67. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- Laos
PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary
- Secretary McNamara
- Attorney General Kennedy
- The Under Secretary
- General Geo. H. Decker
- General C.E. Le May
- General David M. Shoup
- Admiral Arleigh Burke
- Mr. McGeorge Bundy
- Deputy Under Secy Johnson
- Assistant Secy McConaughy
- Deputy Asst. Secy Steeves
- Mr. Charles E. Bohlen
- Mr. Daniel V. Anderson
- Ambassador Kenneth Young
- Mr. G. Edward Reynolds, Lao Desk Officer
The Secretary observed that the principal change on the ground had been that forces had moved from such points as Muong Kassy and Tha Thom. However, there had been no major change that would in itself make the difference between our carrying out Plan 5 today and three weeks ago.
Mr. McNamara said that the real question was whether we could land forces in Vientiane because of the danger of Chinese air retaliation, local sabotage and the action by PL guerrillas who could move into Vientiane at any time. The Secretary observed that the presence of these guerrillas had been noted for weeks.
General Le May observed that there had been a large build-up of supplies on the Pathet Lao side.
Admiral Burke said that we were faced with the “folding” of the FAL, which was not fighting.
The Secretary asked to what extent we were influenced by the movement of Chinese Communist fighter bombers and pointed out that this capability certainly existed three weeks ago.
General Le May said that these aircraft could always be moved in to scare us off.
The Secretary next asked to what extent the Defense Department had been influenced by the danger of escalation. Had this made any [Page 151] considerable difference? Mr. McNamara replied that it would be easy for the PL or Chinese Communists to prevent successful landings at Vientiane or Seno.
Admiral Burke said that the situation had deteriorated quite a bit but he still thought it possible to go in. War is dangerous, he said. If pushed we could retreat across the river, reinforce from Udorn and go back and fight.
When the Secretary asked whether we could send in troops to secure the airfield, Admiral Burke said that would be a first task. Mr. McNamara said it would be easy for the enemy to deny us the airfield as we would need thirty-six sorties a day to get US troops into Vientiane.
Mr. Bundy said that if we took this action we would be doing something which most countries would not appreciate.
The Attorney General asked where would be the best place to stand and fight in Southeast Asia, where to draw the line. Mr. McNamara said he thought we would take a stand in Thailand and South Viet-Nam. The Attorney General asked whether we would save any of Laos, but the major question was whether we would stand up and fight.
Admiral Burke said that we could hold Tourane, and General Le May observed that we could use our air power back as far as necessary, letting the enemy have all of the countryside but that the PL could be stopped by air power.
Mr. McNamara said that we would have to attack the DRV if we gave up Laos.
The Secretary suggested that the part of Laos from the 17th Parallel across to the Mekong might be easier to hold than the entire country.
General Decker thought that there was no good place to fight in Southeast Asia but we must hold as much as we can of Viet-Nam, Cambodia and Laos. At this point the Secretary said that we had missed having government troops who were willing to fight.
Mr. Steeves pointed out that we had always argued that we would not give up Laos and that it was on the pleas of our military that we had supported Phoumi; that we had reiterated in the press and to the public what Laos meant to us. If this problem is unsolvable then the problem of Viet-Nam would be unsolvable. If we decided that this was untenable then we were writing the first chapter in the defeat of Southeast Asia. Mr. McNamara said the situation was not as bad five weeks ago as it was now.
Admiral Burke pointed out that each time you give ground it is harder to stand next time. If we give up Laos we would have to put US forces into Viet-Nam and Thailand. We would have to throw enough in to win—perhaps the “works”. It would be easier to hold now than later. The thing to do was to land now and hold as much as we can and make [Page 152] clear that we were not going to be pushed out of Southeast Asia. We were fighting for the rest of Asia.
Mr. McNamara wondered whether more Viet Cong would necessarily enter South Viet-Nam if Laos went down the drain. He mentioned that some 12, 000 Viet Cong had entered South Viet-Nam under present conditions and that the Communists held the area south of the 17th Parallel to a depth of twenty-five miles with a supposedly friendly government in South Viet-Nam. (Several of those present questioned the accuracy of the figure of 12,000.)
Turning to the question of the morale of the Southeast Asians, the Secretary recalled that the Thai Foreign Minister had told him during the recent SEATO conference that Thailand was like a “golden bell” which had to be protected from outside. The Secretary said he was not sure the Foreign Minister was wrong. He added that he was less worried about escalation than he was about infectious slackness. He said he would not give a cent for what the Persians would think of us if we did not defend Laos.
