting in Bangkok—of a meeting of military personnel. Sent out cable saying I wasnʼt informed of any shortage in bombs.⁶

Only shortage is 750 pound (bombs) used in B–52s. Nobody in right mind thought weʼd drop these bombs in B–52 on Vietnam. But we are working hard on this.

President: Whatʼs wrong with Ridgway?

Wheeler: Heʼs probably bitten by bug that we should never get involved in land war in Asia.

President: Do you think our failure to bomb the North will materially affect the balance out there?

Wheeler: Yes, Sir. We should decrease by every pound we can to stop movement of supplies. In interdiction, you start at the beginning and go all the way through to finally stopping it in-country. Is like stopping water after it comes out of the hose.

President: What are we cutting off?

Wheeler: We hit the power plant. Hitting LOC (lines of communication)—and have raised the cost to them of moving supplies southward. We cannot apply interdiction to stop the supply of troops they are supplying today—about 80 tons a day. But we can stop the supplying of a larger force.

McNamara: This is a very important question but Iʼm not sure of the figures. They need up to 80 tons to supply them—but if they increase troops they will need 165 tons but they have capabilities of 200 tons a day. But these figures are very rough. Our Air Force has learned all over again to do iron bombing. There is much to learn—

President: We really pay a price—if we are not getting a payoff.

(Either Wheeler or McNamara): We know it is costing them—and to feel pain. But I cannot tell you today that our bombing will cut down their operations in the South.

Rusk: Purpose of bombing ought to directly help our troops and break the will of the other fellow. My own priority would be to concentrate on operational connections in the South.

President: When you go back in here, Dean, weʼre going to have to go in closer—and do more risky bombing than we have before. You could see that the other night.⁷

Are we getting closer to danger points by resuming our bombing—and shoving it—or by not resuming it?

McNamara: By resuming, we increase military action with Communist China (presume he meant risk of military action). We must seek to avoid this at all costs. The burden is on us. Some of the programs recommended cause excessive risk.

If we donʼt resume, the risk is more political than military. I personally think this is a high risk.

The CIA estimators feel this way.

Bundy: All estimators say that cessation will strengthen the will of the enemy.

McNamara: People in this country believe that supplies will demand we protect our boys.

President: Did we make a mistake in starting to bomb in the North?

McNamara: No.

Bundy: I share the view that we donʼt need to take the suggestions of those around the table the other night. We never said we would bomb cities.

Wheeler: I must take issue. I agree with the political argument. But I think it is important to bomb militarily.

We never had a heavy enough interdiction program. It has to be heavy. Day after day. We have had only 86 a day. Nothing at night. Now we can do a better job at night.

POL is absolutely vital to interdiction.

But the problem is not the 155 battalions they will have; itʼs what they could have if we allow them to continue supplying. The only industrial target is the iron works in Hanoi. We ought to take that out.

But we need to expand our interdiction campaign.

President: Will that materially increase the danger of pulling China in by increasing bombing program?

Wheeler: Highest possible danger is if we make amphibious landing in North Vietnam. I could be wrong but I donʼt believe it. Donʼt think the Soviets will get involved.

McNamara: Donʼt think we know how many sorties we need to stop the flow of supplies. We could apply quadruple intensity on certain targets. We need more facts.

President: Do we need another 35 days of pause to get them?

McNamara: This has nothing to do with resuming bombing.

President: What have we lost during these 35 days? What are we getting out of these bombings? What reports do we get out of North Vietnam?

Rusk: We get no real reports except from reconnaissance. We are old-fashioned in our spying.

We ought to hit only those targets directly involved in support of troops.

President: Who are people in your Department—their background—and what are their reasons for not resuming?

Rusk: Ball, Thompson. Thompson wants at least two more weeks—to confuse [?] each other. Each of the enemy is afraid to get caught laying down their commitment. Thompson is concerned about Russian involvement.

Bundy: His fundamental point is that Russians know they have a constraining influence on us.

President: Doesnʼt it worry you that Russia might heat up the world somewhere else?

McNamara: No. I think Russians are less a risk than China. And we are strong enough to handle other commitments. I donʼt agree (that) Senator Russell is right.

Wheeler: I think we are strong enough.

McNamara: He may be saying this in context of being a world policeman.

Rusk: Bill Bundy is ready to go—but is worried over the Souvanna thing.

President: What will U Thant say?

Rusk: Some danger. U Thant will say “too bad”. “Some negotiations were in progress and they could have worked.”

Goldberg and Sisco are hoping for holding off. Harriman would be more comfortable with some more time.

President: What is the logic of Goldbergʼs position of three weeks more?

Bundy: He says no damage militarily. Makes no claim that we would get peace.

President: Does he want to pull out?

Bundy: No. He wants to compromise it out.

President: But the only way to get a fellow to talk to you is to show strength. To show daring and imagination and find a way to get to the table.

Are we doing any good playing with the Viet Cong?

Bundy: VC never said they would sit down and talk about prisoners. The door was slammed in our face.

Rusk: Itʼs true we can give wrong decisions to Hanoi. But we donʼt know what they would do with the right signal.

Bundy: One thing the bombing has done is to serve as an umbrella for 200,000 men.

President: I think if you stop bombing they will go for something else. If you let them run you out of your front yard, theyʼll run you out of the house.

I donʼt want war with Russia or China. I feel less comfortable tonight than I felt last night. I donʼt want to back out—and look like Iʼm reacting to the Fulbrights.

We must realize the price we pay for going back in. We will lose a good part of the Senate. I thought of chucking that resolution back to them.

Do we want to take on the Senators—or let others take them on?

McNamara: I think the longer we delay the more controversy we produce.

Bundy: We ought to be sure we hit only trucks and highways until later.

President: We donʼt have anyone defending us.

Bundy: Yes, thatʼs right, and we donʼt have anyone of stature.

President: Douglas⁸ could do it. Heʼs got the standing to do it.

What I donʼt have is evidence.

—Turn loose 115 nations and having them shout at us. Suppose we would not announce a resumption. We would keep the nations off us. Can we take this same firepower and use it in the South?

McNamara: Why wouldnʼt we be better off applying all the sorties in the South?

One, we donʼt need them in South Vietnam.

Two, are we using them in Laos? I donʼt know. They are blind bombing and Iʼm sure we are getting benefit from this.

President: We have to be sure—we must be sure.

McNamara: I am sure we need to resume bombing.

President: What did Bobby⁹ say?

McNamara: He says the burden of proof is on us.

President: What will he say when we resume?

McNamara: I donʼt know. Iʼll see him 10:30 Saturday¹⁰ morning.

President: I think weʼll carry a big burden when (we) resume with the Senate, peace lovers, ministers, etc.

McNamara: We cannot use the same firepower elsewhere. I can prove that.

President: I donʼt think we have the case made to resume bombing. What will the papers say?

What I think we ought to do is to be prepared with statements—let the wise men chase it around.

Ought to talk to all the people we need to talk to Saturday.

And will send order—prefer Monday.

McNamara: Will do it so it will be announced on Tuesday.

1. Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room.
2. Document 49.
3. Fifteen Democratic Senators sent a letter to President Johnson on January 27 opposing resumption of the bombing. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLVI)
4. January 30.
5. See Document 45.
6. Not further identified.
7. Presumably a reference to the January 25 meeting with the Congressional leadership; see Document 43.
8. Presumably a reference to Senator Paul Douglas (D–IL).
9. Senator Robert F. Kennedy (D–NY).
10. January 29.