Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

52. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, April 13, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Task Force Meeting on Laos, April 13, 1961¹

1. It is the general appreciation that the Communist tactic in Laos is to delay on the cease-fire while the situation crumbles politically and militarily. The political crumbling may be now under way as Phoumi seeks to retrieve a political situation for himself in a neutral Laos. The military crumbling consists in the positioning of Communist troops in areas which will permit them quickly to collapse FAL forces, protecting Paksane and Takhek. The collapse of these two towns would cut Laos in half, isolating Vientiane and Luang Prabang from the south.

2. The assessment is that the Russians understand the need to avoid a major overt move until it is too late for us to move in and their present objective is a collapse of the morale of the FAL forces and of the present government. It was the consensus of the meeting that you, Mr. Rusk, and Mr. McNamara should urgently consider a SEATO operation of a Lebanon type; that is, the movement of forces into Laos as envisaged under Plan 5/61.² This was judged preferable to the four actions on pages 4–5 of the attached memorandum. It was felt the first of these actions—the use of B–26s—would constitute an act of escalation without clear overt occasion; that the other three suggested acts would be inadequate to stabilize the military and political situation and provide us with the necessary bargaining strength during a conference.

3. If this position is accepted, the following actions are required urgently:

a. Consultation with the British;

b. The generation of a request for such an action from the Laotian King;

c. The contingent alerting of our own forces to the possibility of such action.

4. In addition, we should consider now whether, if the British answer is negative or if there is further delay, we should execute such an action with the Thai and Philippine components.

[Attachment]

³

Paper Prepared by Thomas J. Corcoran

Washington, April 13, 1961.

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS IN LAOS

Watch Committee conclusion of April 13, 1961 summarizes the critical political and military situations developing in Laos. It observes that the apparent collapse of the Government’s Muong Kassy offensive will further depress FAL and Vientiane morale and will permit the communists to resume attacks in the Luang Probang and Vang Vieng areas. It notes indications in the Paksane area that the communists are making preparations for military pressure against Government forces which have withdrawn from Tha Thom. It finds increasing indications that communist forces in Central Laos have been strengthened in recent weeks, and that the pattern of military clashes suggests that the communists are preparing to make a relatively strong military effort in the direction of Thakhek. It predicts that in view of the Government’s weakened military posture in this area and its general lack of trained reserves, the communists can probably make further extensive military gains. It concludes that the bloc position that the contending elements in Laos should discuss the terms of a cease-fire is probably intended to stall the termination of active hostilities. It observes that if the position which the Asian communists have advanced—that a cease-fire should be effected simultaneously with a conference—becomes the official bloc position, it will be further evidence of bloc interest in maximizing, without precipitating SEATO intervention, the communist military and political position in Laos prior to any conference.

Thus, while the Russians maintain their airlift and delay their reply to the British note on a cease-fire in Laos, both the political and military situations in Laos continue to deteriorate. We now face the distinct possibility of entering a fourteen-power conference under the pressure of successful communist military activity. We also face the strong possibility that the Royal Lao Government will be drawn into premature negotiation of substantive political questions in the course of long drawn-out cease-fire talks with the Pathet Lao in a manner to prejudice its prospects at the conference.

If we are to head off either of these equally disastrous possibilities we must arrest and, if possible, reverse the current adverse trend reflected in yesterday’s watch report. Action to this end should be designed markedly to improve the circumstances under which a fourteen-power conference would begin. It should also be designed to exert pressure on the communist bloc by demonstrating in a deliberate and limited manner our readiness to take whatever measures may be appropriate to create for ourselves at least a reasonably strong negotiating position.

The first step in so demonstrating our readiness would be to inform our SEATO allies, individually or collectively, of our concern at the dangerous nature of current bloc actions. The Russian failure to respond on the cease-fire question, the continuation of the Russian airlift and evidence of Pathet Lao military preparations against Paksane and Thakhek are significant in this regard. This ominous combination of circumstances would be described as casting doubt on Russian intentions to proceed with the conference in a meaningful manner. We would inform our SEATO allies that we were planning in concert with the Thai, whose security is immediately threatened, certain emergency measures which would support the RLG against bloc pressure and incidentally put some pressure on the Russians to respond on the cease-fire question. These measures would follow logically in the absence of a satisfactory Russian reply to our demarche in Moscow of April _, 1961.

We would tell our SEATO allies that the limited measures we proposed might well fail to bolster the Lao Government or to induce the Russians to move towards a cease-fire. That is, the Pathet Lao attempt to take over Laos by force of arms and with formidable bloc assistance might be continued or even intensified. In this event we should at least have obtained confirmation of bloc intentions and should know that SEATO ought promptly to take appropriate action such as implementing Plan 5/61.

The emergency measures we would plan to take in the absence of a constructive Russian reply on the cease-fire question by April 15 would include removal of certain restraints we have heretofore placed on the Royal Lao Government and tangible demonstration of friendly support for the Royal Lao Government in its present difficult predicament. Specifically, we should:

a) Authorize the operational employment of certain aircraft, which the Royal Lao Government now has available and for which it has obtained qualified pilots, against appropriate military targets in Laos. Some 15 B–26 aircraft are involved and they would use machine guns, rockets, high explosive munitions or combinations of some or all of these weapons as determined by the characteristics of available targets.

b) Send into Laos a small token force of uniformed Americans and Thai (and perhaps Filipino and Pakistani) military specialists and technicians. The American personnel would be produced by ordering LTAG personnel into uniform; that is, by ordering them to add USARMY insignia to their present costumes. PEO personnel would retain their present “civilian” status at least for the time being.

c) Authorize and provide logistics, pay and support for seven additional Lao Army battalions and their supporting service troops. (Six of these are already in being, but not receiving US support.)

d) Authorize and obtain the approval of the Royal Thai Government for the immediate commitment to Laos of two Thai 105 mm. artillery batteries with personnel and equipment.

These recommendations are made in the full knowledge that they may have adverse effect on plans for an international conference. However, the communists’ stalling tactics, their continued military buildup, and their political maneuvering (especially their successful buildup of Souvanna Phouma) appear to be conditioning the approach to the conference in a way unacceptable to us. Furthermore, we think it equally likely that the steps recommended above might well bring about a cease-fire and a conference sooner rather than later, and enable us to enter the conference on an acceptable basis.

These steps should be taken on the assumption that we may face stepped-up communist retaliation in the area. Under these conditions SEATO elements, in part or in whole, must be ready to act, and immediate precautionary measures must be taken to supply air defense of friendly forces in the area.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Countries, Laos Security, 4/2/61–4/20/61. Secret.
1. The more detailed summary report of the Task Force meeting of April 13, prepared by Sullivan, is ibid., National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 4/11/61–4/16/61.
2. See Document 41.
3. Top Secret. Marginal notes, “48 hrs” and “targets,” and doodles that are apparently in the President’s hand, are on the source text.