The principal discussion turned on the recommendations. The Secretary of
Defense pointed out that the recommended actions to improve the military
situation (a) to (i) inclusive would be helpful, but would not be
expected to reverse the unfavorable longer term prospects. He pointed up
the issue of the military desirability of interdicting the Soviet Air
Lift through the additional measures in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c)
versus the State Department’s concern that these measures would greatly
impair the prospects of the political negotiations which they propose to
initiate. The Secretary of State said that he would not reject (a), (b)
and (c) but would want to talk with the U.S.S.R. before undertaking. Furthermore, he would want to
have a strategic appreciation with the British and French of the more
general problem of the security of Southeast Asia before talking with
the U.S.S.R. He felt we may have let
our allies off too lightly by permitting them to isolate the Laotian
problem. He also thought we should increase our support to Thailand and
Vietnam, and seek the creation of a composite SEATO force. In other words, he wishes to smoke out the
real attitude of our allies.
The President expressed concern at the weakness of the local situation in
Laos coupled with the weakness of allied support for our position.
[Page 27]
He proposed that, if the British
and French aren’t going to do anything about the security of Southeast
Asia, we tell them we aren’t going to do it alone. They have as much or
more to lose in the area than we have. General Lemnitzer stressed the vital importance of Laos
to the security of the entire area and to our relations with our
Southeast Asian allies.3
There then followed a more detailed discussion of some of the specific
courses of action. It was my impression, confirmed by a call to
McGeorge Bundy, that we were
authorized, but not directed, to proceed with all the military measures
(a) through (i) as may continue to appear to be wise after further
detailed exploration. Proposal (c) was, however, subject to
clarification by the State and Defense Departments as to the legal
status of the PEO personnel engaged in
this operation and clearance with the French in the field.
On (i) Mr. Rusk pointed out the
great disparity between the risks we may run into in Southeast Asia and
the amounts of money involved in these matters. He hoped the President
would authorize State to work out more flexible arrangements for
handling these matters. The President agreed.
[Attachment]
5
Report Prepared by the Inter-Agency Task Force on Laos
ANALYSIS
I. Current Adverse
Factors
Efforts to achieve U.S. objectives in Laos are handicapped by the
following factors:
- (1)
- An adverse current military situation which is
deteriorating progressively and which could result in the
loss of Paksane and other areas. Time appears to be against
us if we do not increase our support of RLG forces.
- (2)
- An apparent determination on the part of the bloc
countries to take maximum advantage of their present
opportunity in Laos by introducing the necessary military
measures and committing the necessary resources. They may
see victory in sight.
- (3)
- An internal situation in Laos which makes the general
populace and even large segments of the army apathetic
toward the course of events there. The only real
determination appears to reside in the Pathet Lao.
- (4)
- Uncertainty of SEATO
members as to SEATO and
U.S. intentions regarding Laos, caused by failure of SEATO up to this point to
take action in a crisis which appears to have called for
action. This is particularly acute in the case of Thailand,
which would be immediately threatened by the loss of
Laos.
- (5)
- Unwillingness on the part of the British and the
Australians, and even more on the part of the French and New
Zealanders, to support effective SEATO action.
- (6)
- Unwillingness of the French to use their position in Laos
and their military personnel in wholehearted support of the
RLG. Indeed, there is evidence of obstruction, at least on
the part of certain French personnel, to the defense of
Laos. Our own ally is working against us.
- (7)
- Unwillingness on the part of many important free world
countries, particularly South Asian countries, to accept and
deal with the present Lao government, thus diminishing its
general aura of legitimacy.
- (8)
- A generally adverse world reaction to recent United States
actions in Laos and criticism in important circles even in
the United States. There is no important power which would
contribute significant forces to a joint military
intervention in Laos with the U.S., few who would openly
support our intervention. Of those who would, only Thailand
is in a position to provide significant number of troops
quickly. There would be widespread opposition in the U.S. to
committing U.S. troops to support of the RLG.
