Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

442. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union⁰

Washington, February 14, 1963, 3:56 p.m.

1697. Assistant Secretary Harriman called in Soviet Ambassador Feb 13 to make oral statement on Laos.¹ He informed Ambassador his remarks amplified what President had said to Mikoyan² and contained comments on Soviet statements.

As President told Mikoyan large numbers of Vietminh remain in Laos. These are in excess of 2,000. In this connection Khrushchev had referred to communique issued at Hanoi at time of Phoumi visit and Harriman wished make clear that North Vietnamese declaration concerning withdrawal Vietminh from Laos was unilateral statement which Phoumi did not endorse. North Vietnamese have also been using Laos to interfere in South Vietnam contrary to Geneva agreements. In U.S. judgment continued presence Vietminh troops in Laos having demoralizing effect on Souvanna Phouma’s efforts establish peace and security. Souvanna trying to act in accord with Geneva Agreements and Zurich communique and U.S. doing everything it can to support him in this effort. However, there has been no integration of armed or civilian forces and the country in effect is divided into two areas. Cease-fire has been violated and Pathet Lao have made unprovoked attacks on Royal Army units, peaceful tribesmen and even neutralist forces. Most recent shocking incident was assassination previous day of Colonel Ketsana, one of Kong Le’s commanders and strong supporters.³ Unfortunately ICC has been stymied and its two investigations made under conditions which it protested. We are convinced withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces will require Soviet cooperation would offer start on path to peace and unity.

The U.S. and USSR have responsibility to use their influence to help factions seek unity and from beginning U.S. has not only materially and morally supported Souvanna government but has also used its influence to see that he gets support of former Royal Government adherents. With regard to withdrawal of U.S. military personnel, all were withdrawn except for Attaches which ICC can easily verify. Similarly with regard to “adherents of Chiang Kai-shek” these are in fact without military significance and we have been informed none remain in Laos. As for American aircraft in Laos these are all civilian planes operating in response to Souvanna Phouma requests and open to inspection not only by ICC but all three factions.

Harriman noted former Soviet and American Ambassadors had cooperated effectively in Vientiane and he requested that Soviet Ambassador Vientiane be instructed work closely with U.S. Ambassador on making Agreements a success and to seek agreement on facts thereby helping eliminate obstacles to understanding between our two governments. Harriman also requested Soviets use their influence with Polish member ICC to seek his greater cooperation, noting that Indian Chairman preferred to operate on basis of unanimity.

Dobrynin said that while he did not necessarily agree with all of Harriman’s statements, he would forward them to Moscow and noted that references to Souvanna could be discussed with him there.

Ball

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 Laos. Secret; Priority. Drafted by John C. Guthrie of SOV, cleared by Cross and Thompson, and approved by Harriman. Repeated priority to Vientiane.
1. With Harriman’s and U. Alexis Johnson’s clearances, Koren drafted on January 23 an oral statement to be handed to Dobrynin, which was the basis for Harriman’s presentation. (Ibid., POL 27–14 Laos)
2. See Document 438.
3. The Department of State believed Ketsana was killed by the Pathet Lao because of his opposition to them. (Telegram 1693 to Vientiane, February 13, and telegram 1166 from Vientiane, February 14; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6–7 Laos)