Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

46. Notes of Meeting¹

Washington, January 26, 1966, 1:25–1:50 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Resumption of Bombing

PRESENT

• The President, Rusk, McNamara, Mac Bundy, Raborn, Ball, Valenti²

Rusk: Souvanna has problem—possibility of NVN coming back this weekend.

Considerable strength if you resume the bombing as much in sorrow as in anger.

Youʼve thought very hard about everything they said.

And beneficial to let Michael Stewart get out of town before bombing.

We are a little thin about VC activity on the ground. This may cause some trouble when we start.

If you think you can stand the pressure—recommend you wait until Sat.³

President: Worried not about pressure—am worried about another Souvanna item. Each time they will bring up something to delay us. J.S. Cooper (Senator from Kentucky) wants to wait. I asked him if he could deliver VC if I gave him more time. He couldnʼt answer.

Rusk: But the central policy issue is embarrassment over some thin issue—

McNamara: We canʼt start before Friday their time—and according to Dean he wants Saturday their time. Only a matter of 24 hours.

President: Must emphasize how sorrowful we are—we must let this be known. If you understand Fulbright he wants us to get out. Mansfield wants us to hunker up.

Rusk: Am disturbed as much by other statements as much as M. and F.

President: I agree.

Rusk: No one can look you in the eye and tell you where we are going if we donʼt get peace.

President: Do you really belive Souvanna will pull something off?

Bundy: No. Odds are nine to one nothing will happen. We ought to lean on Souvanna hard and tell him weʼre his friends and weʼll wait til Saturday.

President: Iʼm afraid theyʼll give us some peace treatment that will be phony—and put us in a box.

McNamara: It is only 24 hours—and we ought to wait. We need that 24 hours.

President: Could you go tomorrow if we had to?

McNamara: Yes, we can—12 hours from now, but it may be a little ragged. Better on 24 hour lead.

President: Whatʼs your answer to PM Wilson telegram⁴ (Prime Minister Wilson)?

McNamara: He accepted our view, it seems to me, putting it on a military basis.

(Bundy read Wilson telegram.)

McNamara: What disturbs me is feeling the fire of the heavier bombing boys. Iʼm not sure we can shut off supplies with bombing.

President: Bring me all you have of military evidence during the pause.

Ball: Let the Ambassadors show it to governments and not put it out to the American press.

President: Thatʼs good. Letʼs do it that way.

McNamara: When should we have this evidence (compiled by CIA)?

Bundy: In 24 hours.

President: When will we hear from Souvanna?

Rusk: Friday night our time.

Bundy: Heʼs supposed to go Thursday and come back Friday.

(Discussion about Fulbright and his position.)

President: I donʼt want to be in Asia but if we tuck our tails and run …

How do you answer Ballʼs memo on China (coming) in the war?⁵

McNamara: I believe we can tell China we do not intend to destroy the political institutions in NVN.

Ball: What we need is a philosophy of the bombing. We donʼt have any now.

McNamara: I disagree.

(McNamara had to leave to testify on the Hill.)

President: There is something wrong with our system when our leaders are testifying instead of thinking about the war.

Letʼs re-write the “Why Vietnam” booklet.⁶ Bring it up to date.

1. Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room.
2. The Presidentʼs Daily Diary indicates that Moyers was also present. (Ibid.)
3. January 29.
4. Wilsonʼs message was transmitted in telegram 4352 from London, January 26. Stating that he thought the Johnson administration had made an honest and commendable effort to avoid further conflict, Wilson indicated that he would support a decision to resume the bombing and suggested that the United States help those who wished to defend its actions by releasing as much evidence as possible about the military use to which the North Vietnamese had put the bombing pause and the two holiday truces. Telegram 1447 to all diplomatic missions, January 31, summarized enemy military activity in South Vietnam and infiltration from North Vietnam during the pause. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
5. Document 41.
6. Why Vietnam, containing statements on Vietnam by the President, Rusk, and McNamara, was printed by the U.S. Government Printing Office in 1965 and widely distributed.