- (9)
- The geography of Laos, particularly its isolation and lack
of access to the sea, its mountainous-jungle terrain,
absence of railroads, inadequate roads and airstrips. Laos
would be a most undesirable place in which to commit U.S.
forces to ground action.
Measures calculated to achieve U.S. objectives in Laos must reckon
with all foregoing concurrently.
II. Military vs. Political
Approach
Basic to any effective U.S. strategy in Laos is the necessity for
proceeding simultaneously both on the political and military fronts.
This is self-evident since it is unlikely, on the one hand, that
there could ever be a decisive military victory for our side within
the present military and political context, and since, on the other
hand, the success of any attempts on our part for a political
settlement is directly affected by the military situation. As long
as the PL and bloc forces maintain
their present advantage through control of the Plaine des Jarres and
continued success elsewhere, it would be illogical for them to agree
to a weakening of their position without a suitable quid pro quo. If
they succeed militarily, there is no necessity for them to
negotiate.
Indeed, there appears to be no reason, from their standpoint, why the
bloc countries should not capitalize on the opportunities afforded
them by their present situation in Laos to create a puppet state in
at least the northern part of the country, which they could use as a
further springboard against Thailand and Southern Viet-Nam.
III. Possibilities of a Political
Solution
Following are the principal considerations which it is believed are
likely to affect favorably the willingness of the bloc to negotiate
a political settlement:
- (1)
- Evidence of determination on the part of the United States
not to permit a Communist takeover of Laos. This can be
evidenced by the type and level of military support being
given currently to the RLG, and by convincing proof that
increased support will be given in the future. It can also
be evidenced by the deployment of U.S. naval, air and ground
units which would indicate the possibility, if not the
threat, of direct U.S. intervention.
- (2)
- Support of world public opinion, particularly that of the
South Asian neutral countries, of a particularly proposed
political solution for Laos to the point that it would have
gathered such momentum that it would be difficult for the
bloc countries to turn it down.
- (3)
- It is also possible that the Soviet Union may have
uncertainties as to the degree to which, and how, Communist
China might exploit the capture of Laos by Communist forces.
The Soviet Union may feel that this might lead China to an
unpredictable and reckless course of action which would
endanger world peace and upset the balance of power between
them. The Soviet Union may be in a position now to influence
China with respect to their joint policies in Laos because
of the dependence
[Page 30]
of
the Pathet Lao forces on Soviet supplies and airlift. China
may in the future be able to achieve greater independence of
action.
- (4)
- The change in Administration in the United States, which
brings a new President into office with whom Russia has
indicated expectations of dealing with on a more cooperative
basis than the past Administration. Bloc willingness to
cooperate in a Laotian settlement might be highlighted as a
proof of good intentions upon which the incoming
Administration could assess the possibility of its being
able to work with the Soviets. The Soviet Union might be
unwilling to prejudice this possibility so early in the new
Administration. There is risk, on the other hand, in the new
Administration’s committing its prestige and the future of
its ability to work with the Soviet Union to the Laos issue,
where the bloc countries have at the moment such a favorable
situation to exploit.
There is also an advantage to the United States through the fact of
the new Administration, in that there will appear to many critics of
our past policies a potentiality for a new approach. The new
Administration will have an initial momentum which might be an
advantage in its relationship with other countries as well as the
Soviet Union. Most countries should be inclined to give the new
Administration every benefit of the doubt in its attempt to devise
new lines of action to cope with the Laos situation.
IV. SEATO
One complicating factor on the present scene is the ambiguous
position of SEATO. Since SEATO was created to act in
circumstances such as that now existing in Laos and has not acted,
it casts doubt not only on its own integrity but on the reliability
of the United States as its originator. The obvious reluctance of
the British and French and others to take SEATO action with respect to Laos creates general doubt
as to the validity of our case in Laos. SEATO becomes a means whereby restraint is imposed on
us by our allies against action which we might be willing and able
to take unilaterally and which might be generally acceptable.
