Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

46. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State⁰

Moscow, April 1, 1961, 2 p.m.

2354. Eyes Only Secretary. Khrushchev called me in at 11 a.m. and gave me copy of aide-mémoire on Laos which they had given British this morning.¹ Kuznetsov and Dobrynin were present and I said my government would of course wish study it carefully but it seemed to me that though there were some statements in it with which we could not agree it seemed in general a positive reply. I said I thought it important everything be done to remove suspicion of both sides that negotiations might be used as cover for trying improve position on ground. I inquired if he did not think it would be useful for Souvanna return home promptly. Khrushchev said he agreed and in his opinion Souvanna should never have left. When his country on fire, scarcely time travel around world. He said he did not know when Souvanna planned come Moscow. I said I had heard he expected leave France about 12th. Khrushchev said he understood Souvanna was going visit Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. He said he thought it might be awkward for him give Souvanna advice as he might question why this being done, but he fully agreed he should return promptly.

He said that for personal reasons as well he wanted get away from Moscow and was now awaiting visit Afghan PM and did not wish be obliged await Souvanna’s visit.

He thought if we were both honest and sincere in wanting neutral and independent Laos we could overcome difficulties and arrive at solution.

I am meeting British Ambassador at 6 p.m. to compare notes.² Balance of conversation, which lasted one and a half hours, and text aide-mémoire in septels.³

Thompson

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4–161. Confidential; Priority.
1. Text of the Soviet Union’s aide-mémoire is printed in full in Department of State Bulletin, April 17, 1961, pp. 545–546, and in part in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 998–999.
2. In telegram 2366 from Moscow, April 1, Thompson briefly reported his and British Ambassador Roberts’ impressions of their conversations with Khrushchev. Both Ambassadors believed that the Soviet Union did not want the conference indefinitely postponed. Except for an assurance that the cease-fire should precede the conference, they recommended not to “quibble over the fine points.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4–161)
3. The text of the aide-mémoire is also in telegram 2358 from Moscow, April 1, and the report of the additional conversation with Khrushchev, which did not relate to Laos, is in telegram 2362 from Laos, April 1; neither printed. (Ibid.)