Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

62. Memorandum of Meeting With President Kennedy⁰

Washington, April 26, 1961, 3:30–6 p.m.

The meeting was called by the President on my recommendation after a conversation with Acting Secretary of State Bowles. Present were: Acting Secretary Bowles, Mr. Alexis Johnson, Mr. Steeves, Mr. Cleveland from State Department; Secretary McNamara, Mr. Nitze, Admiral Burke and General Fontana from the Department of Defense; Messrs. Rostow and Bundy from the White House.

The President read gloomy dispatches from Brown and Boyle¹ and a memorandum on the situation from Mr. Bowles,² all attached. After discussion, the President called Ambassador Bruce and asked him to communicate with the Prime Minister, to show him Brown’s cable, and to express the President’s grave concern. It was arranged that the Prime Minister would be asked to call the President back. The President also sent for Viscount Hood, the British Minister, and for Ambassador Alphand, to express his concern to them personally. He later reported that in these conversations he had pointed out the gravity of the situation, the increasingly urgent need for an immediate cease-fire, and the high importance of not letting Vientiane fall. He asked that their governments consider whether further representations should not be made to Moscow, and he hoped for their prompt advice. He left open with them, as with the people at the meeting, the question whether he would later feel it necessary to order U.S. forces into Laos.

During the discussion in the Cabinet Room the President considered a number of alternative approaches to the situation. He had particularly in mind a statement from Peking that the Chinese Peoples Republic did not believe a cease-fire could come before the withdrawal of American forces and equipment.

In assessing the possible character of a large-scale involvement in Laos, the President was confronted with general agreement among his advisers that such a conflict would be unjustified, even if the loss of Laos must be accepted. As to whether an intervention in Vientiane would provoke strong military response, there was some uncertainty, but on balance it seemed wise to avoid a test if possible.³ At the same time the possibility of a strong American response is the only card left to be played in pressing for a cease-fire, and accordingly the President explicitly refused to decide against intervention at this time.

The Department of State undertook to alert Ambassador Stevenson to a possible need for urgent UN action,⁴ and it also drafted a Presidential message to Prime Minister Nehru⁵ and planned other appropriate cables to carry out the general line which the President had indicated. In particular, the Department proposed to send messages of interim encouragement to Brown and to the Royal Laotian Government, urging them to stand firm while renewed and urgent efforts are made to obtain cease-fire.⁶

It was agreed that in the event that the Laotian position should crumble, it would probably be essential, at a minimum, to place substantial U.S. forces in South Vietnam and Thailand, and Secretary McNamara undertook to begin contingency planning toward this end.

McGeorge Bundy

0. Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Countries, Laos Security, 4/21/61–4/30/61. Top Secret. Drafted by McGeorge Bundy. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House.
1. For Brown’s telegram, see Document 60. Boyle’s telegram, ML 1722 from CHMAAG to CINCPAC, April 26, repeated to the JCS and Department of Defense, stated in part: “My estimate of situation is that FAL is on the ropes and that enemy has capability on [of] taking any of the major population centers now held by the FAL. If enemy should decide to exploit this capability, it would take the employment of B–26’s and US or SEATO intervention to stop them.” (Johnson Library, Vice Presidential Security File, NSC, 1961)
2. Document 61.
3. In a discussion with Eisenhower on April 22, Kennedy stated that there was no way of saving Laos by unilateral military action and he was looking forward to the upcoming cease-fire. (Eisenhower Library, Post-Presidential Papers, 1961–1969, John F. Kennedy) Published in Declassified Documents, 1981, 124B.
4. On April 27, Stevenson telephoned Cleveland to report on his discussion with British and French colleagues at the United Nations. The information in the telephone call was written into a memorandum from Bowles to the President, April 27. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4–2761)
5. The text of the letter to Nehru is in telegram 3040 to New Delhi, April 26. (Ibid., 751J.00/4–2661)
6. In telegram 1172 to Vientiane, April 26, 10:52 p.m., the Department informed Brown of the results of this meeting and denied his request to use B–26 aircraft. The Department also stated that the decision to send Harriman to Laos would be delayed 24 hours to await developments. The Department assured Brown that it understood the gravity of the situation, but reminded him that it was his “difficult task” to impress upon Phoumi the need to maintain as advantageous a military position as possible while still showing himself amenable to compliance with the request for a cease-fire. Phoumi should agree to meet for political talks only on neutral ground and make no hasty concessions. (Ibid.)