In view of the great emphasis which the U.S. has placed in the past
on its worldwide treaty system, and the probable effect on other
existing treaties, such as the Central Treaty Organization and even
NATO, we cannot ignore, by-pass or seek to disband SEATO. If we conclude that it is
best, in the light of all circumstances, for SEATO not to act directly on Laos, we
must in the immediate future take action to clarify its position
toward the Laotian crisis by requesting, approving, or at least
acquiescing in whatever unilateral United States action is decided
on. If SEATO is not to play an
important role in the future, it should be progressively
de-emphasized and United States unilateral action substituted for
it, i.e., by a bilateral treaty with Thailand and whatever U.S.
military dispositions are called for by the circumstances.
[Page 31]
A basic problem facing the United States arising out of bloc military
success in Laos, failure of SEATO
to take effective action, and what has appeared to be a
retrogressive series of possible United States actions, is how to
inject a basic strengthening effect into the free world position in
Southeast Asia. This is necessary both to assure the continued
support of Thailand, which must play a role in many of the immediate
additional military actions called for in Laos, and to show U.S.
determination to prevent Southeast Asia from being captured by the
Communists. One way of doing this would be to land United States
contingency forces in Thailand, on Thai request, in such a way as to
give a clear indication that this did not indicate any expectation
or acceptance of the loss of Laos. A careful statement should be
made by the U.S. Government explaining its action as related to its
long range objectives in Laos and Southeast Asia.
V. Additional Military Measures in
Laos
All additional military measures which might be taken now in Laos to
counteract the adverse military situation, within the present level
of escalation, should be pursued vigorously. The only important
additional actions requiring high escalation which might be
considered are
- (a)
- Introduction of Thai and/or other non-U.S. SEATO troops.
- (b)
- Introduction of United States fighters and/or bombers over
Laos.
- (c)
- Introduction of United States ground forces in
Laos.
It is not believed that there is any important advantage to the bloc
at the moment in the degree of their escalation. We both engage in
military supply. We have introduced fighter aircraft to the RLG,
[less than 1 line of source text not
declassified]. They have introduced transports to the
PL. They have introduced DRV personnel. We have introduced a few
[less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] personnel. The principal advantage they hold
is a quantitative one, i.e., their DRV personnel are much larger in numbers and more
effective. Their DRV personnel are
with advanced troops, ours are not. The military effect of our
fighters has been negligible. In other words, we have not taken
advantage of the escalation we have injected.
In considering the possible introduction of additional measures which
could be considered a further escalation, it is not, of course,
necessary to assume that each would be met by the bloc. It is,
however, necessary to analyze whether the introduction of that
particular measure by us would, if met, give the bloc an inherent
advantage.
In considering the possible introduction of Thai troop units [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] consideration must be given to the fact that
the DRV has a very large troop force
available in North Viet-Nam, in the order of 13 divisions, which is
greatly in excess of the number of available Thais, this being in
the order of 3 divisions.
[Page 32]
In considering the possible introduction of U.S. fighter aircraft,
consideration must be given to their relative ineffectiveness in
interdicting supply on the ground. Russian or Chinese fighter
aircraft could probably interdict our air transport as readily as we
can theirs. It must be remembered, too, that the RLG controls the
large cities, road junctions, and supply centers which provide much
better targets for bombing and strafing than are afforded by the
Pathet Lao forces operating in mountainous and jungle terrain.
Although an air war between U.S. and bloc forces over Laos might not
lead to further escalation, the next stage of escalation in Laos
itself, i.e., the introduction of U.S. troops, would be highly
disadvantageous to us in view of the inaccessibility to Laos,
difficulty of supply, greater familiarity with terrain and guerilla
type of warfare on the part of the Pathet Lao and the DRV. The fact that a jungle guerilla
type war is the most difficult type for organized units, combined
with a generally adverse world and U.S. public opinion, would make
this a most difficult step to take, consequently we do not have it
available as a threat if a lower order escalation fails.
