Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

300. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State⁰

Vientiane, February 26, 1962, 8 p.m.

1225. Ref: Deptel 763.¹ Apparently we in field and officers in Department have widely different appraisal of possibilities of influencing Phoumi to fit into our program.² I am convinced, as are all members of my Country Team, my British, French and Australian colleagues, Prince Souvanna and most Lao with whom we have talked, that Phoumi will not accept a government under Souvanna with Defense and Interior in Souvanna’s hands, except possibly in extremist under most drastic duress. Even then his participation is, in opinion of all of us, doubtful. This is disagreeable, hard and dangerous fact.

Basic carrot which should, but does not appeal to Phoumi is long-term prospect his rise to ultimate power after period of service as major minister in government fully supported by West. (This point has been made to him by President’s letter (Deptel 668),³ Secretary Harriman’s final remark to him at Geneva (Confe 1055)⁴ and by myself.) Phoumi, however, insists that a government under Souvanna with Defense and Interior in latter’s hands will lead to early Communist takeover.

Agree point made para 2 Reftel⁵ might have some appeal to Phoumi, particularly if Souvanna would agree no change in command structure would be made for a set period and not until program for integration satisfactorily agreed. It would also help if we could tell Phoumi that we would give intensive support to an anti-Pathet Lao political organization. To be effective, however, this would have to be agreed with Souvanna in order to avoid competing candidates and conflict between Phoumi and Souvanna organizational efforts. It might be possible to get this agreement from Souvanna. We could also promise Phoumi political support of his Ministry of Information, Sports and Youth such as radios, newsprint, presses, [garble] teams, impact aid programs, technical advice on propaganda items, and perhaps financial support to expand and organize already extant nationwide young Lao movement (Embdes 260 April 6, 1961)⁶ into an anti-Communist youth movement. This again would require at least tacit approval of Souvanna.

We might try to get Souvanna to agree to transfer of police to Interior with chief of police satisfactory to Phoumi (it would probably not be Soukhan whom Phoumi distrusts) and to their being trained by US personnel. This would probably appeal to Phoumi, if Souvanna would agree to maintain present management of the Veterans Association or have it under Phoumi’s ministry, this might help also.

I can explore these possibilities with Souvanna (despite some risk of discouraging him by making him feel US support for him less wholeheartedly) if Department wishes.

Fundamentally, however, I think it most unlikely that these inducements will be sufficient. US colleagues agree. Even if we are wrong in this judgment, we must, before going to Phoumi and the King with Souvanna’s proposition, be prepared for the contingency that we might be right.

Has Department any other carrots to suggest?

Re para 3 Reftel. Reftel approves my telling King in presence of my diplomatic colleagues that Souvanna package is only solution we can support. This clearly means, and they will all take it to mean, that we will withdraw support to any other solution, namely present RLG. If we do not do this, nothing will happen and we will by inaction have accepted alternative mentioned in Embtel 1219 of endeavoring to get along with a continuance of present dangerous state of affairs. Effect on Souphanouvong/PL/Vietminh military activity of failure by US than to act effectively will remain to be seen.

If we are not prepared to apply real sanctions to Phoumi at this stage, and still wish pursue policy of Deptels 703 and 704,⁷ I request that Dept explain to British, French and Soviets. I certainly am not in a position to do so here.

As far as obtaining right-wing strength for support of Souvanna’s coalition is concerned, we are simply going to have to take our chances on people coming over to Souvanna when they see that Phoumi has finally and in fact been discarded by West. It will be more effective in influencing them to come if we have a sharp surgical and complete cut-off than if we let matters drag on by continued use of half-measures. As stated in Embtel 1219, our influence in Vientiane is diminishing. (See A–78 to Dept, CX–15 from ARMA, for example.)⁸ Further comments on this point are being sent by other channels.

Re para 4 Reftel.⁹ Souvanna has clearly indicated in talks here that he has no suggestions as to how to deal with Phoumi and is relying on US to exercise pressure on Phoumi. I can of course ask him what private assurances he could give Phoumi, especially along lines of third para above/4.

I am sure that whatever may be Souvanna’s ideas on the subject, Phoumi will never allow anyone except himself to pay his troops.

Re para 5 Reftel.¹⁰ I do not see how I can even try to influence or persuade Phoumi if I cut off all contact with him. I still feel that cutting all contact with him will hurt us more than it will hurt him.

In view of reservations of reftel, I request most explicit instructions on what I am authorized to tell Phoumi when Souvanna presents his final proposition to him. Even if I am to try to use a carrot, I must also have a stick and must know just what that stick is.

Brown

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/2–2662. Secret; Niact; Eyes Only. Repeated to Bangkok, Geneva for Fecon, London, Paris, Saigon, and CINCPAC for POLAD.
1. In telegram 763, February 25, the Department commented on a plan outlined by the Embassy; see footnote 3 below. The Department considered that the Embassy’s plan “moves too rapidly into sanctions with dangerous consequences.” The Department stated that its goal was to either obtain Phoumi’s cooperation or displace him while still keeping conservative political and military strength in the future Souvanna coalition. The Department suggested there should be “more carrot” in Brown’s approach to Phoumi with the aim “of producing carrot and stick combination with the strongest psychological impact on Phoumi.” (Ibid.)
2. The Embassy recommended that if Phoumi refused to accept a coalition government under Souvanna, which the United States considered acceptable, the Embassy should inform Phoumi that he had 48 hours to agree or the United States would suspend all financial and military support to the RLG and would cut off all deliveries of military aid, withdraw all advisers, and cease all air support, except food supplies, to FAR. (Telegram 1219 from Vientiane, February 25; ibid., 751J.00/2–2562)
3. Document 278.
4. Document 273.
5. In paragraph 2 of telegram 763 to Vientiane, the Department suggested that Souvanna’s expressed intention of postponing integration and demobilization for armed forces in Laos for a while after formation of his government would give Phoumi time to judge whether the Souvanna solution was working.
6. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4–661)
7. Documents 290 and 291.
8. Airgram A–78, February 16, is in Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/2–1662. CX–15 from ARMA has not been found.
9. In paragraph 4 of telegram 763, the Department instructed Brown to get Souvanna’s advice on means of cooperation and dealing with Phoumi.
10. In paragraph 5 of telegram 763, the Department suggested that Brown might want to reconsider the idea of “isolating Phoumi by no longer dealing with him personally.”