236. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State0
1496. Rome eyes only Attorney General. Reference: Embassy telegram 1487 to Department.1 In hour and half informal coffee session alone with President Sukarno this morning he said he would “get over” his injured personal feelings (details regarding which are being conveyed by Attorney General) but made it unmistakably clear that he was not prepared to move forward on WNG question in way Kennedy has asked.
On other hand, Sukarno appealed to US Government to be “more assertive” on WNG issue.
“Give me one positive thing I can go back to my people with to show them where America stands” he said. “America says we are friends with both sides. This is not the America I know historically. This is not the America of the revolution or the America of Abraham Lincoln. The WNG question is a question of right or wrong. The America I know has always stood for what it thought was right regardless of consequences”.
President did not commit himself on Pope matter but neither did he back away from previous position. I appealed to him not to let personal pique affect his attitude on questions important to US-Indonesian relations as well as to personal relations between Presidents of the fourth and fifth largest nations in the world. I expressed briefly personal and official regret at what had happened, pointed out that Attorney General Kennedy [Page 534] had apologized to President Sukarno for moment of temper and that I trusted there was an end to the matter.2
I presented to him handwritten letter from Attorney General thanking him for his hospitality written just before plane takeoff.
Sukarno replied that he had accepted Attorney General’s apology; he had indeed told Kennedy it was okay but that Djuanda was furious. He added some reports regarding incident had already leaked out and his own position might be difficult.
He commented he could not understand why humanitarian considerations should be so important in Pope case when American justice executed people by gas or electric chair without considering feelings of their families. I indicated question had now become question of good faith between two Presidents, that he understood political realities, that if issue got to floor of Congress and on front pages of newspapers it would not only result in embarrassment of administration which not responsible but as case became cause celebre would make it more difficult for us to be helpful in WNG affair. I emphasized that these were two completely separate questions, there was not and could not be any element of trading involved on either side. Practical fact, however, was that US press was already urging administration to take Dutch side in WNG affair as result of demonstrations against Embassy in Djakarta and Consulate in Surabaya. Furor over Pope case could only result in exacerbation this feeling, something I was convinced none of us wanted and which could be injurious to important causes. I urged President to look ahead to future, consider Pope case in this light, think about tremendous possibilities for cooperation between our two countries after WNG issues had been settled as I was confident it would be settled.
As for Sunday’s brief altercation, I said I knew it was too trivial to be taken seriously by Sukarno against background of big picture. I explained close personal relationship of affection, regard and confidence between two Kennedy brothers, related how Bob Kennedy had dedicated his life ever since World War II to political career of his brother, how hardly day went by that brothers were not on direct telephone connection between their offices discussing vital issue of day. Attorney General’s emotion should be understood in this context—he felt his brother was being let down, and he lost his temper for a moment as we all do occasionally—indeed, as Djuanda had on same occasion. Sukarno [Page 535] nodded, said he understood this; as I was aware, he had not taken brief outburst as seriously as others. I said I was glad to hear this, had been confident all along he would take long view, as friend of Indonesia I could say without hesitation this was attitude in interest of his own country.
Sukarno then turned to West Irian question. Indicating he regarded our conversation up to this moment as primarily personal and unofficial, said he had something official to convey.
“I am not satisfied with merely an agenda item on subject transfer of administration to WNG,” he said. “I want to be clear on that.”
I said I assumed he was saying what he had said before that he wanted assurances that Dutch were willing to negotiate in good faith on this issue.
“Not only that” he replied, “I want a clear understanding that the purpose of the meeting is to negotiate the basis of transfer of administration to Indonesia. I will not settle simply for an item on the agenda. The Bob Kennedy proposal is not satisfactory.”
Sukarno made this statement just as aide signalled him other visitors were waiting and he rose, indicating time interview was at end. Consequently I had no opportunity to probe further as to what he meant although statement on its face appeared to be repetition of what Sukarno had said Sunday as reported paragraph 6 reference telegram. As such it would represent slight whittling down of his final position as we understood it at end of conversation.
It may have been just as well this statement was made, perhaps deliberately, at end of interview. Sukarno was not in his best mood, said he had only four hours sleep. Had we discussed point further he might have committed himself in wrong direction to greater extent than we or he would desire.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/2–2062. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated niact to Rome.↩
- In telegram 1487, February 18, Jones reported on his and Robert Kennedy’s last meeting with Sukarno on the morning of February 18 and their discussion on West New Guinea. Jones summarized the discussion as follows: “Upshot was that Indonesians would drop requirement for preconditions provided agreement could be reached with Dutch on agenda before formal talks commenced. Preparation for formal negotiations should be worked out at secret sessions where both parties could talk freely without embarrassment. In response our objection that Dutch wanted third party present, Indonesians agreed accept third party if they could be assured of secrecy. They would accept US but not U Thant representative, since leaks bound occur in UN atmosphere.” (Ibid., 656.9813/2–1862)↩
- According to telegram 1492 from Djakarta, February 19, Robert Kennedy engaged in a heated exchange with Sukarno on February 18 when Sukarno refused to put a date on the release of Pope. According to Jones, Robert Kennedy “expressed himself in forceful terms as dissatisfied.” Jones learned from Foreign Minister Subandrio that Sukarno planned to free Pope in 4 or 5 weeks, but he did not tell Robert Kennedy because he did not wish to appear to be responding to pressure. Sukarno would inform President Kennedy directly of his decision. (Ibid., 298.1122-Pope, Allen Lawrence)↩