VI. Ultimate Political Objectives
in Laos
In supporting any plan for Laos it must be made clear to all that the
United States is willing to accept in Laos any truly neutral
government, i.e., a government not aligned to either power bloc, if
it is committed to protecting itself against subversion. This may
make it necessary to go back to the conditions existing at the time
of the Vientiane Agreements, including at least tacit acquiescence
to Pathet Lao control of Phong Saly and Sam Neua provinces.
The promise of free elections in Laos supervised by neutral
observers, as part of a general plan, would be one of the best ways
of proving to the world the sincerity of our intentions in Laos. We
should in this eventuality be prepared for the election of a certain
number of Pathet Lao representatives. Certainly, however, if there
were a preparatory period during which the Laotian Government gives
evidence to its people that it has something to offer them along
civil lines, there would be no real danger of losing control to
“real”, i.e., Communist dominated, Pathet Lao.
Although it is a question which need not necessarily be faced at the
present time, we might even consider the inclusion of “Laotian”
Pathet Lao in unimportant positions in the government if this should
prove to be a necessary condition. The Soviets are unlikely to agree
to any situation in Laos which would permit the coming to power of a
true pro-Western government. If we are to achieve our objective of
creating Laos as an independent buffer state
we must be willing to abandon this as a possibility, providing we
have assurances that Laos will not fall under Communist
domination.
[Page 33]
VII. Diplomatic Action vis-à-vis
the Soviet Government
The key point in our diplomatic action will be the approach to the
Soviet Union in response to the two oral statements which have been
made, one in Washington and one in Moscow, to the United States
Government by the Soviet Government on Laos.6 It would be highly desirable and conceivably
essential that we should have more assets both military and
political in regard to Laos than we have now before any approach was
made to the Soviet Government. These would comprise (a) a
stabilization of the military situation within Laos, particularly in
the vital areas around Vientiane, (b) a SEATO basis for possible Thai-U.S. action and (c) on
the political side a much wider acceptance among our allies and
friends of the legitimacy of the present Lao Government.
To approach the Soviets under present circumstances would in all
probability invite a sharp Soviet rebuff or at best becoming
involved in a conference along the lines suggested by Prince Sihanouk and supported by
the Soviet Government. It would therefore appear desirable before
approaching the Soviet Government to put into effect military
measures set forth in other parts of this document and endeavor to
obtain SEATO permissive
authorization for U.S.-Thai action. On the diplomatic side a further
effort should be made with our allies and friends utilizing the
prestige of the new Administration and endeavor to line up solid
support for the legitimacy of the present Laos Government.
On the other hand, most careful analysis should be made of the degree
to which these measures will indeed provide us with greater assets,
political and military. If our considered judgment is that they will
not be successful, then we should probably approach the Soviets
without further delay. In other words, we should seek to estimate
whether with the actions now in contemplation we will in effect at a
later date be in a stronger position than we are now as against the
possibility that despite these measures our position will have
worsened.
GENERAL LINES OF RECOMMENDED ACTION
- (1)
- First, all steps that can be taken to stiffen the Laotian
military situation [less than 1 line of source
text not declassified] within the present level of
escalation should be taken and on proper scale. First priority
in personnel, equipment, and funds should be assigned. Previous
preconceptions as to limits of action in relations between U.S.
personnel and the French in Laos and the Thai Government should
be reanalyzed and accommodated to this objective. Proof must be
exhibited to the bloc countries of U.S. determination to back
the RLG both now and in the
[Page 34]
indefinite future. It must be made clear
that we do not intend to permit the bloc to take Laos.
- (2)
- An immediate effort should be made to influence world opinion
favorably toward the RLG and its cause. We should go out to all
friendly countries in the name of the new Administration
strongly urging them to accept and deal with the present regime
in Laos. We should give assurances as to our ultimate objectives
in Laos and at least hint at our plan that would give prospects
for a generally acceptable solution.
