483. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos0

129. In our program of strengthening the non-communist forces in Laos, considerable if not major emphasis is being and will be placed on the conservatives. They have for example been given the T–28s and will receive the preponderance of heavy weapons, items with large impact. Although this dictated by fact that only FAR has capability to use this materiel, it, together with fact that to date most all supplies for neutralists have been channeled through FAR, probably responsible for feeling among neutralists that we playing favorites and keeping neutralists subordinate to Phoumi. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

In order to check this growing feeling, which will almost certainly adversely affect neutralist-conservative cooperation, we hope you will be able to demonstrate to neutralists that it our policy to support them [Page 1043] fully (Deptel 120).1 Specifically, hope you can move forward quickly with establishment of separate and independent supply line for neutralists.

For Bangkok: In addition we feel that Embassy Bangkok should actively and strongly press RTG to approve training for neutralist forces (Embtel 197).2 Training the neutralists would be small but important step RTG could take to demonstrate its support of non-communist Lao forces.

Ball
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–3 US-Laos. Secret. Drafted by Bruns, cleared by Barbis and in substance with Colonel McCrea, and approved by Koren. Sent also to Bangkok for DEPCHJUSMAG and repeated to CINCPAC.
  2. In telegram 120, July 31, the Department reiterated “that objective our policy in Laos and actions we are taking is to strengthen Souvanna’s position as Pri Min with clear understanding we consider Phoumi in supporting and therefore subordinate role to Souvanna.” (Ibid., POL 15 Laos)
  3. According to telegram 197, August 2, 1, 261 Lao soldiers were to be trained at Lopuri, Thailand. (Ibid., DEF 19–2 Thai-Laos)