Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

279. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos⁰

Washington, January 27, 1962, 8:12 p.m.

669. Eyes Only Ambassadors and Admiral Felt. Ref Deptel. 668.¹

Following instructions to be carried out only if Sarit/Phoumi discussions (Bangkok’s 1079)² do not produce agreement by Phoumi to cooperate to our satisfaction.

In view serious dangers inherent in delay, it has been concluded highest level that final showdown with Phoumi can no longer be deferred.³ At your meeting with him on January 29, you should, therefore, first give him President’s personal letter (Reftel) and then elaborate as follows:⁴

1. As shown by letter he has just read advice he has previously received from Harriman and yourself stems directly from President’s own position, i.e., that Phoumi must make every effort facilitate formation of government of national union under Souvanna. This requires his conceding Defense and Interior to center. We would, of course, support him for two other important posts. We would expect him to negotiate intelligently on remaining posts so that overall composition of cabinet would be acceptable along lines we have described to you.

2. Recent military activities in Laos have given incontrovertible proof of FAR’s fundamental military weakness as compared with PL/VM strength. Thus, since Phoumi patently cannot win militarily, his only hope for own future lies in early formation of Souvanna Government and in his participating in and cooperating fully with it. If he does, we will continue to befriend him.

3. If Phoumi gives you his solemn pledge that he will negotiate in good faith, will not hold out for Defense and Interior, and will press for earliest meeting Luang Prabang with at least Souvanna, even if Souphanouvong does not attend, we will maintain our full support of him. If he refuses, however, US can no longer regard him as a man acceptable for us to work with and will immediately break off all contact with him. The King, PriMin, and all other responsible Lao leaders would be apprised of this decision and we would point out that this situation presents grave obstacle to continued US/Lao cooperation. The reason for cutting off all relations with Phoumi rather than with RLG is that we do not wish penalize Lao people for self-seeking stubbornness of one of its leaders.

4. Phoumi must realize that US public opinion will not tolerate military intervention by US forces particularly now that peaceful settlement is clearly possible. In event country overrun by communists, responsibility will fall squarely on Phoumi, if he fails to cooperate with us and causes breakdown of negotiation for peaceful settlement.

You should conclude presentation by stating that you have been instructed to obtain his definitive reply in twenty four hours, and that failure to reply within that time could only be interpreted as refusal.

If Phoumi forces us to break with him, our objective would be to bring about sufficient reorganization of RLG to permit continued negotiations for formation new government. On hearing report from you President is prepared send appropriate message to King. You should bear in mind that if this not successful we may have to apply sanctions. We would not in any case make February deposit until we are satisfied with developments.

Ball

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1–2762. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Cleveland and Queneau, cleared by Cross and Rice, approved in substance by the President and the Acting Secretary, and approved by Harriman. Repeated niact to Bangkok and CINCPAC, and priority to Punta del Este for the Secretary.
1. Document 278.
2. In telegram 1079 from Bangkok, January 28, Young reported that Sarit had invited Phoumi to Bangkok to discuss his differences with the United States. (Department of State), Central Files, 751J.00/1–2862)
3. In telegram 1057 from Vientiane, January 27, Brown reported that Phoumi had told Hasey that Sarit had sent a message to Phoumi stating that the U.S. Government was very firm in its feeling that Phoumi should cede Defense and Interior to center group in a Souvanna coalition. When asked what advice Sarit gave him, Phoumi answered “none”; Sarit was just passing along the U.S. position. Phoumi added with a smile that he thought the message was sent under pressure. (Ibid., 751J.00/1–2762) Documentation on Sarit’s and Thailand’s concerns about events in Laos are included in volume XXIII.
4. In telegram 674 to Vientiane, January 28, the Department instructed Brown to hold up action contemplated in this cable pending further developments arising from Phoumi’s agreement to a three Princes’ meeting in Luang Prabang on February 2. In addition, the Department instructed Brown to “make doubly clear to Phoumi” that a U.S. break would be with him personally, not with the RLG. The United States would continue to work with the military and civil branches of the RLG. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1–2862)