Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

274. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State⁰

Geneva, January 20, 1962, noon.

Confe 1066. From Harriman. Re Confe 1062.¹

Based on initial soundings here, my evaluation of agreement reached yesterday among three Princes is that it represents positive progress and constitutes realistic framework for internal settlement Laos. There are, of course, many questions which still have to be worked out, most important of which is manner in which definitive allocation Defense and Interior portfolios will be decided. Phoumi and Boun Oum tell us that, if a dispute arises on these posts, Princes have agreed that King’s decision will be final. This provision could either be a formula which will permit face-giving [face-saving?] RLG surrender of Defense and Interior or else an obstacle deliberately introduced to scuttle agreement. Our course of action must clearly be designed to assure the former prospect.

Other important features agreement are facts right and left wings have been reduced to two portfolios each (and two SecStates) and that largest number portifolios are assigned to neutral center. This makes it essential that Vientiane neutrals are best available and have significant ministries. Also Secretaries of State in Defense and Interior as well as chiefs of staff and police are important.

Brown returning Vientiane tomorrow to follow developments closely. Most critical at this time is to prevent Sarit from exercising negative influence on Phoumi.²

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1–2062. Confidential; Niact. Repeated niact to Vientiane and Bangkok, and priority to London, Moscow, New Delhi, Ottawa, Paris, and Phnom Penh.
1. In Confe 1062, September 19, the Delegation reported that the three Princes had reached agreement of the shape of a coalition government. Souvanna told the press that the government would have 18 members consisting of a prime minister, 2 vice prime ministers, 9 ministers, and 6 vice ministers. The government would be apportioned as follows: the Souvanna Phouma group to get prime minister with portfolio (Souvanna), 7 ministries, 2 vice ministries; the Boun Oum group to get 1 vice prime minister with portfolio, 1 ministry, and 2 vice ministries; and the Souphanouvong group, same as the Boun Oum group. (Ibid., 751J.00/1–1962)
2. On January 20, Brown called on Boun Oum and Phoumi at Geneva to obtain details of the agreement. They stated that Souvanna wanted Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Interior; Boun Oum suggested he would consider Defense and Interior if he could obtain for his followers two of the following ministries: Foreign Affairs, Finance, or Information. According to Boun Oum and Phoumi, Souphanouvong wanted Information and Economy, but not Economy. Harriman called on the two Lao and assured them that once the new government was formed, it could count on U.S. economic, financial, and military aid in winning elections over Communists. (Confe 1072 from Geneva, January 20; ibid., 751J.00/1–2062)