General Decker thought that we should have stood last August and wondered what would happen if we got “licked”. The Secretary suggested that Thai and US troops might be placed together in Vientiane and, if they could not hold, be removed by helicopter. Even if they were defeated they would be defeated together and this would be better than sitting back and doing nothing. General Decker said we cannot win a conventional war in Southeast Asia; if we go in, we should go in to win, and that means bombing Hanoi, China, and maybe even using nuclear bombs. He pointed out that all the advantage we have in heavy equipment would be lost in the difficult terrain of Laos where we would be at the mercy of the guerrillas. The Secretary pointed out that this fact was also true at the time of the Bangkok Resolution1 but that we had gone ahead with the resolution anyway and had issued statements indicating that we would back up our words with deeds. Mr. McNamara repeated that the situation is now worse than it was five weeks ago. Mr. Steeves pointed out that the same problems existed in South Viet-Nam, but Admiral Burke thought that South Viet-Nam could be more easily controlled.
General Decker then suggested that troops be moved into Thailand and South Viet-Nam to see whether such action would not produce a cease-fire. Admiral Burke asked what happens if there is still no cease-fire. General Decker said then we would be ready to go ahead.
[Page 153]Mr. Kennedy said we would look sillier than we do now if we got troops in there and then backed down. He reiterated the question whether we are ready to go the distance.
The Secretary said that we would want to get the United Nations “mixed up” in this.
Mr. Bohlen said he saw no need for a fixation on the possibility of a reaction by the Chinese Communists. He said we had no evidence that they want to face the brink of nuclear war. He said that he was more concerned about the objectives we would seek if we took military action.
There followed a discussion about the possibility of restoring the kingdom of Champassak where Boun Oum relinquished the throne and where he is popular. It was thought that Sihanouk would support a partition of Laos. General Decker thought that if a cease-fire could be effected now, it would be possible to secure southern Laos.
General Le May did not believe that it would be possible to get a cease-fire without military action. He admitted that he did not know what US policy is in Laos. He knew what the President had said but he also pointed out that the military had been unable to back up the President’s statements. He then enumerated a number of possibilities: 1) do nothing and lose Laos; 2) use B–26’s and slow up the enemy; 3) use more sophisticated bombers and stop supplies and then perhaps Phoumi’s forces could be brought up to where they could fight; 4) implement Plan 5, backing up troops with air. General Le May did not think the Chinese would escalate but believed on the contrary that a cease-fire could then be brought about. He added that he believed we should go to work on China itself and let Chiang take Hainan Island. He thought Chiang had a good air force.
General Shoup suggested that B–26’s should be used before troops are landed. He felt that it might then be possible to obtain a cease-fire and get the panhandle of Laos. Mr. Kennedy asked if any appreciable dent could be made on the guerrillas with B–26’s. General Le May said it would be possible to knock out a big wad of supplies with B–26’s and 100’s. Mr. Kennedy asked what would be the next step. The Secretary said it would be necessary to get the UN in quickly. Mr. Kennedy asked what the others would do then. General Le May said the worst that could happen would be that the Chinese Communists would come in. Mr. Kennedy asked if it could all be done by air. General Le May said it could. Mr. McNamara said you would have to use nuclear weapons. Mr. Kennedy asked if South Viet-Nam and Thailand could be held if Laos were lost. The Secretary and Admiral Burke agreed that it would take a greater effort to hold them after Laos had been lost and Mr. Johnson pointed out that Thailand had to be defended from the other bank.
[Page 154]Mr. Steeves felt that the prize to be focused on was Southeast Asia. The question to be faced, he thought, was whether we could afford to lose Southeast Asia.
The Secretary thought if a cease-fire is not brought about quickly, then it would be necessary to get the UN to come in with the SEATO forces committed in a Plan 5 action. He thought that a majority could be found in the UN for such action if the cost is not distributed. Mr. McNamara and Admiral Burke thought that more than two weeks would be required for UN action. Admiral Burke said that only the United States could pull its own chestnuts out of the fire. (There followed a general discussion on the extent to which others would support us. It was agreed that the Pakistani could be relied upon if we paid for them and that a few Malays, New Zealanders and others would help.)
Ambassador Young suggested the possibility of training 50 to 60,000 Vietnamese. He pointed to the ready access to ports in the area of the Lao border and to the fact that the terrain in the area is not too bad.
Mr. Bowles said he thought the main question to be faced was the fact that we were going to have to fight the Chinese anyway in 2, 3, 5, or 10 years and that it was just a question of where, when and how. He thought that a major war would be difficult to avoid. General Le May said that, in that case, we should fight soon since the Chinese would have nuclear weapons within one or two years.
Mr. McNamara said that the situation was worsening by the hour and that if we were going to commit ourselves, then we must do so sooner rather than later.
The Secretary then adjourned the meeting saying he would like to consider the matter further.
- Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by G. Edward Reynolds and approved by Johnson, McConaughy, Bohlen, and in Rusk’s office on June 6. The time is taken from Rusk’s Appointment Book. (Johnson Library) Also printed in United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 11, pp. 62–66.↩
- The resolution passed at the SEATO Council Meeting at Bangkok; see footnote 4, Document 42.↩