Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXI, Africa

316. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara⁰

JCSM-528-63

Washington, July 10, 1963.

SUBJECT

• US Policy Toward Portugal and Republic of South Africa

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the problems set forth in the memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA, I-24800/63, dated 2 July 1963,¹ subject as above, and express the following views.

2. The US policy toward Portugal and the Republic of South Africa, when reviewed in relation to the independent countries of Africa, must take into account the relative importance to the over-all US strategy of military requirements in the entire area.

3. The importance of Portugal lies primarily in the importance of US base rights in the Azores, and secondarily in the membership of Portugal in NATO. Loss of the Azores would seriously degrade the responsiveness, reliability, and control of major US forces. With regard to air transportation to Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, costs in tonnage and time would be raised appreciably, with a direct effect on limited war or contingency actions. [2 lines of source text not declassified] Loss of support for antisubmarine patrol aircraft would require the addition in wartime of increased Hunter-Killer forces. Defense Communications System radio facilities at Lajes provide an important communications route between the United States and the Europe/North Africa/Middle East areas. Logistic support facilities in the Azores are also important.

4. The divisive effect on NATO of further censure of Portugal cannot be dismissed. At a time when the Alliance is already strained, the withdrawal of Portugal as a result of affronts by her Allies could dangerously weaken our efforts to revitalize NATO.

5. The peacetime contribution of the Republic of South Africa to US security is considerably less important than that of Portugal. There is a missile tracking station there, but the chief interest lies in its strategic location in relation to the rest of the African continent, the ocean approaches to other areas, and its potential value in contingency operations because of its seaports and airfields. Also of importance are its industrial complex, skilled labor, and strategic materials.

6. North Africa, as the southern flank of the Mediterranean, is of great strategic importance to NATO and to access routes to the Middle East. Two of three important US installations remaining in Africa are in North Africa: the Naval Communications facility at Kenitra, Morocco, and Wheelus Air Base in Libya. The third is a major communications site in Ethiopia.

7. Sub-Saharan Africa is of secondary importance to US military strategy. The armed forces of independent nations in that area are scarcely able to maintain internal order. There is, however, a need to deny the area to the Sino-Soviet Bloc because of the natural resources and the flanking geographical position of Africa in relation to Europe, the Middle East, and South America. Consequently, the United States must be prepared for contingency operations alone or within the framework of the United Nations, and efforts to extend US influence should be continued in every feasible manner including economic and technical assistance programs, and limited but selected military assistance programs. We should not, however, yield to blackmail.

8. There is concern that the African nations will form a solid front in supporting resolutions in the UN Security Council calling for severe measures against Portugal and the Republic of South Africa. If such action occurs, positive US support for Portugal and the Republic of South Africa could threaten continued use of US facilities in Morocco, Libya, and Ethiopia. Development of a solid front on this question would appear unlikely. Despite the adoption of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Charter and the many manifestations concerning African unity, there is a real demarcation between Moslem Arab North Africa and Negro Sub-Saharan Africa. There are indications that the Addis Ababa Conference and the OAU Charter were of greater interest and importance to the Negro Africans than to the Arab North Africans. Thus, any US position which favored Portugal or the Republic of South Africa would undoubtedly have greater impact on Negro Africa than on Arab North Africa.

9. Consideration of any UN resolutions should be consistent with the provisions of the Charter. Thus, measures which advocate (a) elimination of colonial rule by force, (b) support of military or subversive action in any of the territories or countries, or (c) interference in internal affairs of legally established governments, should be resisted as being inconsistent with the principles of the Charter.

10. A detailed evaluation of US base requirements on Portuguese and African territory is attached as Appendix A hereto.² Included are discussions of missions, importance, possible alternatives, and effects of alternatives or loss of the bases. A brief discussion of the potential of the armed forces of Portugal and South Africa is attached as Appendix B.³

11. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that:

a. For the foreseeable future, the US requirements in the Azores are of primary strategic importance by comparison with those in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, North Africa is also of major importance because of its geographical position and its relationship to Southern Europe and the Middle East.

b. The need to deny the African continent to the Sino-Soviet Bloc is a basic consideration. Sub-Saharan Africa, while now of secondary importance, may eventually become of increased strategic value because of location and natural resources. Consequently, denial of the area to the Sino-Soviet Bloc is important, as is true of the rest of Africa.

c. Sweeping generalizations should not be made in dealing with African problems, as conditions and interests vary widely in diverse regions of the continent.

d. If a resolution is directed against Portugal and South Africa jointly, the United States should endeavor to have the issues separated to permit more rational consideration of them. Not only are our strategic interests and military requirements very different in the two countries, but the issues which would be of concern to the United Nations are different.

e. In order to protect vital US strategic military interests in the Azores and avoid further weakening of the NATO Alliance, the United States should resist the institution of strong measures against Portugal. Such a course of action would be justified by the improvement which has taken place in Portuguese policy, and progress made in Angola and Mozambique.

f. Any resolution directed against the Republic of South Africa should be examined upon its merits, and harsh and irresponsible castigations should be avoided, in keeping with the peaceful purposes expressed in the UN Charter.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Maxwell D. Taylor⁴
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, South Africa, 6/6/63-7/12/63. Secret.
1. Not printed.
2. Attached to the source text but not printed.
3. Not attached to the source text.
4. Printed from a copy that indicates Taylor signed the original.