Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

59. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, July 15, 1965.

PARTICIPANTS

• USSR
  • Premier Kosygin
  • M.N. Smirnovsky, Chief, American Section, Foreign Ministry
  • V.M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter, Foreign Ministry
• US
  • Governor Averell Harriman
  • Ambassador Foy D. Kohler
  • Marshall Brement, Second Secretary

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Vietnam.]

Premier Kosygin asked whether the U.S. seriously believed, “speaking in human terms between ourselves,” that there is a real legal government in South Vietnam. He said he could not conceive of this. “You just can’t believe this,” he said. “Yet the U.S., for this so-called government, sheds the blood of its own soldiers and kills defenseless Vietnamese.”

Governor Harriman reported that he did not want to dodge that question but that he wished at that point to put another question on the table. Does the Soviet Union really believe, he asked, that without the support and direction of the North Vietnamese there would be a serious situation today in South Vietnam?

Kosygin stated that he would answer Governor Harriman’s question. He said he was thoroughly familiar with Vietnam and knew that the South Vietnamese would fight with bamboo sticks, if necessary, against the current regime there. A rotten regime cannot last, he said, and he offered to cite many examples from Russian history to prove his point. This happened in 1905 and 1917 in Russia and is about to happen in Vietnam, he said.

Governor Harriman noted that the Vietnam situation was, of course, a major difference between the USSR and U.S. which see this problem differently. He noted that agreement had been reached on Laos between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev during their Vienna meeting. He stated that he came here twice in 1963 to try and persuade the Soviet Government that the North Vietnamese were violating the 1962 Geneva Agreement by sending people and arms to Laos. Khrushchev, however, did not want to talk about this and only stated that the Soviets were adhering to the Agreement and that the USSR did not have any other responsibility in the matter. We are regretful, the Governor stated, that the Soviet Union, as co-chairman, did not take a hand in stopping this violation of the Agreement. In Vietnam we are absolutely certain that the NLF is aided, abetted and directed by Hanoi, he said. There is no evidence whatsoever that the NLF movement is really an indigenous uprising, or that the people of South Vietnam want to be taken over by North Vietnam. We have an expression in English, “voting with your feet.” One million people left North Vietnam to go to South Vietnam in 1954, the Governor said. Furthermore, hundreds of thousands of South Vietnamese have left their homes in Viet Cong-dominated areas. It is true that it has been difficult to obtain political agreement in South Vietnam because of internal frictions, largely between the Catholics and the Buddhists. (As this last phrase was being translated into Russian Kosygin laughed and said “this cannot be serious”.) However, the Governor stated, not one of the rival groups in South Vietnam stands for surrender to the North. We believe firmly that the majority of people in South Vietnam want to remain independent and do not wish to be taken over by the Ho Chi Minh clique. The President has stated that we are in favor of elections there once the war is over. The very fact that there have been so many changes of government in Saigon is evidence that we are not imposing our will on the Vietnamese people. It is the people of Vietnam who must decide the future of their own government.

At this point Kosygin laughed again and said directly to Governor Harriman, “You don’t believe what you are saying.”

Governor Harriman quickly replied that Premier Kosygin had hit on exactly the reason for his presence in Moscow and that the Premier’s reaction had been expressed so naturally that Governor Harriman had to believe that it was a sincere reaction. Governor Harriman stressed that what he had just been saying is the real belief of the President, his advisors, Congress, and the American people. The Eisenhower Administration, he said, had made a commitment to Vietnam in 1954 and all successive U.S. administrations had carried through this commitment. What the U.S. is doing is in response to escalation from North Vietnam. We believe, Governor Harriman said, in strict adherence to the 1954 Geneva Agreement and we had adhered to it scrupulously. But starting in 1959 and 1960 terrorism organized by the North Vietnamese had disrupted a country which had been making great strides forward economically. This terrorist action and guerrilla warfare were in accordance with the theories of Mao Tse-tung. Governor Harriman stated that it is important for Kosygin to understand that we are not mistaken in our assessment of the situation in South Vietnam. During the past 3-1/2 years we have captured many prisoners and interrogated them. The weight of the evidence is overwhelming that on the orders of Hanoi the terrorism in South Vietnam has been started, dormant Communist cells had been reactivated and more and more people had been sent to the South from North Vietnam. Now, regular units of the North Vietnamese army had been dispatched to the South. The North Vietnamese seem to believe that they can win by force. However, President Johnson has stated that the honor of the U.S. is involved in this struggle. We deeply believe that we have proof beyond question that the NLF is not a spontaneous liberation movement and that it would collapse if it were not supported by Hanoi. If the Soviet Union is so sure that we are wrong, the Governor stated, then why not accept President Johnson’s proposal and discuss the situation. We could discuss the possibility for future elections in Vietnam, he said. While this was not a proposal, it would certainly be a topic which could be discussed at some possible future conference.

