277. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
3559. For the President. Upon returning from my visit to Honolulu last week, I found the most active political issue in Saigon was related to the conference on Cambodia and the need to obtain the Vietnamese support for participation. We had anticipated considerable difficulty in presenting this matter and obtaining the support of Quat’s government. However, the GVN made matters easier for us by a premature interview given by Foreign Minister Do2 expressing GVN willingness to participate in the conference. However, the interview was not fully cleared with Prime Minister Quat, who showed an understandable reluctance to appear too eager for a conference which might lead to discussions on Viet-Nam. Thus, Patrick Gordon Walker3 had a busy time, though he eventually accomplished his mission of securing GVN agreement. Whether Prince Sihanouk will now succeed in his apparent efforts to block attendance at the conference by the U.S., GVN and Thais remains to be seen.
Although the internal political scene was quiet on the surface, there are continuing indications of unrest among various political groupings who do not find themselves entirely satisfied by the Quat government. There has so far been little to unite these disparate groups of militant Catholics, some unhappy military leaders, southern regionalists, and the usual “out” politicians. Quat is well aware of the danger of these malcontents and is trying to placate those of any real importance. He told us April 274 that insofar as the southern regionalists were concerned, he expected to give them additional ministerial seats in his next overhaul of the cabinet.
On last Friday, I received authority from Washington5 to sound out Quat with regard to the introduction of the additional forces recommended by the conference in Honolulu. Alex Johnson and I presented [Page 612] the matter to him the following day6 under somewhat disadvantageous conditions as he was being pressed at the time by the need to develop a government position on the Cambodian conference. In spite of earlier indications of reluctance to request additional foreign forces, Quat received our presentation quite calmly and indicated almost at once his personal concurrence in principle. Our understanding when we broke up was that he would discuss this matter cautiously with his principal military advisors and call us back for a second conference earlier this week.
Having failed to receive this call, Alex Johnson and I sought an appointment the afternoon of April 27 in which Quat gave his complete concurrence to the introduction of the U.S. and third country forces recommended in Honolulu. We agreed that Generals Westmoreland, Thieu and Minh would initiate planning at once and I have requested Washington for final approval for the phased introduction of the US troops.7
Insofar as Viet Cong activity during the week was concerned, the lull in activity which has lasted for several weeks continued. The Viet Cong main force units are still avoiding contact with ARVN units and react only when the ARVN proceed against their controlled areas. While we always try to push the ARVN to take advantage of such a lull to harass and destroy the Viet Cong in their own bases, results in terms of casualties inflicted on the Viet Cong during the week have not been impressive.
You may have noticed from previous reports that the term “pacification” has fallen into disrepute as being negative and ill-descriptive of the liberation of the country from the Viet Cong and that “rural reconstruction” has been substituted for it. Regardless of the change of name, progress in this field remains as undramatic as in the past. However, a great deal of work is being expended on the numerous actions programs which were discussed with you during my consultations in Washington earlier this month. Whenever security conditions permit, most of these programs are moving quite well but, unfortunately, reconstruction is hampered by security considerations in many provinces.
We may have to seek your help in the matter of the new chancery project which has run into trouble before Congress. You will recall your quick reaction to the bombing of the Embassy in urging and obtaining House authorization for the construction of a new chancery which would be both “permanent” and “dignified”. It has been almost a month since the public announcement of the intention to initiate this construction8 but the legislation has, I understand, encountered obstacles in the [Page 613] Senate. Because of the political and psychological effect here in South Viet-Nam (apart from our urgent need for an efficient and reasonably secure Embassy), it will be most unfortunate if Congressional delays are allowed to blur the impact of your prompt reaction to the bombing of the Embassy.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. No time of transmission appears on the source text, but it was received in the Department of State at 2:06 a.m.↩
- Tran Van Do made this statement in an interview with a Reuters correspondent on April 23.↩
- Patrick Gordon Walker, a Special Representative of the British Government, toured Asia April 14–May 4 to discuss with the Governments of Malaysia, Thailand, Laos, Burma, South Vietnam, Cambodia, Japan, and India the possibility of negotiated settlements regarding Vietnam and Cambodia.↩
- As reported in telegram 3556 from Saigon, April 27. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 VIET S)↩
- See Document 271, which Taylor received on Friday, April 23.↩
- Taylor described this meeting in telegram 3511 from Saigon, April 24. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, NODIS-LOR, Vol. IIA)↩
- See Document 276.↩
- See Document 221.↩