After consultations with George
Yeh and many hours talk 14 October with Chiang Ching-kuo who was constantly
referring substance to Gimo we hammered out a draft of proposed
confidential understanding between President Chiang and President Kennedy which Gimo has seen and will agree to if advised
it is acceptable to President Kennedy.
2. Draft understanding is verbatim as follows:
A. US will not vote for admission of Outer Mongolia to UN.
B. President Kennedy will at early
opportune time to be agreed issue public statement as follows:
“The United States has always considered the GRC the only rightful government representing China and has
always given full support to the position and to all the rights of that
government in the UN. Therefore the
United States firmly opposes the entry of the ChiComs into the UN or into any of the components of the
C. President Kennedy will give
President Chiang the following
private assurance through diplomatic channels:
“I wish to assure you that if at any time a US veto is necessary and will
be effective in preventing Chinese Communist entry into the UN, the US will use that veto.”
This assurance will be given with the explicit understanding that it must
be kept wholly private since public disclosure of such a pledge at this
time would adversely affect the common US-GRC interest in preserving the free world position in the
UN and keeping the ChiComs out of
D. The GRC will not use the veto against
Outer Mongolia's admission to the UN.
3. If you advise me these four points are acceptable to President
Kennedy then Gimo will invite
me for private conference where he will definitely commit himself to
this reversal of position on Outer Mongolia. Strongly urge approval of
wording on public statement as this is by far most innocuous of many
formulations discussed. It seems to me reiteration of technical
juridical position of US on ChiRep issue.
4. Gimo says he expects great local political difficulties including
necessity Prime Minister to resign. Gimo will have big convincing job to
do. Therefore requests one week's time for this job between US public
statement and resumption UN Security
Council consideration Outer Mongolia. If draft proposal approved by two
Presidents public statement should be made soon thereafter providing
only Gimo is informed of timing in advance via this channel.
5. Gimo says private assurance should not be in form of letter because in
China this would imply lack of trust between two correspondents. In fact
Gimo says he is willing approve this difficult change in GRC policy only because he has great
confidence in friendship of President Kennedy and wishes build close personal understanding
between two men. Suggest private assurance be delivered orally by
Ambassador Drumright as
diplomatic message from President Kennedy.
7. If President Kennedy approves
this draft proposal and notification reaches me during next twelve hours
believe Gimo will see me 15 October and give his firm commitment, this
line of action.
*Source: Kennedy Library,
National Security Files, Countries Series, China, General, CIA Cables 7/61-10/16/61. Top Secret;
Eyes Only. Transmitted from the Central Intelligence Agency to the
White House, where it was received at 9:01 a.m. on October 14. It
does not indicate the time of transmission from Taipei.
1Reference is apparently to
Bundy's Out Smilax 3 message, cited in footnote 1, Document 71. Cline's first message in this
series, sent on October 13, reported that he had discussed the
subject of Bundy's October 11 message with
Chiang Ching-kuo and had
arranged to discuss it with George
Yeh. In his second message, sent on October 14,
Cline reported that he
had talked to Yeh, who was
to see Chiang Kai-shek that
day, and commented that he thought a public statement by Kennedy coupled with the proposed
private assurances would persuade Chiang to
withhold the veto. (Ibid.)
2Bundy's Out Smilax 3 message, cited in footnote 1, authorized Cline to inform Drumright.