- (3)
- Concurrently, strong pressure should be put on France in the
name of the new Administration to cooperate in Laos and in
SEATO toward the
objectives we seek and, after obtaining French cooperation, at
the same time we should approach Britain, Australia and New
Zealand along similar lines. As soon as the cooperation or at
least acquiescence of the other SEATO members has been assured, we should take the
necessary SEATO action
required to make the SEATO
position toward Laos clear and to clear the road for U.S.
bilateral action. The SEATO
Council should call on or at least authorize each member to take
such steps under the SEATO
flag, short of direct national military involvement in
hostilities, which in its judgment is necessary to deal with the
current threat to Laos.
- (4)
- Assuming the situation still justifies it, U.S. contingency
forces should be landed in Thailand, on request of the
Thais.
- (5)
- The U.S. is committed to the British and Canadians to support
the British proposal for return of ICC to Laos should exploratory mission of Indian
representatives prove successful. Since we are convinced that
the Soviets will not accept the text of the proposed reply, or
in the event they do accept that either the Indians or Laotians
will reject it, an alternative line of political action must be
sought.
- (6)
- While the foregoing is taking place, therefore, we should see
that a plan is put forward by the King of Laos for the creation
of a commission comprised of Cambodia, Burma and Malaya under
the chairmanship of Prince
Sihanouk, which will supervise the carrying out a
plan of action that has promise of being acceptable to other
allied and neutral nations, should satisfy any legitimate
international concern of the bloc as to the future status of
Laos, and gives evidence of achieving minimum U.S. objectives in
Laos. This concept should be merged with the concept of the
buffer zone proposed by the King of Cambodia to include Cambodia
and Laos. This proposal should be put to our allies with request
for their support in the most forceful possible way, making full
use of the prestige and momentum of the new U.S.
Administration.
[Page 35]
RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Courses of Action to Improve Military Situation
Phase 1—Action to be taken
immediately
It is recommended that the following military courses of action be
approved and that the timing of their implementation be left to
CINCPAC:
[paragraph (2 lines of source text) not
declassified]
b. The training of additional FAL
personnel and/or units in Thailand.
Action required:
- (a)
- Securing approval of Phoumi and Marshal
Sarit
- (b)
- Guaranteeing all costs
- (c)
- Inform CINCPAC
c. Use of PEO personnel (expanded
members, if necessary) as tactical advisers to FAL units, ostensibly as training
advisers.
Action required:
- (a)
- Clearance with JCS
- (b)
- Secure approval of Boun
Oum/Phoumi
- (c)
- Inform CINCPAC
d. Make use of “silver bullets” and bounty.
Action required:
Inform [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] CINCPAC.
e. Establish a small U.S. logistic support group in Thailand.
Action required:
Clear with JCS.
f. Augment U.S. airlift in SEA in
support of RLG either with contract aircraft [less
than 1 line of source text not declassified] or USAF aircraft.
Action required:
- (a)
- Clear with JCS
- (b)
- Provide funds
g. Substantial augmentation of FAL
airlift by contract (20 H–34s or 43s), improved observation (3 high
altitude helicopters), employment non-Lao commercial pilots and [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] technicians.
Action required:
- (a)
- Clear with JCS
- (b)
- Provide funds
h. Improve SEATO intelligence
collection agency.
Action required:
- (a)
- Clear with JCS
- (b)
- Secure approval of SEATO
Council representatives
- (c)
- Provide funds
i. Make available to CINCPAC and
CHPEO (1) necessary funds to
cover existing deficit from past operations, (2) funds required
urgently for current operations (3) a “drawing account” of ten
million dollars from which to meet special requirements.
Action required:
Approval of a supplementary appropriation to the extent necessary to
cover that portion of the above which cannot be met from current
funds.
Phase 2—Possible additional
military actions
[paragraph (2–1/2 lines of source text) not
declassified]
[paragraph (1 line of source text) not
declassified]
7c. Preparation for commitment of U.S.
aircraft if ChiComs start
fighter escort of airlift.
[paragraph (1–1/2 lines of source text) not
declassified]
e. Removal of restriction on use of bombs and napalm by AT6’s.
[paragraph (1–1/2 lines of source text) not
declassified]
RECOMMENDATIONS
B. Diplomatic Action Vis-à-vis the Soviet
Government
Phase 1—No action to be taken
immediately.
