194. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs (Johnson) to
the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Bundy)0
Washington,
October 5,
1961.
There is attached a copy of a talking paper from which, within the limits
of the time available, we would propose to discuss the situation in
Southeast Asia with the President this afternoon.1 However, the
principal purpose of the meeting is to obtain the President’s general
approval for the line of action it is proposed that Ambassador Harriman take at Geneva, especially in
bilateral discussions with the Soviets. A copy of the draft instructions
to Harriman (which, as of this
writing, have not yet been seen or approved by the Secretary) is
attached.2
As noted in the paper, other courses of action will subsequently be
discussed, hopefully early next week, with the President.
U. Alexis Johnson3
Attachment4
SOUTHEAST ASIA
Present Situation
A. Laos—Political
- 1.
- With respect Geneva, Soviets continue indicate desire reach
agreement and there is some concrete move forward. However,
there are still some essential points that have not been
resolved at Geneva. These include:
- a.
- The ICC voting
procedure.
- b.
- Adequate authority and functions for the ICC, including fixed teams,
especially on the Viet Minh transit routes into South
Viet-Nam.
- c.
- Communist insistence on withdrawal of SEATO protocol protection
from Laos.
- d.
- Presence of French training mission.
- 2.
- With respect Laos, in spite of
Harriman mission and
urgings from French and U.K.
Ambassadors, Souvanna
Phouma has not as yet agreed to a satisfactory
composition of a government of national unity.
- 3.
- In Laos, there is also not yet anything approaching an
understanding between the parties on the vital question of
demobilization of the various armed forces.
- 4.
- The “three Princes” are meeting at Ban Hin Heup on October 6
to begin discussion of formation of a Government.
B. Laos—Military
- 1.
- While FAR capabilities have
increased and numerically it is far superior to the PL, the enemy still retains military
superiority.
- 2.
- While the enemy has capability of initiating offensive action
any time of his own choosing, he does not yet show any clear
signs of doing so and cease-fire generally remains in effect
although there is some increase in small probing actions on both
sides.
- 3.
- Soviet and Viet Minh supply activities remain at high level
and Soviet air lift has been extended to Tchepone.
- 4.
- There probably have been some Viet Minh withdrawals from
northern Laos but Viet Minh movement into southern Laos
bordering on South Viet-Nam has increased. Thus it appears enemy
may be accepting stalemate for time being within Laos and giving
priority to stepping up offensive action against South
Viet-Nam.
C. South
Viet-Nam—Political
- 1.
- According to Saigon country team, Diem Government has not significantly improved
its political position among people or substantially furthered
national unity.
- 2.
- Also, according to country team, Diem has still not delegated sufficient
authority to field command and country team does not feel that
“September saw progress toward attainment task force goals of
creating viable and increasingly democratic society.”
D. South
Viet-Nam—Military
- 1.
- Although GVN military capabilities have increased, Viet Cong
capabilities are increasing at more rapid rate and Viet Cong
attacks have increased in size.
- 2.
- Viet Cong “regular” forces have increased from about 7,000 at
beginning of year to approximately 17,000.
- 3.
- Viet Cong have moved from stage of small bands to large units.
During September Viet Cong mounted three attacks with over 1,000
[Page 442]
men in each. Viet
Cong strategy may be directed at “liberating” an area in which a
“government” could be installed.
- 4.
- Although vast majority of Viet Cong troops are of local
origin, the infiltration of Viet Cong cadres from North Viet-Nam
via Laos, the demilitarized zone, and by sea appears to be
increasing. However, there is little evidence of major supplies
from outside sources, most arms apparently being captured or
stolen from GVN forces or from the French during the Indo-China
war.
E. Thailand—Political
1. Thailand has indicated increased dissatisfaction with SEATO, desire have a bilateral
defense pact with the United States, and concern that the Souvanna Phouma Government in Laos
will eventually result in the loss of Laos to the Communists. The
internal situation in Thailand remains stable.
F. Cambodia—Political
1. Relations with South Viet-Nam are on the downgrade, with increased
exchanges of mutual recriminations between Saigon and Phnom
Penh.
G. Cambodia—Military
1. Although there have been some Cambodian-Viet Cong clashes within
Cambodia, hopes for improved Cambodian border control of Viet Cong
appear dim at this time.
II. Additional Courses of Action
A. Laos—Political
1. Primarily through Ambassador Harriman, intensify bilateral negotiations with
Soviets with objectives of:
- a.
- Preventing renewal of hostilities in Laos.
- b.
- Obtaining Soviet agreement for an ICC able freely to move and report without an
internal veto and with cooperation of Lao Government, with
particular emphasis upon the infiltration routes from Laos
into South Viet-Nam.
- c.
- An acceptable Souvanna
Phouma Government.
- d.
- Satisfactory arrangements for demobilization and
reintegration of Lao forces, particularly to insure Pathet
Lao do not retain private army.
- e.
- Engaging to maximum Soviet responsibility for fulfillment
of conditions by Communist side.
(There is attached a draft instruction to Ambassador Harriman to carry out the foregoing
objectives.)
Other additional courses of action will subsequently be submitted for
the consideration of the President.