Kosygin stated that he was not authorized to negotiate on the question of Vietnam. However, he said, since Governor Harriman had touched upon this matter, he would speak his mind frankly. He said that he was profoundly convinced that Governor Harriman did not believe what he had just said. The information presented was completely at variance with reality. The U.S. knows that there is no duly constituted government in South Vietnam, he said. There is only a clique of military men paid by the U.S. which kills Catholics and Buddhists alike. Kosygin then cited desertions from the South Vietnamese army as perhaps another example of “voting with one’s feet.” Our information is good, he said. If the Vietnamese people were given a real chance to vote, the Saigon clique would be thrown out. He had been to Vietnam, he said, and talked to people there he trusted 100% and he believed them. How can the U.S. say that it is helping the South Vietnamese? he asked. “This is a monstrous statement. You are killing South Vietnamese. History will never forgive the U.S. for this crime. This will always be a blot on the U.S.”

Kosygin stated that he would like to offer for consideration one aspect of the Vietnam situation which he had been thinking about. He stated that, as the U.S. knew, differences exist in the international communist movement on questions of war and peace between the Chinese and the Soviets. The U.S. was now doing all it could to prove the Chinese right and the Soviets wrong on this question. “You follow pro-Chinese policies,” he said. You are responsible for tensions in the area and the peoples of the East are turning against you. You only have your puppets there and by your actions and resistance to national liberation movements you only prove the Chinese point that war is inevitable. This is my personal view, he cautioned, and not for the press. He went on to state that the U.S. was trying to prove that war is inevitable whenever national liberation movements arise. You are thereby, he said, taking the view of those you profess to fight. You are taking a pro-Chinese stand.

Governor Harriman stated that although the Premier’s words were harsh, he appreciated his speaking what was on his mind. Governor Harriman said that we have to speak frankly and openly in order to move forward in solving the problems which confront us.

Kosygin replied that he had never said this to anyone else and he hoped Governor Harriman would communicate his thoughts to President Johnson.

Governor Harriman stated that without sincerity we cannot solve the problems that face us and he assured Premier Kosygin that he was utterly convinced that what he had told him was the truth.

Premier Kosygin stated that if he had the time he was sure that he could convince Governor Harriman that his own assessment of the Vietnam situation was the correct one. You may be convinced of what you say, he said. “If so, your convictions are completely erroneous, 100% erroneous. There are many disparate forces in South Vietnam, but by your own cruelty, by your barbarism you are uniting the people of Vietnam against you. If I were a Vietnamese, I myself would grab a stick and start to fight against you. By your actions, he said, you are helping those who favor war in the world.” Indicating another engagement, he then stated he would like to bring the talk to a conclusion and asked Governor Harriman whether he could offer any new hypothesis or proposal (1) to reduce tensions in the world, or (2) to improve relations between the U.S. and USSR. “Or do you have nothing to offer?” he asked.

Governor Harriman stated that Chairman Kosygin had put him in a difficult position by asserting that the President is wrong. Chairman Kosygin had to acknowledge first of all, he stated, that the President is sincere. You say you have been in Vietnam and know the situation there, but you have been deceived, the Governor said. You must accept the President’s sincerity, he said, adding that he did not question Chairman Kosygin’s sincerity even though he knew him to be wrong.

Kosygin replied that he had not been deceived by anyone. “That is impossible.” There are other sources of information than the U.S. is aware of. Your crude (gruby) actions have not only united the Vietnamese against you but will cause events in Vietnam to be repeated throughout Southeast Asia. Talks such as this, he said, will not solve the question. It will be solved, sooner or later by the people of Vietnam themselves. You cannot win by buying governments. He stated he could buy “these puppets of yours” tomorrow for one million dollars. And it is for these marionettes that you sacrifice the people of Vietnam and your own people as well, Kosygin said.