Phase 2—Possible future diplomatic
action.
- (a)
- At such time as the following political and military
objectives have been achieved in Laos (a) a stabilization of the
military situation within Laos, particularly in the vital areas
around Vientiane,
[Page 37]
(b) a
SEATO basis for possible
Thai-U.S. action and (c) on the political side a much wider
acceptance among our allies and friends of the legitimacy of the
present Lao Government, or it has been determined by appropriate
authorities that these objectives are not likely to be attained,
it is recommended that an approach be made to the Soviet
Government pointing out that the continuance of active Soviet
support for armed bands seeking to subvert and overthrow the
armed forces of the legitimate Government of Laos cannot but
render illusory the possibility of fruitful discussion between
the United States and the Soviet Union on other international
questions. This message would urge that Laos be made a test case
of the ability of our two governments to work together toward
peaceful objectives.
- (b)
- If, however, it is determined to utilize [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
combat aircraft to interdict effectively the Soviet airlift, a
formal personal communication should be sent Khrushchev by President
Kennedy announcing
(a) our determination not to permit overthrow of Lao Government
by armed bands sustained and supported from without, and (b) a
coherent plan for a political settlement; in other words,
offering Moscow the olive branch or the sword.
- (c)
-
SEATO
Discuss bilaterally with SEATO members a SEATO program of action including the following
elements:
- (1)
- Visit by SEATO
Secretary General to Laos, who would report findings
to SEATO with copy
to UN.
- (2)
- Holding of a publicly announced SEATO Council meeting
to examine the nature of Communist intervention in
Laos.
- (3)
- Stationing, subject to Thai’s request, of U.S.
military unit (probably a battle group and an air
squadron) at Ehorat. This unit to fly SEATO flag, if members
agree.
- (d)
-
Proposal for Neutral Commission
Explore first with Laos and Cambodia and then with U.K., France and other SEATO members creation of a
neutral commission on following lines:
The King of Laos would invite Cambodia, Burma and Malaya to
constitute a neutral commission.
The terms of reference of the commission might include some
or all of the following elements: recommend a cease fire, a
regrouping of contending forces to positions allocated in
the Geneva accord, an amnesty, a cessation of outside
military supplies, a broadened Laotian Government and
possibly free elections.
- (e)
-
Direct Pressure on Our Allies for
Solidarity
Messages to friendly countries emphasizing the importance the
new Administration places on concerted action in face of
growing general threat and specifically urging coordinated
support of RLG.
[Page 38]
POLICY TOWARD LAOS
Problem
To arrive at a sufficiently precise determination of broad policy
toward the Laotian situation to give (a) guidelines for planning and
action and (b) to leave necessary room for flexibility and
initiative to those having specific subordinate
responsibilities.
Background Considerations
- a.
-
Internal Political Situation
The King, the Boun Oum
government, and the Phoumi forces appear to be the only Laotian
leadership presently available to give cohesion to the
forces resisting a pro-Communist take-over of Laos. A
broadening of the political base of the government, however,
appears desirable.
- b.
-
Internal Military—Political
Situation
Continued control of the Plaine des Jarres would give the
Pathet Lao—Kong Le
forces a dominant strategic situation, threatening
simultaneously Luang Prabang, Vientiane and Pak Sana. From
this dominant strategic position, the symbolic centers of
authority in Laos could be isolated and overrun and the
country could be cut in half by a thrust to the Mekong
River. Such a development of the military threat could
mature in a matter of days.
Ambassador Brown
reports a psychological weariness on the part of the
Boun
Oum-Phoumi elements which could result, if there
are further military reverses, in a spreading collapse of
the Laotian will to resist.
- c.
-
External Political Situation
The Soviet Union has recognized the Souvanna Phouma group as
the legitimate government, has recognized a Pathet Lao group
as constituting the legitimate provincial government in the
Plaine des Jarres area, and is overtly supplying the Pathet
Lao forces with an expanding airlift.
