236. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State0

Confe 896. From Harriman. Weekly Evaluation.

In week of concentrated negotiations at successive meetings of six (US, UK, French, Indian, USSR and ChiCom Dels) conference has moved closer to agreement on all remaining issues except that of private armies. Discussions, which were sometimes heated, made clear that Pushkin is far more flexible than are ChiComs on these issues. This particularly clear in respect ChiComs’ tough opposition to provisions which they interpret as ICC supervision and control of Lao neutrality.

ChiComs particularly adamant in their opposition to ICC function with respect Neutrality Declarations. Pushkin took sharply contrasting line in meeting of six that it was obvious ICC would have to inform co-chairmen of any violation of any of the undertakings of the signatories and that ICC will of course report to co-chairmen in event of any threat whatsoever to Lao neutrality. He proclaimed, however, that since this so obvious, it unnecessary to include any specific provision in protocol covering this.

In subsequent private conversation with MacDonald, Pushkin reiterated to MacDonald that of course ICC will report on violations of both the Lao Neutrality Declaration and the responsive declaration with undertakings of thirteen other signatories. He urged however that it not be written into Protocol so explicitly as Western Dels were proposing. Asked that we not make so public an issue of it. Pushkin further reiterated to MacDonald Soviet determination to see to it that bloc signatories observe their obligations and asked MacDonald be sympathetic with his (Pushkin’s) problems, presumably with ChiComs.

There were three meetings of six during week, on November 21st, 22nd and 24th interspersed by several private meetings between co-chairmen, MacDonald and Pushkin.

All Western Dels agreed, and this seemed especially apparent to MacDonald from his private talks with Pushkin, that one of Pushkin’s principal objectives in these meetings of six was to bring ChiComs directly up against Western positions so that they could gauge for themselves whether or not Pushkin was doing best he could.

In consideration this aspect of situation I was particularly firm and blunt in pressing our positions. Subject of private armies appears be [Page 527] ChiComs particular bete noire, with Chang belligerently proclaiming he will not discuss subject. Pushkin of course has agreed that any hostile action of a private army would be breach of cease-fire and therefore automatically come under supervision and control of ICC.

At the Nov. 21st meeting Pushkin announced that Commie bloc had agreed to our final drafts on armaments and rearranged corridor provisions. At subsequent meetings we discussed SEATO, voting, inspection teams, amendments to co-chairmen article and French presence. As result these meetings, talks between co-chairmen and discussions among heads Western Dels, Western committee of experts have agreed on package of amended drafts which have been cabled to Dept for approval. These amendments revolve around voting provisions, access and function for ICC in connection Neutrality Declarations.

Thus all remaining unsettled issues are now under specific negotiation here. We have given Pushkin draft on subject private armies and will go after the bloc hard on this issue after we conclude with voting, access, and neutrality package. We will hold in abeyance further discussion on SEATO until favorable reply obtained from Manila that Philippines join in affirmative SEATO resolution associating SEATO with undertaking four SEATO powers at Geneva to respect Lao wish not recognize protection of any coalition or military alliance. Believe issue of French presence can be resolved insofar as instructors are concerned, provided French are ready agree unequivocally end French base at Seno.

General attitude of Soviet Del is that we ought to be able come to agreement promptly on all issues except private armies. Even this latter may not be as serious a problem as ChiComs make it because of Pushkin’s attitude on agreed ICC function with respect cease-fire as noted above and because Pushkin is pressing hard for an early conclusion here. I think undue delays on our part in responsive negotiations would be prejudical to our interests.

Also during week Pushkin agreed with MacDonald’s earlier proposal for a message from co-chairmen calling on three Princes reach prompt agreement. However, Soviet draft message as initially proposed was not as impartial type of message we would approve. Pushkin is now wrangling with MacDonald over our proposed changes in wording.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–2761. Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to Vientiane and Bangkok, and to London, New Delhi, Ottawa, Paris, Saigon, and Moscow.