Governor Harriman stated that he had come here in good faith and not to be abused. He recalled that when he was Ambassador here during the war, Marshal Stalin once told him that he accepted his sincerity because Governor Harriman had come to the Soviet Union in the 20’s in order to help the Soviet people. Governor Harriman reminded Chairman Kosygin that he had had long experience with the leaders of the Soviet Union over the years and that nobody until now had questioned his good faith. He stated that he himself was not important. However, he vigorously stated that Kosygin must believe that the President is completely sincere and has no intention of allowing Ho Chi Minh, supported by the Chinese, to take over South Vietnam. We had faced a similar situation in Korea, the Governor stated, and did not flinch there. Our actions in Vietnam are based on what we believe to be incontrovertible evidence. The President is also absolutely sincere, he said, in wanting to go to the conference table. This, however, should not be interpreted as weakness. We must perhaps wait for Hanoi to realize that it cannot succeed in its efforts. Once Hanoi realizes this, the Governor said, perhaps we can then have a conference and come to some arrangement whereby the problem could be settled. In view of the Soviet dispute with Peiping, he said, he would have thought that the USSR would not favor the use of force as a means for the settlement of problems in the Far East. He assured Kosygin that the U.S. will not stand by and see country after country fall under Peiping’s heel. He denied that those who supported the U.S. position in the Far East are “puppets”, and asserted that many peoples in the Far East sincerely support us. The U.S. fought a bloody war with Japan in order to stop that country from taking over that area and it will not stand by and let China accomplish what Japan could not. Governor Harriman pointed out that we have great experience in the area and are well acquainted with the forces which are at work there. The way to reduce tension between the U.S. and USSR he said, was perhaps exemplified by India where both countries worked together to strengthen India’s capacity to resist Peiping’s aggression. But the first step in reducing tension is for the Soviet leaders to accept the sincerity and determination of the President, he said. Without that, there is little left to talk about.

Premier Kosygin said that Governor Harriman was asking him to support President Johnson but that this completely contradicts the Soviet view of the problem and would be impossible for any humanist. Such an action could not be justified, he said. He stated that the Soviet people approve the actions which the Soviet Government has taken to support the Vietnamese and he was convinced that many American people do not support U.S. Government policy in Vietnam. He said that the U.S. pilots who destroy defenseless villages could not be considered heroes. No one could believe this, he said. “It would go against the grain of any humanist, any communist.”

Kosygin stated that when he had expounded his views, Governor Harriman had interpreted them as somewhat insulting. He said that Governor Harriman had referred to the fact that Stalin had valued his personal integrity. He stated that he had given Governor Harriman no cause for personal pique and had not meant to impugn his integrity. He added that he had been Deputy Premier during the war and knew how sharply Stalin could speak. The Soviet Union stands firmly for peaceful coexistence, he said. This view is shared by all Soviet leaders. The Soviets will continue this policy and will not embark on any military adventures. It was for this reason, he stated, that he had asked Governor Harriman whether the U.S. could offer any hypothesis to improve bilateral relations or to settle the Vietnam problem.

Governor Harriman pointed out that discussions of the Vietnam situation were one possibility. Since the Soviet Union was co-chairman, he said, it should be thinking of finding ways to bring about negotiations. He emphatically stressed that President Johnson had the support of his advisors, of Congress and of the American people in pursuing his Vietnam policy. According to the latest public opinion polls in the U.S., 70% of the people supported the President. He added that he had never suggested that the USSR was in any way responsible for the acts of Hanoi and certainly not for those of Peiping.

Kosygin said that the U.S. should not think that a peaceful initiative in Vietnam would be regarded as weakness. The French settlement of the Algerian war had been a sign of strength. Kosygin added that the U.S. would be making a mistake in equating Peking and Hanoi. He himself, he said, had talked to the Vietnamese leaders and knew that they do not rule out a possible political settlement. “You must find a way, an approach, to bring this about.” He said that he had known Ho Chi Minh for more than thirty years and he could assure Governor Harriman that Ho is a heroic representative of the Vietnamese people, who love and admire him. The only way out in Vietnam is for the U.S. to start talks with the Vietnamese themselves and find a solution for this affair. What else is there? Fighting in Vietnam for many years to come will not help that country. He reiterated that a peaceful initiative in Vietnam would never be considered by the Soviet Union to be a sign of weakness and that the prestige of the U.S. would not sink if peaceful initiatives were undertaken.

Governor Harriman replied that President Johnson is ready and anxious for talks but that thus far Hanoi had shown no interest in them. If this was Kosygin’s suggestion, he said, then the U.S. will certainly follow it.

Kosygin replied that “waiting is all right, but people with the noise of bombs in their ears are not anxious to negotiate.”

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Vietnam.]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 US-USSR. Secret; Exdis. Transmitted as enclosure 1 of airgram A-120 from Moscow, July 22. The meeting was held in Premier Kosygin’s office in the Kremlin. Harriman sent a summary of this conversation to the President and Secretary Rusk in telegram 138 from Moscow, July 15. McGeorge Bundy forwarded the telegram to the President on July 15, under cover of a memorandum in which he noted that what was striking about the conversation was the routine character of Kosygin’s comments, including a standard exchange on Vietnam. A notation on Bundy’s covering memorandum indicates that the President saw it. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XII)