The French have supported Souvanna Phouma overtly, and Kong Le covertly, and have
not recognized the Boun
Oum government.
The British have separated themselves from our policy, are
avoiding their SEATO
commitments and are seeking the role of middleman between us
and the Communists.
The other members of SEATO
are prepared to give Laos varying measures of
support.
- d.
-
The External Military—Political
Situation
Communist Assets
The North Vietnamese can continue and increase the type of
support they are giving the Pathet Lao. In addition to
support of the Pathet
[Page 39]
Lao with cadres and supplies they could draw upon their
13 divisions and 16 regiments for “volunteer” intervention
forces.
The Chinese Communists could give massive support, either
through so-called volunteers, or overtly.
The Soviet Union’s logistic lines are long, but her
capabilities for varied forms of support obviously
immense.
Western Assets
Thailand has assets which could be committed to Laos [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified]. Thailand has three divisions, one regimental
combat team, one ranger battalion, and 128 aircraft in tactical
units (33 jets) from which forces could be drawn for [3 lines of source text not declassified].
South Viet-Nam possesses seven divisions, one airborne group, and 88
aircraft in tactical units. They have no jets and only 15 fighters
and 30 transport aircraft. Their Air Force Chief, however, has
indicated a willingness to use his AD–6 aircraft on ground attack
missions.
The Philippines have only one division with a low level of combat
readiness, and 68 aircraft in tactical units (37 jet fighters).
Pakistan has seven divisions and 120 aircraft in tactical units (73
jet fighters). SEATO Plan
5–608 calls for the commitment
of one brigade group and one squadron of F86’s by Pakistan and she
has announced her readiness to make such a commitment.
The United States can provide air support from carriers or from bases
in Thailand. A battalion of Marines currently afloat could be
introduced in 3–6 days. An airborne Army battalion group in Okinawa
could be introduced in approximately the same time. This would leave
the remainder of the Marine Division on Okinawa and the remainder of
the Army Division in Hawaii as possible commitments from CINCPAC’s resources.
Factors Governing the Commitment of These
Assets
It is possible that increased Western [less than 1
line of source text not declassified] support would be met
by increasing Vietminh and Communist Bloc support along present
lines.
It is possible that overt commitment of Thai, South Vietnam and or
Philippine and Pakistani forces would be met by overt support from
the Vietnamese with backing from other members of the Communist
Bloc.
[Page 40]
It is likely that the overt introduction of U.S. forces would bring
in Communist Chinese volunteers with backing from other members of
the Communist Bloc.
BROAD POLICY ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE
The present crisis in Laos can be viewed as being one of a number of
focal points at which over-all U.S. policy is in confrontation with
Soviet bloc policy. Many of the interrelated basic elements of that
confrontation bear directly on the Laotian crisis and in turn will
be affected by its outcome.
The basic objectives of U.S. policy include the maintenance and
strengthening of our alliances, the maintenance of a firm position
versus the Soviet leadership coupled with a willingness to
negotiate, and the maintenance of control over the risk of nuclear
war either with Communist China or the USSR.
In Laos itself our immediate aim is to enable the RLG to reestablish
firm political control over the population and communication
centers. We have no aim to include Laos in any military system but
on the contrary would accept and support its neutralization.
It does not appear that this aim can be obtained without increased
external aid and support of the RLG from without Laos.
The broad policy alternatives facing the U.S. involve the manner in
which we decide to carry out our basic policies in support of our
local aim in Laos.
[1 paragraph (6–1/2 lines of source text) not
declassified]
Another range of alternatives is to mobilize a far higher degree of
political support from our allies for the RLG. This would require a
very specific commitment of the new Administration’s initial
potential with the French and the British.
A third range of alternatives involves those specific, but relatively
minor actions, which can improve the prospects of the RLG of
restoring political control in the essential areas, without raising
risks of escalation or substantial changes in the present position
of our major allies.
A concrete policy would be unlikely to fall clearly in any one of
these ranges of alternatives but would combine elements of all
three. Emphasis in one direction or the other will, however, be
important to our over-all policy.
