Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

38. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson¹

Washington, January 24, 1966.

SUBJECT

• Briefing of Senate Foreign Relations Committee January 24, 1966

Thirteen Members of the Committee, including Senator Mansfield and excluding Senator Morse, were present for a large part of this morningʼs briefing, in which the atmosphere was frankly more friendly and less critical than I expected. A number of the Senators were complimentary about the “Meet the Press” TV show last evening. My opening statement was confined to the present negotiating situation and our assessment of the attitudes of the various parties, which I repeatedly cautioned was extraordinarily sensitive.

Senator Fulbright opened the questioning with a considerable discussion of the problem of dealing with the National Liberation Front, attempting to draw out, by a discussion of the history since 1940, that it might represent a continuity of the basic opposition to French colonialism, and that our willingness to deal with the NLF might be the key to satisfactory negotiations. This subject was referred to throughout the questioning by several other Members, and we had a full airing of the difference between recognizing the NLF on an equal footing with governments, and bringing it into the picture as just one minority element in South Vietnam. Senator Fulbright remained sceptical of the difference.

Senator Hickenlooper aired some concerns that the continued bombing pause, which he feared might be extended through Prime Minister Wilsonʼs visit to Moscow in February, might give the enemy an undesirable chance to regroup and strengthen themselves. I informed him that Wilson had not asked us to postpone the bombing through his visit and that the decision would be taken on its merits after weighing all factors.

There was extensive discussion of alternatives of all sorts. In an obvious effort to be helpful, Senator Lausche asked where we would draw the line in Southeast Asia, if we donʼt hold it in Vietnam. The view was also expressed by Senator Case that we are getting in a position where we will have to shoulder the responsibility of containing every war of national liberation without assistance from our Allies. While I have no illusions of having changed any positions (although Senator Clark seemed a little less withdrawal-minded than usual), I again feel that the subject was thoroughly aired.

There was considerable discussion about our willingness to accept free elections without anything very much new having been added, and with Senator Fulbright quoting General Eisenhowerʼs book to the effect that if there had been free elections in 1956, about 80% of the South Vietnamese would have voted for Ho Chi Minh.²

Senator Symington requested my estimate of whether the Chinese would be brought in if we bombed Hanoi or Haiphong and landed troops at Vinh to cut off the Ho Chi Minh trail, saying that many of the American officials he consulted during his travels in Southeast Asia did not think they would. I replied that while it is difficult to predict with certainty what the Chinese would do, in my judgment such action would increase the chances of Chinese Communist intervention.

Several questions in a similar vein brought a reasonable degree of consensus on my statement that our present general course of measured action was ultimately less likely to provoke a nuclear war than either of the major alternatives of either abandoning Vietnam or a major escalation on our part.

Senator Pell advanced the Gavin theory of perimeter defense³ as an alternative to which I noted some objections, but the question was not completely explored.

Senator Symington raised the question of adequate control of CIA, referring to the Sunday⁴ editorial in the Washington Post. He had earlier confided to me that his question would be designed to pre-empt and undercut a similar question by Senator McCarthy.

Senator Pell was somewhat obdurate in questioning the credibility of the Administrationʼs view that there have been no peace initiatives by Hanoi and cited the Schoenbrun article last November⁵ to try to prove his point. I hammered the point that the original initiatives were taken by third parties and not by Hanoi, but Pell remained unconvinced.

Consultation: Perhaps the single matter most concerning the Members was the extent and method by which they would be consulted prior to taking crucial decisions on the conduct of the conflict. There was general agreement that we were right in not declaring war, but all felt we should bring the Congress in on major decisions. Several Members, primarily on the Democratic side, requested consultation by you with the whole Committee, before resuming bombing of North Vietnam. Senator Pell went so far as to suggest that you should also consult with the Committee, before substantially increasing our forces and also on the relative merits of holding a few enclaves versus more aggressive action by our forces in South Vietnam. Senator Mundt, on the other hand, favored consultation with you on policy, but opposed consultation on tactical questions, among which he characterized resuming the bombing in North Vietnam and Laos, the selection of targets, etc. He observed that the war could not be won by Committee quarterbacking. Nonetheless, almost all Members of both parties specifically mentioned the feeling that the Chairman of the Committee was not always included with the Leadership in consultation on key decisions. I was requested, and promised, to transmit their views to you.

Senator Case asked some questions about long-term objectives, if we were going to make a greater physical commitment. I offered to set up an informal session myself with those who might wish to discuss the broader philosophical implications, including such thorny questions as “spheres of influence” and our own posture in the world.

I came away with the impression that what most of the Members most wanted was a chance to sit down with you on a give-and-take discussion basis rather than for formal presentations and disclosures of pending decisions. While I am aware of the great difficulty of doing this with this Committee as a whole, given the several other Committees in both Houses, who would consider themselves entitled to equal treatment, I do feel that the time is perhaps ripe for us to take another look at the problem of Presidential consultation.⁶

DR

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Dept. of State, vol. VIII. Secret. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum. For text of Ruskʼs testimony, see Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), vol. XVIII, pp. 133–187.
2. In his 1963 memoir The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953–1956, Eisenhower stated, “I have never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable in Indochinese affairs who did not agree that had elections been held as of the time of the fighting, possibly 80 per cent of the population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader rather than Chief of State Bao Dai.” (p. 372)
3. For an analysis of Gavinʼs theory by the JCS, see Document 61.
4. January 23.
5. Not further identified.
6. On January 25 Rusk sent a memorandum to President Johnson summarizing his briefing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee that morning, noting that both Chairman Morgan and Representative Zablocki raised the issue of Presidential consultation. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Dept. of State, vol. VIII)